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I. INTRODUCTION
Ambiguity serves a legislative purpose. When legislators perceive a need
to compromise they can, among other strategies, "obscur[e] the particular
meaning of a statute, allowing different legislators to read the obscured
provisions the way they wish."1 Legislative ambiguity reaches its peak when a
statute is so elegantly crafted that it credibly supports multiple inconsistent
interpretations by legislators and judges. Legislators with opposing views can
then claim that they have prevailed in the legislative arena, and, as long as
courts continue to issue conflicting interpretations, these competing claims of
legislative victory remain credible.
Formal legal doctrine, in contrast, frames legislative ambiguity as a
problem to be solved rather than an opportunity to be exploited. Toward that
end, judges and scholars have developed an arsenal of interpretive techniques
that are designed to extract functional meaning from ambiguous statutory text
and conflicting legislative history. The Supreme Court regularly addresses the
question of statutory interpretation in its opinions and offers guidance as to
I. ABNER J. MIKVA & EPIc LANE, LEGISLATIVE PRocEss 779-80 (1997). Compromise
can, no doubt, also be achieved through a variety of techniques that do not require legislative
ambiguity, such as logrolling. Moreover, not all examples of legislative ambiguity are the
consequence of a need to compromise. Ambiguity can, for example, arise as a result of
inadvertence or change of circumstance. Our analysis recognizes these alternative
techniques for achieving compromise and rationales for ambiguity, but focuses on instances
in which ambiguity is clearly attributable to the legislative need to compromise. See infra
Part II.
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2000); NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONsTRucTION (5th ed. 1992); Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpretive Statutory
Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585 (1996).
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appropriate rules of construction.3 If these interpretive techniques are effective,
then different judges faced with the challenge of construing a fixed piece of
legislative text and history should produce consistent interpretations.
Legislators, staffers, and lobbyists are, however, well aware of the
judiciary's interpretive technology.4 If the judiciary can predictably ascribe a
consistent meaning to a record that legislators intend to be ambiguous, then
ambiguity's value as a tool of compromise is lost. Legislators therefore have
an incentive to develop a technology of ambiguity that can frustrate the
judiciary's most effective interpretive methods.5
Judges are similarly aware of legislative techniques that are used to
frustrate the judicial imputation of clear meaning 6 Judges can respond by
strengthening their own interpretive technology in order to frustrate the
legislature's efforts to obscure.7 Not all scholars are persuaded, however, that
the judiciary is as committed to interpretive consistency as the formal canon
suggests.8  A judicial preference for flexible standards of statutory
interpretation over more rigid rules can, for example, be viewed as consistent
with a preference for discretion.9 More broadly, judges who value the ability to
exercise discretion would also rationally prefer ambiguous statutory
language. 10 Indeed, there is evidence that judges also practice conscious
ambiguity as part of the art of judging when courts rely on vague language or
avoid critical issues in order to craft decisions that maintain judicial
3. For a discussion of these principles, see infra Part III.
4. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 34 (1997) ("Nowadays,
however, when it is universally known and expected that judges will resort to floor debates
and (especially) committee reports as authoritative expressions of 'legislative intent,'
affecting the courts rather than informing the Congress has become the primary purpose of
the [legislative history] exercise.").
5. We recognize that it is meaningless to speak of congressional or judicial intent as
though each branch had a single, coherent point of view when, in fact, each is composed of
individuals with a wide range of often conflicting incentives. Instead, when we speak
generally of legislative or judicial incentives, we mean only to suggest the existence of
coalitions in each branch that have reason to behave in a manner consistent with the
described tendency.
6. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 4, wherein a Supreme Court Justice describes the
techniques used by legislators to frustrate and influence judicial interpretation of statutory
language.
7. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388-91 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In his concurrence, Justice Scalia criticizes the
majority opinion for even mentioning legislative history that supports the statutory language,
and he reasons that such a citation is "harmful, since it tells future litigants that, even when a
statute is clear on its face, and its effects clear upon the record, statements from the
legislative history may help (and presumably harm) the case." Id. at 391.
8. See infra Part lL
9. "Standards authorize a judge to bring his intuitions of policy to bear on the decision
of a case. Rules tell him not to." RICHARD A. PosNER, OVERCOMING LAw 134 (1995).
10. Id.
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coalitions. 11 The Supreme Court's strongest proponent of precision in statutory
construction, Justice Scalia, has gone so far as to observe that the high court has
the ability to write an opinion "so that it says almost nothing," if that suits the
Court's purpose. 12
The legislative and judicial branches thus appear to be locked in an
interpretive battle. The legislature has a clear incentive to value ambiguity
because it facilitates compromise. The judiciary has crafted an array of
interpretive rules designed to extract consistent meaning from intentionally
ambiguous statutory utterances. There is debate, however, over the strength of
the judiciary's incentive to apply rigorously its own interpretive technology.
The result of this conflict between the branches is a rational expectations
equilibrium in which each branch's strategy must take the other's into
account. 13
Which force prevails? There is no theoretical reason to expect that the
legislative ability to obscure will systematically defeat the judicial capacity to
interpret, or vice versa. The question is essentially empirical. It is also
historically and textually contingent. Accordingly, there may be periods during
which, with respect to specific interpretive issues, one branch's technology
more completely dominates the other, only to find the situation reversed during
other periods.14
11. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (2000).
12. Dahlia Lithwick, Shecky Scalia's Yuk Fest, SLATE, Feb. 28, 2001, at
http:l/slate.msn.com/courtlentries/0l-02-28101710.asp (describing oral argument before the
United States Supreme Court in Good News Club v. Milford Central School District, 533
U.S. 98 (2001)). In Good News Club, Justice Scalia criticizes the decision below for
creating ambiguity by failing to discuss a Supreme Court precedent that was squarely on
point and that was fully briefed. Justice Scalia further observes that when it came time for
the Supreme Court to draft its own decision in the matter, the Court retained the ability to
write its opinion "so that it says almost nothing." Id.
13. By "rational expectations equilibrium" we mean only to suggest that an equilibrium
solution to the battle between the legislative incentive to obscure and the judicial incentive to
interpret must take into account the fact that each branch acts with full awareness of the
strategic responses available to the other. We do not mean to specify any specific form of
equilibrium, such as a Nash equilibrium. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H.
GERTNER & RANDALL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 23, 27-28 (1994); PETER C.
ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 118, 187 (1986); STEvEN M. SHEFFRIN,
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS (2d ed. 1996).
14. Consider, for example, the ambiguity that arises when Congress fails to specify
whether a statute will support an implied private right of action. A change in the
composition of the Supreme Court in the 1970s was correlated with the adoption of a new
rule that prohibited the inference of a private right of action absent clear congressional intent
to imply such a right. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979) (holding there is a limited private right of action under Investment Advisers Act to
void an investment advisors contract, but implying no other private causes of action);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (holding there is no private cause of
action under provision of Securities and Exchange Act requiring broker dealers to keep
[Vol. 54:627
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Testing whether the legislative ability to obscure trumps the judicial
capacity to interpret is no easy matter. A rigorous test of this hypothesis
requires the identification of a statute that was enacted as a result of a
compromise rooted in willful rather than inadvertent legislative ambiguity.
That statute's text and legislative history would then also ideally be subject to
repeated judicial interpretations that are unconstrained by controlling
precedent. If the courts were to coalesce quickly on a uniform interpretation of
the statute then, on the facts of the statute presented, the judicial ability to
interpret would prevail over the congressional capacity to obscure. On the
other hand, if the courts were to disagree over the proper interpretation of the
statutory language, and if their interpretations remained diffuse over time, the
congressional capacity to obscure would prevail.
An appropriate sample for such analysis is unlikely to arise at the Supreme
Court or circuit court level. Because the Supreme Court rarely has occasion to
interpret the same statutory language more than once, any analysis of Supreme
Court practice in statutory construction will fail to control for variations in text
and legislative history across different statutes. This is, we believe, a
significant constraint on the usefulness of Supreme Court decisions as a
database for the analysis of interpretive technology. No doubt, a Supreme
Court decision interpreting an ambiguous statute constitutes a final decision on
the question presented.' 5 The finality of such a decision does not, however,
imply that the judicial ability to interpret has trumped the legislative capacity to
obscure. The legislature and judiciary are involved in a repeat game process;
i.e., the Supreme Court must interpret many ambiguous statutes over time. The
legislative capacity to obscure can prevail in this larger "super-game," even if it
is preordained to fail when the Supreme Court interprets individual statutes, as
long as the Supreme Court's ultimate decisions are random over a series of
records and file reports with Securities and Exchange Commission); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975) (holding there is no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610). But see
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognizing private cause of action under
Title IX even though none is expressly defined). See generally Joseph A. Grundfest,
Disimplying Private Rights ofAction Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's
Authority, 107 HARv. L. REV. 961, 992-96 (1994). The consequence was to make it more
difficult for legislators to argue that ambiguity expressed in the form of silence could later
support the imputation of a private right of action. This shift by the high court temporarily
tilted the balance of power on this one interpretive issue away from the congressional ability
to obscure and toward the judicial capacity to interpret with precision. No doubt, ambiguity
on this question is reintroduced over time as the legislature learns to generate conflicting
signals as to whether it "intends" to imply a private right of action, but this evolutionary
process only underscores the contingent nature of the question posed.
15. The decision may, however, create a new set of ambiguities that lead to another
round of litigation or to legislation designed to undo the Court's interpretation. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
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independent statutory interpretations. 16 The contours of a splintered opinion in
an individual Supreme Court case can also provide insight into the legislature's
ability to frustrate the Court's interpretive technology. 17 A five-four split more
strongly supports a legislative ability to obscure than a unanimous
interpretation, but such information is at best suggestive.
Circuit court decisions are a better source of insight regarding Congress'
ability to obscure. When circuits split over the interpretation of identical
statutory text and legislative history, the simple existence of the split suggests
that Congress has introduced some level of ambiguity into the interpretation of
the statute at issue. The number of circuits that split, the number of differing
interpretations that arise, and the contours of the circuit splits provide
additional useful information about the congressional ability to obscure. The
small number of circuits and rules of intra-circuit stare decisis suggest,
however, that appellate decisions will also be too few to support formal
statistical analysis.
A sample sufficiently large to permit formal statistical analysis of the
legislative ability to obscure as pitted against the judicial capacity to interpret is
thus likely to arise only if district courts have an opportunity to write a
sufficiently large number of opinions interpreting a single ambiguous text
before the circuit courts or the Supreme Court issue controlling precedent.
District courts are generally the first (and sometimes the last) tribunals to
interpret a particular federal statute. Their interpretations often represent the
"law" of a statute for the first few years after a statute's enactment. If a
sufficiently large number of unconstrained district court interpretations of a
fixed statutory and legislative history can be gathered, then such a sample could
support formal statistical analyses that pit the judicial ability to interpret against
the legislative capacity to obscure. Such a sample could also provide insight
into whether, for a particular statute, the resolution of statutory ambiguity has a
material predictive effect on the disposition of cases. The sample could also
allow for tests of various "legal realist" hypotheses. These tests could
determine whether the patterns in individual judges' approaches to legislative
ambiguity can be explained by an array of exogenous factors, such as a desire
16. Because participants in the legislative and judicial process repeatedly bargain with
each other over time they are able to trade off favorable results in one situation for
unfavorable results in another. Ambiguity can thus be defined in the "small," in the sense
that a specific statute is interpreted inconsistently, or in the "large," in the sense that
individual statutes may be interpreted consistently but that different statutes are interpreted
differently over time. The latter strategy is consistent with a logrolling or vote-trading
equilibrium over time. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 13, at 56, 89-94. For a discussion of the
importance of repeat games, or "super-games," in the legal process, see BAIRD ET AL., supra
note 13, at 15-18, and KEITH KREHBiEL, PIVOTAL POLITICs: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING
(1998).
17. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget It Is an Inkblot We Are
Expounding: Section 10(b) as Rorschach Tes4 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 41 (1995).
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to control judicial docket loads, the characteristics of litigants in an individual
proceeding, or the political affiliations and pre-confirmation experiences of the
individual judges interpreting the ambiguous legislative record.
We believe that the "strong inference" provision of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA" or "Reform Act") 18 satisfies the
requirements necessary for a formal statistical analysis of the sort just
described. In an attempt to discourage meritless securities fraud litigation, the
PSLRA requires that private plaintiffs, in addition to satisfying the specificity
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite
state of mind."19  The interpretation of this "strong inference" pleading
requirement has become one of the most contested issues in federal securities
law.20
As explained below, the "strong inference" provision can be viewed either
as clear on its face or as subject to significant uncertainty. The legislative
history leading to the enactment of the "strong inference" provision is also
exquisitely conflicted as key actors in the legislative process, representing
diametrically opposed interest groups, articulated inconsistent interpretations of
the standard. The record further supports the conclusion that the PSLRA would
not have been enacted but for a conscious agreement to disagree over the
proper interpretation of the "strong inference" provision. The net result of
these competing efforts was a statute and legislative history designed to
frustrate doctrines of judicial interpretation as a price of enactment.
But did the competing congressional constituencies succeed in their efforts
to obscure the statute's meaning? We have identified thirty-three appellate
decisions interpreting and applying the "strong inference" standard. We have
also identified 167 district court decisions that were rendered prior to the
issuance of controlling appellate precedent, each of which interprets the same
"strong inference" standard. Each of the judges in this sample faced the same
mix of text and legislative history. Each confronted the challenge of using a
common set of interpretive tools to impute meaning to a common legislative
record. The structure of this sample thus distinguishes our study from previous
empirical analyses of statutory interpretation that fail to hold constant the text
and history subject to analysis.2I
18. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Jordan Eth & Daniel S. Drosman, The Private Securities Litigation
Refonn Act: Five Years Young, 34 SEC. & COMMOD. REG. REP. 153, 160-61 (2001).
21. The closest analogue we are aware of is Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew
P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998). This study differs from ours, however, in that it
examines a question of constitutional interpretation-the constitutionality of the Sentencing
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This Article proceeds in four parts, and is accompanied by an appendix.
Part II frames the legislative and interpretive process as a series of games. It
analyzes legislators' motivations for the use of ambiguity and describes
legislative means for creating ambiguity. Part II also describes the judiciary's
interpretive technology, and explores incentives that the courts may have to
acquiesce in legislative ambiguity. Part Im traces the legislative history of the
PSLRA's "strong inference" provision, explaining how competing factions in
Congress introduced multiple conflicting interpretations of the "strong
inference" standard, and why such ambiguity was necessary for the statute's
enactment.
Part IV analyzes thirty-three appellate court decisions interpreting the
"strong inference" standard. We find that the circuits are split into three
distinct interpretive camps. We also find that panels within the same circuit
have adopted conflicting interpretations of identical language, that the courts
often differ in the application of the identical standard to a common set of facts,
and that a new split has emerged as to whether the "strong inference" provision
applies in resolving motions for summary judgment as well as motions to
dismiss. We conclude that, on these facts, the congressional ability to obscure
prevails over the judiciary's ability to interpret at the appellate level.
The Appendix to this Article reports on an empirical analysis of 167
decisions by district courts resolving motions to dismiss on the basis of the
"strong inference" standard. We find that a large number of judges practice a
strategy of judicial minimalism by ruling on motions to dismiss without
interpreting the statutory language. They conclude that the complaints at issue
are either so well crafted that they satisfy the strongest interpretation of the
standard or so poorly drafted that they fail the weakest interpretation, without
ever defining the standard. Among judges who address the question, behavior
in the aggregate is consistent with a coin-toss model of decision-making in
which judges first toss a fair coin to determine whether the "strong inference"
standard incorporates the Second Circuit standard, the weakest interpretation of
the heightened pleading standard, or requires a stricter interpretation. If the
coin lands heads, the judge adopts the Second Circuit standard. If the coin
lands tails, the judge tosses it again to decide between an intermediate standard
and the strictest of the three standards, the Silicon Graphics standard. The
district court data thus reinforce the conclusion that the legislative capacity to
obscure has here defeated the judicial capacity to interpret.
The Appendix also reports on statistical tests of a wide variety of "legal
realist" hypotheses that search for patterns in judicial behavior that might
explain the selection of an interpretive standard or the resolution of the
Guidelines-rather than a question of statutory interpretation. It therefore does not implicate
the relationship between Congress and the courts because the judges in that study are
constrained primarily by prior judicial precedent, not by text and legislative history.
[Vol. 54:627
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underlying motion to dismiss. The dominant conclusion of this analysis is that
the data must be interpreted with great caution. The significance of individual
explanatory variables is highly contingent on the specification of the underlying
model and on the regression technique employed. There is, however, no a
priori theory that supports any one model specification or statistical approach
over any other. We therefore test a large number of model specifications and
apply a range of statistical techniques in a search for patterns in the data. This
approach opens us to the legitimate criticism that we have engaged in a form of
"data mining." We respond by observing that our online statistical appendix
reports all regression results, even those that are statistically insignificant, and
that we consider relationships to be analytically meaningful only if they are
statistically significant across a large number of alternative specifications. We
also observe that this approach is preferable to one that focuses solely on
specifications and techniques that generate the largest number of statistically
significant relationships because such an approach is likely to exaggerate the
true incidence of statistically significant relationships, particularly given the
absence of an underlying theory that could be used to impose structure on any
of the statistical models.
With this cautionary language firmly in mind, our multivariate analysis
appears to support the conclusion that, when it comes to selecting an
interpretive standard, judges who sit in busier districts (measured in terms of
docket load per judge) and judges who sit in districts that hear more cases
involving high-technology issuers (measured in terms of the number of
decisions involving high-technology issuers per judge sitting in that district)
tend to adopt pro-defendant interpretations of the "strong inference" standard.
These observations are consistent with a "docket control" hypothesis (judges
adopt stricter standards in order to make it easier to dismiss cases and thereby
clear their dockets more quickly) and with a "technology is different"
hypothesis (complaints filed against high-technology issuers are, all other
factors being equal, weaker than complaints filed against other issuers). We
also find that judges appointed by Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon tend to
adopt pro-plaintiff interpretations of the "strong inference" standard. This
latter observation is inconsistent with a pure Democrat-Republican
dichotimization of the bench. It instead suggests that, to the extent political
factors correlate with judicial decisionmaking, it may be necessary to adopt a
more refined description of the judicial process.
With respect to the resolution of the underlying motions to dismiss, the
multivariate data again suggest that district court judges who sit in busier
districts, and in districts that hear more cases involving high-technology
defendants, tend to issue pro-defendant rulings on motions to dismiss. The
analysis also suggests that judges who have ruled on multiple cases in our
database are even more strongly inclined to issue pro-defendant rulings on
motions to dismiss. This finding is consistent with the observation that, in the
Apr. 2002]
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world of class action securities fraud litigation, familiarity breeds skepticism on
the bench. The data also suggest that the definition of the pleading standard
helps explain the outcome of the motion to dismiss, but that other variables can
be more significant than the precise specification of the pleading standard in
explaining the resolution of the underlying motion. This finding is consistent
with the observation from the appellate data that there is substantial plasticity in
the application of the "strong inference" standard to a given set of facts, but
that stricter interpretations of the standard are nonetheless correlated with a
more frequent incidence of pro-defendant rulings.
Part V concludes with the observation that, on the text and legislative
history of the "strong inference" provision, the congressional ability to obscure
thrashes the judicial capacity to interpret. Although we must be cautious in
generalizing from a study that examines the interpretation of two words in a
single statute, the thoroughness with which Congress is able to flummox the
courts suggests a much broader observation. It is entirely rational that, in the
repeat game between Congress and the courts, both branches prefer a degree of
ambiguity that can sustain mixed-strategy equilibria.22 It follows that efforts to
articulate more consistent and precise rules for statutory construction could be
doomed to failure whether those rules are described as textualist, intentionalist,
expressive, dynamic, or of any other form. Those rules could be doomed to fail
in practice not because they are illogical or incorrect in any sense, but because
they seek to impose a degree of uniformity in interpretation that is inconsistent
with the equilibrium relationship between the legislative and judicial branches.
Put another way, an unresolvable measure of ambiguity may be part of the
essential fabric of our legal regime. Efforts to impose greater precision than the
underlying political structure can bear may lead nowhere because the political
equilibrium between the judicial and legislative branches may benefit from a
base level of interpretive ambiguity.
Thus, even if the courts could invent a magic black box that processed
statutory text and legislative history to produce a precise and predictable
formula for the interpretation of any legislative language, there would be good
institutional reasons for Congress not to want the courts to use that black box.
There also would be good reasons for the courts not to want to use it.
Ambiguity, we think, may have strong survival characteristics in our multi-
branch legal regime that relies on political compromise within and among the
branches in order to function.
22. A "mixed strategy" is one in which the players react randomly according to a
formula designed to optimize their objectives over time. See, e.g., BAIRD Er AL., supra note
13, at 37-39, 42-43; ORDESHOOK, supra note 13, at 133, 136-37, 182.
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II. INTERPRETATION, AMBIGUITY, AND EQUILIBRIUM
The concept of "bargaining in the shadow of the law" is now a staple of
legal analysis.23 We suggest that the crafting and interpretation of statutory
language involve a simultaneous bargain in which the legislative and judicial
branches negotiate in each other's shadow.
A. Ambiguity and Mixed Strategies
The process of statutory design and interpretation can be modeled as
involving three "games." First is a "legislative game" in which a legislature
develops a coalition sufficiently large to support passage of a bill over the
threat of any credible veto. Second is a "judicial game" in which courts engage
in the act of judging, and thereby interpret the statute enacted by the legislature.
Third is an "interactive-interpretive game" between the legislative and judicial
branches over the interpretation of statutory language and legislative history.
The notion that legislators are involved in a repeat process game when they
enact statutes has been extensively explored in the literature. 4 Legislators
trade votes, manipulate agendas, stack committees and subcommittees, and
participate in procedural ploys-all to achieve their legislative objectives 25
The notion that judges are also involved in a "game" when they decide
cases has been expounded by Judge Richard Posner, but has received far less
attention.26 Posner suggests that the act of judging can be described as a game
in which judges seek to maximize a judicial utility function subject to the
condition that their expression of "policy preferences and personal
convictions" 27 comports with the rules of judicial process. Posner
distinguishes the "rules of judging" from the "rules of substantive law, to which
the community is subject but to which judges in their judicial capacity relate
differently, as law givers and law appliers.2 8 He describes the rules of the
judging game as being "institutional" and recognizes that different judges may
have differing conceptions of those rules. Thus, "[s]ome judges play by
'activist' rules, others (a larger number) by rules of 'restraint' because those
rules are more congenial to the legal profession's self image.'2 9 These rules
23. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
24. See, e.g., KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORWATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991);
KREHBIEL, supra note 16; ORDESHOOK, supra note 13.
25. See, e.g., KREHBrEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION.
26. POSNER, supra note 9, at 109-44.
27. Id. at31.
28. Id. at 133.
29. Id.
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are also often "uncertain or contested,"30 and can be driven by processes of
professionalization and socialization and by a desire not to be reversed on
appeal. 31 Indeed, it is only "because judges play by the rules of the judicial
game"32 that their behavior can be predicted, thereby allowing "legislatures [to]
control judicial behavior, though not perfectly, by substituting rules ... for
standards. '33 Posner further observes that "[b]ecause obedience to the rules
laid down by the legislature is itself a rule of the judicial game, a legislature can
expect a fair degree of compliance by the judges with its rules even though
there is no sanction for noncompliance. 34
The observations that legislators are aware of the rules by which judges
play the judicial game and that legislators rely on those rules as part of the
legislative process presage the third game: the game between the legislature
and the courts over the proper interpretation of statutory language. While a
growing literature models the relationship between Congress and the courts,35
no scholarship appears to focus on the role of statutory ambiguity in that
relationship.
Broadly speaking, the equilibrium solution to any game can be described as
involving either "pure" or "mixed" strategies.3 6 A participant adopting a pure
strategy follows a precisely defined decision rule: If another player does x the
response is y. A player adopting a mixed strategy follows a probabilistic rule:
If another player does x then the response is y with a probability ofpy, z with a
probability of pz, and so on. These mixed strategies are often analogized to a
rule that tells a player "what dice to throw in order to choose an action. 3 7
Players who are able to follow mixed strategies will always be able to find
equilibria that are no worse than those available to players who are constrained
to follow pure strategies. Mixed-strategy players may also be able to find
30. Id. at 129.
31. Id. at 128-36.
32. Id. at 134.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme
Court Statutory Decision with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 87 (1996); Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision
Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 361 (2001); MeNolIgast,
Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995); James Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling
Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. Sci. 84 (2001); Jeffrey Segal,
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL.
ScI. REv. 28 (1997).
36. See, e.g., DREW FUNDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 5 (1991) (describing a
mixed strategy as a "probability distribution over pure strategies"); Epic RASMussEN, GAMES
& INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 66-67 (3d ed. 2001).
37. RASMUSSEN, supra note 36, at 67.
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equilibria in games that have no equilibrium if players are constrained to follow
pure strategies.
The distinction between pure and mixed strategies has direct application to
the process of statutory design and interpretation. If Congress seeks to adopt a
statute that will be interpreted by the courts as a rule providing precise
direction, then Congress must apply techniques that generate a pure strategy in
the interactive-interpretive game between the judiciary and the legislature. Put
another way, in order for the judiciary to apply a statute uniformly, Congress
and the courts must both agree to follow a pure strategy: If Congress says x
then the courts will do y. This pure strategy can exist only if rules of statutory
construction in the judicial game are sufficiently well defined by the Supreme
Court that the legislature can predict with adequate certainty how a rule-based
statute will be applied by the courts.
In contrast, if Congress decides that it must compromise and employ
ambiguous, standards-based language in order to enact a piece of legislation,
then the courts must agree to interpret the statute ambiguously in order for
Congress to achieve its desired result. In that event, the equilibrium is a mixed
strategy: If Congress says x then the courts might do y with a probability py, or
z with a probability pz, etc. The observation of inconsistent judicial
interpretations of the statutory language would then be viewed as the successful
implementation of a mixed strategy that reflects an ambiguity born of
compromise rather than the failure of the judiciary's interpretive technology.
To be sure, the probabilities and ranges of actions associated with such mixed
strategies need not be entirely random from the legislative or judicial
perspective. By modulating the legislative text and history, the legislature can,
given the prevailing rules of statutory construction, constrain the range of
choices that the judiciary is likely to express as part of its mixed strategy and
thereby influence the frequency with which a specific interpretation is likely to
be adopted by the courts.
We are thereby able to formalize the notion of statutory ambiguity.
Statutes that are rules-based, precise, and unambiguous are expressed as pure
strategies in the interactive-interpretive equilibrium between legislatures and
courts. Once enacted, these statutes should give rise to consistent judicial
interpretation. Statutes that are standards-based and adopted as a consequence
of a compromise rooted in ambiguity are expressed as mixed equilibria. Once
enacted, these statutes should give rise to a range of potentially inconsistent
interpretations that reflect the ambiguity intended by the legislative bargain.
Significantly, a credible mixed-game strategy is possible for the legislature
only if the judiciary does not have a technology of interpretation so effective
that it can ascribe a consistent, precise meaning to even ambiguous statutory
text. The existence and implementation of such a strategy by the judiciary
would render legislative compromise through ambiguity impossible.
The technology of statutory construction is thus central to the structure of
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equilibrium in the game between Congress and the courts. This
conceptualization of the legislative and interpretive process calls for greater
exploration of the incentives for precision and ambiguity among legislators and
judges alike.
B. Legislative Incentives for Ambiguity
Within the boundaries set by the Constitution, and subject to the veto
power of the Executive, Congress can dictate any policy outcome it desires.
When a statute's text is clear, its plain language is supposed to control its
interpretation.38 It is a familiar story, however, that Congress sometimes does
not provide a clear answer in the text of the statute to questions that courts must
answer in order to resolve disputes.
There are several entirely innocent and socially responsible rationales for
certain forms of legislative ambiguity. At one extreme, Congress might not
even recognize that it is creating ambiguity. It might also fail to legislate with
precision because it wishes to avoid cluttering the statutory text with excessive
detail. Apart from aesthetic concerns, Congress may lack the foresight and
expertise needed to specify every last jot and tittle of a rule in the text of the
statute, and it could be inefficient for a legislature even to try?9 Congress
could also rationally decide that a legislative scheme will work better if
discretion is delegated to the courts to resolve disputes according to flexible
standards, even though the resulting flexibility generates foreseeable
inconsistency in application. Legislating through standards may require
ambiguity in the legislative language to confer that flexibility40 Ambiguity
can also arise over time as a consequence of unforeseen technological,
economic, or social developments. Ambiguity can, however, also be the result
38. See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("[I]n
interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others.
We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.").
39. See Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert
Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAMD. L. REv. 1243, 1314 (1999) ("It is
tempting to say that one should try to make all rules as explicit as possible, in order to
maximize the stability, predictability, and democratic accountability of the legal system. In
reality, explicitness is like other human goods: it is valuable, but costly to produce and
suffers from diminishing returns.").
40. There are limits to the flexibility that Congress can confer in a statute; an
excessively ambiguous statute might violate the nondelegation doctrine. See David M.
Driesen, Loose Canons and the "New" Nondelegation Doctrine (Apr. 19, 2001) ("If a statute
itself does not properly delegate the needed authority to the judiciary, because it lacks an
intelligible principle, then the statute's existence may not justify judicial construction. A
lack of an intelligible principle might suggest that there is 'no law to apply' in resolving a
case."), at Working Paper Series 53, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_
id=267351.
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of a need to compromise in order to accumulate a majority (or a veto-proof
supermajority) in support of legislative action.
Indeed, it is not unusual for competing factions of Congress to "agree to
disagree" in the drafting of a statute.4 1 Congress is made up of 535 individuals
who represent divergent interests. When faced with a conflict among
competing legislative coalitions, carefully crafted ambiguous language can
allow legislators with divergent interests to adopt competing, inconsistent
interpretations of the same statutory text. Legislators can point to the statutory
text and legislative history that supports their favored interpretation, even
though contradictory interpretations are equally plausible. In that event, the
statute will develop "multiple personalities" as competing constituencies cite
the same enactment in support of fundamentally irreconcilable positions. Each
constituency can hope that its position will ultimately prevail, and ambiguity
thereby expands the circle of winners in legislative battles, at least temporarily.
If Congress succeeds in creating such ambiguity, then determining which
position will ultimately prevail is deferred until the Supreme Court decides the
question, assuming that the Court even agrees to hear the question-an
increasingly tenuous assumption given the growth in legislative output and the
limited size of the Supreme Court's docket. Once the Supreme Court
adjudicates the matter, the contours of the debate may change dramatically, but
the dispute is not necessarily resolved. The Supreme Court's decision can itself
generate a new range of ambiguities for the lower courts to resolve. The
Supreme Court's decision can also provoke a new round of legislative activity
designed to undo or modify the Court's decision. 42 Supreme Court review thus
poses a natural limit, though not always a hard stop, to Congress' ability to
endow a statute with multiple competing personalities. By the time the Court
decides, however, individual legislators may have left Congress, putting them
beyond the wrath of disappointed supporters. Alternatively, legislators on the
losing side may be able to blame the Court's willfulness for their constituency's
defeat, and perhaps solicit additional contributions from the losing constituency
to overturn the Court's decision with a new statute. Ambiguity thus allows
legislators to claim short-term victory, and to shift accountability for a potential
eventual defeat to the courts.43 Interest groups may not be taken in by such
41. See ABNER J. MIKVA & EPic LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2 (1997) ("Some compromises result in a
proposed provision being omitted from a statute, some result in changes in existing
language, some result in additional (sometimes redundant, sometimes conflicting) language
or provisions, and some result in clear statutory language purposely being made unclear.").
42. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 15.
43. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988) ("[W]hen a
legislator cannot avoid conflictual demand patterns, she will try to satisfy all the relevant
interest groups through a compromise statute acceptable to all concerned. If this cannot be
accomplished, the legislator's next-best strategy will be to support an ambiguous law, with
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rationalizations, but they may reasonably prefer the compromise inherent in
ambiguous language over the potential for defeat that could occur if they
pressed for a more favorable but precise locution. The compromise facilitated
by statutory ambiguity can thus represent an essential legislative device for
reconciling conflicting policy positions.
C. Judicial Responses to Ambiguity: The Formalist Perspective
Formal legal analysis views ambiguity as a problem to be solved, not as an
opportunity to be exploited. The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to
begin their analysis with the "plain language" of a statute. According to the
Court's doctrine, that is also where the inquiry should end if the "plain
language" is clear. Courts "may resort to a review of congressional intent or
legislative history only when the language of the statute is not clear.'44 But if
Congress is bent on creating ambiguity, it can seek to craft language that is
neither "plain" nor "clear." Moreover, a meaning that is plain to one judge may
be obscure to another.
In the absence of "plain" or "clear" meaning, courts resort to legislative
history.45 This reliance on legislative history has come under attack in recent
details to be filled in later by courts or agencies. In that way, the legislator will be able to
assure each group that it won, and then will be able to blame a court or agency if subsequent
developments belie that assurance.").
44. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
45. Empirical studies of judicial reliance on legislative history have focused primarily
on the Supreme Court. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294 (1982);
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351 (1994); Randall W. Quinn, The Supreme Court's Use of Legislative History in
Interpreting the Federal Securities Laws, 22 SEc. REG. L.J. 262 (1994); Jane S. Schacter, The
Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:
Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond 51 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1998);
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Cour4 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277
(1990) [hereinafter Wald, Sizzling Sleeper]; Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195 (1983)
[hereinafter Wald, Observations]; Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1073 (1992).
These studies have shown considerable fluctuation in the frequency with which the
Supreme Court relies on legislative history. For example, Judge Wald found that the Court
used legislative history in virtually all of its statutory interpretation opinions during the
1981-1982 Term. Wald, Observations, supra, at 195, 197. When she repeated her study for
the 1988-1989 Term, however, the percentage of statutory interpretation cases making
substantive use of legislative history had fallen to 75 percent. Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra,
at 288. Tom Merrill found that the number had fallen still further by the 1992-1993 Term,
with the Court relying on legislative history in only 18 percent of the cases. Merrill,supra,
at 355. Thus, for a time it appeared that legislative history might disappear from the Court's
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years.4 6 Critics have worried that once courts leave the text of the statute to
examine its legislative history and seek to divine the accompanying legislative
intent (assuming that it even makes sense to speak of the collective intent of a
legislature engaged in strategic compromise), the potential for confusion only
expands.47
There are, moreover, many different and potentially inconsistent sources of
legislative history. Empirical studies of Supreme Court opinions suggest that
all of these sources are relied upon to one degree or another. For example, in
an analysis of Supreme Court opinions from 1938 to 1979, Jorge Carro and
Andrew Brann found that House Report, Senate Report, and Congressional
Record citations (primarily to debates) far outnumber other documents.4 8 Nick
Zeppos found, in a random sample of statutory interpretation cases from 1890
to 1990, that "congressional reports appear in 32 percent of the cases,
congressional debates in 16.9 percent of the cases, and congressional hearings
in 12.6 percent of the cases."49 Thus, while legislative reports, particularly
conference committee reports, carry the most weight with the Court,5 0 other
sources are also influential.
The Supreme Court has adopted a variety of doctrines for determining the
relative weight that courts should give to the different forms of legislative
history.5 1 These doctrines are described as guides for courts in determining the
meaning of statutes.52 The Supreme Court presumably offered these guides in
opinions. More recently, however, Jane Schacter found that the decline of legislative history
has been reversed. Studying the 1996-1997 Term, she found that the Court cited legislative
history in 49 percent of its statutory interpretation cases. Schacter, supra, at 15. So
legislative history continues to matter to the Supreme Court, although perhaps not as much
as it once did. Lower courts, wary of reversal, are therefore likely to bolster their opinions
with references to legislative history to show that their decisions are consistent with
legislative intent.
46. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 69 (1994) ("When the text has no answer, a
court should not put one there on the basis of legislative reports or moral philosophy-or
economics! Instead the interpreter should go to some other source of rules, including
administrative agencies, common law, and private decision.").
47. See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note 1, at 757-97.
48. Carro & Brann, supra note 45, at 299 (finding that these sources constitute 65
percent of legislative history sources cited).
49. Zeppos, supra note 45, at 1093. Randy Quinn found a similar hierarchy of sources
in securities cases decided by the Court. Quinn, supra note 45, at 265-66 ("The materials
discussed by the Court, in order of frequency of occurrence, include committee reports,
hearings, prior drafts, post-enactment materials, and floor statements.").
50. See Wald, Observations, supra note 45, at 201 ("Committee reports indeed remain
the most widely accepted indicators of Congress' intent. Conference committee reports and
statements of floor managers are considered particularly weighty.").
51. We discuss those doctrines and apply them to the specific example of the
legislative history of the Reform Act's pleading standard in the next Part.
52. Which, of course, assumes that there is meaning to be discovered. That may not
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the hope that lower courts would reach the same interpretation that the Supreme
Court would reach if it addressed the question.5 3 Critically, however, those
doctrines are styled as presumptions, with no source of legislative history
taking absolute priority over any other. For example, conference committee
reports are ordinarily entitled to the greatest weight,54 but courts can place
greater weight on other sources when they consider those sources more
relevant. As a result, the rules that the Court relies upon to determine the
relative weight to be given to different pieces of legislative history are
inherently plastic. If the rules of statutory construction actually confer
discretion, then judges are free to approach legislative history with a great deal
of flexibility.
The diversity of sources relied upon by the Supreme Court has important
strategic consequences for Congress. Members of Congress clearly are aware
that legislative history provides a menu of means by which they can signal their
preferences to the courts. They therefore attempt to sneak interpretations into
footnotes of reports, insert statements into the Congressional Record
contradicting the interpretation found in the committee report, and engage in
colloquies intended to influence judicial interpretation.55 Because the Court
relies on presumptions rather than strict rules of priority to determine the
weight to be given to sources of legislative history and because courts have
flexibility in deciding when a rule or presumption applies, the result of this
legislative gamesmanship can be a legislative history that offers no clear
direction on congressional intent. Why, then, would courts rely on such
unreliable and manipulable evidence?
D. Judicial Responses to Ambiguity: The Institutional Perspective
Formally, the interpretive techniques of statutory construction may be
motivated by a desire to generate consistent interpretations of statutory text.
always be the case. See Grundfest, supra note 17, at 42.
The demand for judicial interpretation of legislative inkblots has spawned a cottage industry
that generates rules, standards, and principles for the interpretation of vague or incomplete
legislative language.... But no matter how cogent, this literature cannot paper over the fact
that many principles of statutory construction are, at root, efforts to impose meaning where
there is none.
Id.
53. Schacter, supra note 45, at 13 ("The interpretive resources that appear in Supreme
Court opinions help to set the boundaries for statutory interpretation by legitimating
particular resources and approaches. Further, the Court's opinions offer guidance to lower
courts, lawyers, and litigants.").
54. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 n.7 (1986) ("We have repeatedly
recognized that the authoritative source for legislative intent lies in the committee reports on
the bill."); MIKVA & LANE, supra note 41, at 36.
55. All of these stratagems allegedly were employed in the crafting of the Reform
Act's legislative history. See infra notes 114, 118, 140, 144 and accompanying text.
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Pragmatically, judges, including Supreme Court justices, may value a level of
discretion that conflicts with the formal goal of precision. The formal judicial
emphasis on discerning a statute's "clear meaning" may therefore not
accurately reflect the judiciary's true objective function.
Judge Harold Leventhal's cynical view, so delightfully phrased that it has
become a clich6 in articles on legislative history, suggests that citing legislative
history is akin to "looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.'5 6
Perhaps judges who rely on legislative history do so because they value their
own ability to exercise discretion and can always find a "friend" in the
legislative history. Moreover, as long as the Supreme Court is not too choosy
about how you pick your friends, the standards of statutory construction can
still allow substantial room for the exercise of discretion.5 7 Indeed, the
doctrines supporting the use of legislative history are so flexible that even
advocates of the use of legislative history concede that it can or should be
ignored if it does not help in interpretation.58 A skeptic might thus suggest that
the courts rely on legislative history because it can be manipulated to give
judges maximum freedom in interpreting statutes. If so, rules of statutory
interpretation are unlikely to produce a determinative answer when Congress
has enacted an ambiguous statute.
Assessing the possibility that the dominant rules of statutory construction
fail to constrain (or only weakly constrain) judicial discretion requires a theory
of judicial behavior. Federal judges are cut off from the usual incentives of
monetary gain and the quest for reelection. Explaining and predicting their
behavior is therefore a difficult task.59  Academic theories of judicial
motivation have revolved around two competing models: (1) the "attitudinal
model," a descendant of legal realism popular among political scientists, which
holds that judges decide cases in ways that further their ideological preferences;
and (2) the "legal model," a descendant of legal formalism, favored more often
by judges and legal scholars, which holds that judicial decisions are derived
from reasoned arguments based on traditional legal tools such as text and
56. As reported in Wald, Observations, supra note 45, at 214.
57. See Zeppos, supra note 45, at 1124 ("The sheer range of sources of perfectly
acceptable pedigree means that judges will rarely have to stray too far to find support for
even their most controversial conclusions.").
58. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 862 (1992) ("One can easily find examples of vague or conflicting
legislative history. The critics do so, and they cite them.... Logically, the argument is open
to the response, 'If the history is vague, or seriously conflicting, do not use it.' No one
claims that history is always useful; only that it sometimes helps.").
59. See generally Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Reassessing the Role of the
Independent Judiciary in Enforcing Interest-Group Bargains, 5 CONST. POL. EcoN. 1 (1994)
(describing difficulties Congress has in controlling judges); Richard A. Epstein, The
Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L.
REv. 827 (discussing institutional constraints on judicial self-interest).
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precedent.60 Political scientists claim empirical support for the attitudinal
model,61 and it can be said to have attained the level of an article of faith in that
discipline.62 More recently, law professors have begun to test the claims of the
attitudinal model as empirical work has become a more important part of legal
scholarship.63 These studies have provoked some rather heated responses by
60. Lee Epstein & Tracey E. George, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision
Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323 (1992).
61. See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS (1996); see also Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the
Decision To Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 238-39 nn.128-30 (1999)
(collecting studies).
62. Rowland and Carp, for example, ask the rhetorical question: "Does anyone
doubt... that the Clinton appointees to the district courts will be more supportive of civil
rights claims and underdog claims in general than are their brethren appointed by Presidents
Reagan and Bush?" ROWLAND & CAR, supra note 61, at vii-viii.
63. See Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1995) (studying effect of judicial attitudes on civil rights cases); James J. Brudney, Sara
Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the
Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999) (studying
the effect of judicial background on appellate court review of NLRB decisions); Frank B.
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (studying
adherence to precedent in judicial review of agency decisionmaking); Frank B. Cross &
Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical Assessment of Supreme
Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741 (2000) (studying federalism
decisions by the Supreme Court); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of
Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991)
(studying effect of judicial attitudes on outcomes in racial discrimination suits); Tracey E.
George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998) (studying decisions by en banc courts of appeals); George, supra
note 61 (studying decisions to grant en banc review); Joseph D. Keamey & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court 148 U. PA. L. REV.
743 (2000) (studying effect of amicus briefs on Supreme Court decisions); John R. Quinn,
"'Attitudinal" Decision Making in the Federal Courts: A Study of Constitutional Self-
Representation Claims, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 701 (1996) (studying decisions on assertion of
right of self-representation by criminal defendants); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (studying effect of
ideology on judicial review of EPA action); Richard L. Revesz, Strategic Voting on the D.C.
Circuit?: A Case Study of Challenges to Health-and-Safety Regulation, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001) (studying the effect of the composition of Congress on D.C. Circuit
review of agency decisions); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and
Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging
Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992) (studying effect ofjudicial background on
anti-discrimination suits); Sisk et al., supra note 21 (studying district court decisions on the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines).
John Allison and Mark Lemley do not control for ideological influences in their
empirical study of patent validity decisions because the Federal Circuit is so heavily
Republican and because of their skepticism that ideology has much influence on patent law.
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity
Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 745, 752 n.27 (2000).
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federal judges defending the paramount role of formal legal sources in judicial
decision-making.64
The gap between the formalist norms of the legal model, requiring
adherence to external authority, and the realpolitik of the attitudinal model,
positing that judges pursue ideological preferences, is potentially quite large. If
the rules of statutory construction are sufficiently flexible, however, legislative
history may provide judges with a means to bridge that gap. Indeed, even those
judges who defend the formalist model concede that judicial attitudes play a
role when the traditional tools of decision making provide no clear answer.65
Legislative history, when filtered through the Supreme Court's potentially
elastic rules governing its use, can allow legislators to provide judges with
useful materials to justify their decisions, without actually constraining those
decisions.66 Legislators may be able to politicize judicial decision-making
simply by injecting ambiguity into statutes and their accompanying legislative
histories. To paraphrase Judge Leventhal, perhaps legislators use legislative
history to provide "friends" to judges who share their policy outlook. The real
battle, then, in the creation of legislative history, is the contest between the
opposing factions to provide like-minded judges with more and better
interpretive "friends."
How can this factional infighting be reconciled with the formalist norms
that judges espouse? As previously suggested, Judge Posner's
conceptualization of judging as a game produces a useful frame of analysis6 7
In Posner's model, judges rely on traditional legal materials in deciding cases
because deciding within the rules is an important part of what makes judging
challenging and interesting. Posner's model comports with the notion of
64. See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circui 84
VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998); Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 235 (1999). Revesz replies in Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C.
Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REv. 805 (1999). See also
ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 61, at 17 ("[T]he assumption that all federal trial judges are
motivated by extralegal, personal preferences is contrary to what studies of judicial role
models have concluded, and it also gives offense to judges themselves, who consistently
deny such an assertion.").
65. See Wald, supra note 64, at 236 ("I register something of a ho-hum reaction to the
notion that judges' personal philosophies enter into their decision making when statute or
precedent does not point their discretion in one direction or constrain it in another. Judges
would be rudderless ships if we did not steer through uncharted and murky waters by some
sense of conscience or some core of personal beliefs.").
66. Cf Schacter, supra note 45, at 54 ("[L]egislative history can be... seen as one
source of information and guidance-among many-in a pragmatic exercise. It is neither a
source that trumps language, nor one that.., is entitled to dispositive weight as evidence of
singular intent that most often does not exist.").
67. POSNER, supra note 9, at 131 ("The pleasure of judging is bound up with
compliance with certain self-limiting rules that define the 'game' ofjudging.").
Apr. 2002]
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
professionalism common to participants in many learned activities 6 8 Any hack
can decide a case according to his knee-jerk reaction to the issue presented; it
takes real skill and judgment to decide the case on a legal basis. The elasticity
of legislative history can thus be viewed as expanding the boundaries of the
game, particularly when statutory text is ambiguous. Judges must necessarily
interpret statutes in the course of resolving disputes. The judge who relies on
congressional intent as expressed in some portion of the legislative history
when interpreting a statute cannot be criticized as willfully flouting the clear
language by his fellow judges or lawyers because he can point to external (i.e.,
formal) authority in support of his decision.6 9 This flexibility allows the judge
to further his policy preferences while maintaining the professional
respectability that comes with reliance on formal legal authority7 0 If a lower
court judge finds himself being reversed on an issue of statutory interpretation,
his fellow judges are unlikely to think that his failure to focus in on the favored
portion of legislative history shows incompetence or willfulness. Perhaps just
as importantly, being able to point to an external source for the decision
(particularly one with its source in the democratically elected legislature)
allows the judiciary to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the
other branches of government.71
68. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994).
69. See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-
Making, 75 B.U. L. Rv. 941, 973 (1995) ("The appearance of operating according to set
rules and under external constraints also is important to judges (individually and as a class),
as it insulates them against many types of criticism. While 'I was only following orders'
may not be a complete defense in all circumstances, it has strong intuitive appeal."); see also
Cornell W. Clayton, Separate Branches-Separate Politics: Judicial Enforcement of
Congressional Intent, 109 POL. SCi. Q. 843 (1994-1995); Lori Hausegger & Lawrence
Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory
Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. Sci. 162 (1999).
70. See PosNER, supra note 9, at 131 ("Playing by the rules is also consistent with
judges' often voting their policy preferences and personal convictions. For in our system the
line between law and policy, the judging game and the legislating game, is blurred. Many
cases cannot be decided by reasoning from conventional legal materials. Such cases require
the judge to exercise a legislative judgment, although a more confined one than 'real'
legislators are authorized to exercise."); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial
Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions; 44 DUKE
L.J. 1051, 1058 (1995) ("[J]udges who ignore clear craft norms in order to pursue an
outcome orientation are likely to suffer a loss of respect among fellow jurists, lawyers, and
the public.").
71. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251, 272-73 (1997) (discussing
the perception of external constraints on decisions as being essential to judicial legitimacy).
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E. Equilibrium
Based on these observations, we hypothesize an interactive-interpretive
equilibrium in which the forces that are charged with seeking clarity (the
judiciary) are arrayed against forces that prefer ambiguity (the legislature).
Each is, moreover, acting "in the shadow" of the other, because each institution
understands the incentives that govern the other's operation 72 Without delving
further into the incentives facing each branch, there is no reason to conclude
that, at any one point in time or with respect to any specific statutory language
or history, the forces of ambiguity will prevail over those that seek precision.
The incentives facing the legislature, however, are clear. Legislators want
to be able to compromise by enacting ambiguous statutes. A statute is credibly
ambiguous only if the judiciary lacks an interpretive technology that can
quickly ascribe precise meaning to the text and legislative history.
The incentives facing the judiciary are more complex. The formalist canon
calls for precise rules of interpretation and consistent application of these
interpretive principles. However, institutional factors and personal proclivities
suggest a judicial preference for standards over rules and for ambiguity over
precision in statutory design and interpretation.
The legislative preference for ambiguity can be effective only if the
judiciary cooperates by not adopting interpretive techniques that are too strict.
Otherwise, the mixed strategies necessary to attain ambiguous compromises
would be impossible. If this analysis is correct, then the equilibrium between
the legislative incentive to obscure and the formal judicial interpretive norm
may well be tilted in favor of the legislature's goal of ambiguity because that
result promotes judicial objectives as well 73 Judicial tolerance of legislative
ambiguity could then reflect a mutually advantageous exchange between the
legislative and judicial branches.
Although this theoretical perspective suggests that the forces of ambiguity
have an advantage over the goal of interpretive consistency, the question
remains empirical. Testing the nature of this equilibrium requires the
identification of a statute that was crafted to be ambiguous in order to
72. This notion of equilibrium extends only to situations involving intentional
legislative ambiguity. It does not seek to address interpretive challenges raised by the
natural limits of language; changed social, economic, technological, or legislative
circumstances; legislative oversight; ambiguity consistent with an intent to delegate to any
administrative agency or other sources of interpretive confusion. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36 (2d ed. 1994); David Lyons, Open Texture and the Possibility
ofLegal Interpretation (Apr. 18, 2000), Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 99-
9, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=212328.
73. See Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of
Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REv. 561, 602 (1989) ("[I]f there is a reigning jurisprudence among the
judges of the day, the legislature will be more effective in writing its statutes if it knows
what this jurisprudence is and how to exploit it.").
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implement a legislative compromise. It then requires the analysis of a large
number of independent decisions all interpreting the same text. We
demonstrate in Part I that the "strong inference" provision of the PSLRA
provides just such a test case.
III. THE "STRONG INFERENCE" PLEADING STANDARD UNDER THE PSLRA
In this Part, we describe the legislative evolution of the "strong inference"
pleading standard of the PSLRA. We document extensive efforts by competing
interests to fashion statutory language and legislative history to suit competing
objectives and we relate those efforts to the relevant principles of statutory
construction as applied by the courts. We also present evidence, rooted in the
Senate's decision to override a presidential veto by a single vote, that the
legislation would not have been enacted but for an agreement to disagree over
the meaning of the "strong inference" provision. In addition, we discuss
congressional efforts to influence the interpretation of the "strong inference"
provision through the creation of post-enactment legislative history.
This legislative saga provides substantial evidence that congressional
combatants are well informed regarding the principles of statutory construction
that will later be applied by the courts. Their efforts constitute an elaborate
attempt to build a record that can be interpreted in their constituencies' favor in
subsequent disputes before the courts. The open empirical question, which we
address in Part IV and in the Appendix to this Article, is whether these efforts
to obscure are successful (in which case we should observe a range of
interpretations at the district court level and significant splits at the circuit court
level) or whether they fail (in which case the courts should coalesce on a
consistent interpretation of the statutory language).
A. Background to Legislative Action
The story of the Reform Act's pleading standard begins with the Supreme
Court's 1976 decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, which held that merely
negligent misstatements would not establish liability under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").74 Instead, plaintiffs were
required to establish that the defendants acted with "scienter," defined by the
Court as misconduct that was "knowing or intentional."75 The Court left open
the possibility that "recklessness" might satisfy this state of mind requirement,
but it did not define the requisite degree of "recklessness. '76 The Court has
twice expressly declined to address whether recklessness establishes the
74. 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 193 n.12.
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requisite scienter.77
Since Hochfelder, every court of appeals that has addressed the issue has
held that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement of Section 10(b)7 8
This surface unanimity among the circuits, however, masks considerable
divergence of opinion as to the precise definition of recklessness that supports
liability.79 While some courts apply a "barely reckless" standard, other courts
lean toward a "highly reckless" standard.80 Some courts speak of recklessness
as "carelessness approaching indifference,"81 or as existing when defendants
"had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were misstated or
omitted, but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such facts although they
could have done so without extraordinary effort."'82 Other courts are more
demanding, insisting upon "a lesser form of intent [rather] than merely a
greater degree of ordinary negligence," 83 or on a showing of "severe
recklessness. '84  The result of this confusion is that there is "little
uniformity... among the circuits or even among different panels on the same
circuit, on how proof of recklessness should be used to satisfy scienter."' 5
Worse still than this lack of uniformity is the risk that lower courts have
allowed "a negligence-like standard [to creep] back into 1Ob-5 actions, and the
subjective focus of the scienter requirement imposed by Hochfelder has been
undermined." 86 The standard used by some lower courts raises the possibility
77. Id. at 193; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980).
78. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-70 (9th Cir. 1990)
(en bane), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863
F.2d 809, 814 (1 th Cir. 1989);In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d
Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982); G.A. Thompson
& Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 962 n.32 (5th Cir. 1981); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779,
783 (8th Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir.
1979); Rolfv. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978); Cook v. Avien,
Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792-
93 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
79. It also does not necessarily imply that the high court agrees with the unanimous
view of the courts of appeals. Cf Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164 (1994) (rejecting unanimous view of courts of appeals that Section 10(b)
supported liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud).
80. 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 83 (2d
ed. 1990).
81. Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (Ist Cir. 1978) (quoting lower
court opinion).
82. Kiernan v. Homeland Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1984).
83. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
84. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981).
85. Paul S. Milich, Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Scienter,
Recklessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J. COP. L. 179, 180 (1986).
86. Id. at 180-81.
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that subjectively honest, but incorrect, statements could give rise to liability.
Such a standard (combined with the enormous damages available in securities
fraud cases) threatens, in the view of critics, to chill corporate speech relevant
to investors and thereby reduce the information contained in securities prices.
While the definition of recklessness divided the courts of appeals prior to
the Reform Act, they disagreed even more sharply on the question of what was
required to plead scienter. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that plaintiffs plead the circumstances giving rise to a claim of fraud
"with particularity," but allows state of mind to be "averred generally.'8 7 Prior
to the Reform Act, the Second Circuit held that pleading scienter under the
Rule requires "plaintiffs to allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of
fraudulent intent." 88 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding the Second Circuit's
interpretation inconsistent with the plain language of Rule 9(b). The Ninth
Circuit instead held that plaintiffs could adequately plead a complaint simply
by "saying that scienter existed."89 The Reform Act purported to resolve this
conflict by adopting a uniform standard for pleading scienter, the "strong
inference" standard.90
The issue of pleading scienter in a federal securities law complaint that
raises a claim of reckless conduct thus implicates three distinct levels of
ambiguity. First, does scienter encompass recklessness? Second, if
recklessness constitutes scienter, how is recklessness defined? Third, even if
we assume that recklessness constitutes scienter and even if recklessness can be
consistently defined, what pleading standard must be satisfied in order for a
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss? The battle over the "strong
inference" standard, while technically raising only the third question, therefore
also unavoidably involved strategic maneuvering over the predicate state of
mind requirement. The stakes of this legislative game were thus much greater
than the articulation of a simple pleading standard.
B. The Reform Act and the "Strong Inference" Standard
The "strong inference" pleading standard had its genesis early in the
drafting of the PSLRA. The initial House version of the bill that eventually
became the Reform Act would have required a showing of actual knowledge,
thereby eliminating liability for reckless conduct.9 1 The bill eventually passed
87. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b).
88. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
89. In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
90. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 21D(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2)) (requiring that the plaintiff's complaint in a private action "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind").
91. Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 10A(a)(2)
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by the House, however, instead codified recklessness as "[d]eliberately
refraining from taking steps to discover whether one's statements are false or
misleading. '92 This attempt at codification did not survive the legislative
process.
The Reform Act's "strong inference" standard for pleading scienter
originated in S. 240, the Senate precursor to the Act. 3 The Senate Banking
Committee's report makes clear that Congress modeled the Act's pleading
standard on that of the Second Circuit 94 but there was also uncertainty as to the
precise definition of the "strong inference" standard that was required by the
Second Circuit. Indeed, there was reason to believe that the standard had at
least three different articulations.95
If the text of the Reform Act and the Senate report were the only materials
available to courts interpreting the Reform Act, there is a reasonable probability
that courts would have construed it as adopting the Second Circuit standard for
pleading scienter, although there could have been residual uncertainty about
how that standard should be interpreted and applied. Prior to the passage of the
Reform Act, and according to one articulation of the standard, the Second
Circuit had construed the "strong inference" standard as being met, in the
absence of direct evidence of the defendant's intent, by either (1) strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless misbehavior, or (2) facts
showing motive and opportunity to commit the fraud9 6 Absent contrary
evidence, courts ordinarily presume that Congress intended to adopt the settled
judicial construction of a rule when it has incorporated that standard into a
statute.97 On the other hand, because the Second Circuit standard can be
(1995) (requiring proof that defendant "knew [his] statement was misleading at the time...
made, or intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that such omission would render [his
statement] misleading" (emphasis added)).
92. Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 10A(a)(4) (1995) (as
passed by the House).
93. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. 240, 104th Cong. § 36(b)
(1995) (as reported in the Senate, June 19, 1995) (requiring that the complaint "specifically
allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind").
94. The report states:
The committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that would generate
additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the
pleading standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard,
the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference"
of defendant's fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard, although courts may find this body of
law instructive.
S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
95. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
96. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc , 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
97. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 562 (1991) ("Because these
decisions were part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress enacted [the
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interpreted as having at least three different manifestations, 98 it could also be
argued that there was no settled meaning. So even if Congress intended that
courts adopt the Second Circuit standard, Congress did not specify which
version of the standard it sought to apply.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that inferences to be drawn
from the Senate report are contradicted by subsequent developments in the
legislative history. Senator Arlen Specter attempted to make the law's reliance
on the Second Circuit tests more explicit. He offered a floor amendment that
would have provided:
[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind
may be established either-
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and
opportunity to commit fraud; or
03) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant. 9
The Senate adopted the Specter amendment, 100 but the conference committee
deleted it, thus reverting to the formulation adopted by the Senate Banking
Committee.101
The defeat of the Specter amendment is susceptible to at least two different
interpretations. The first is that Congress was not willing to define the Second
Circuit standard with any greater precision. The second is that Congress
intended to reject Second Circuit precedent altogether as a basis for the
interpretation of the "strong inference" provision. Indeed, Supreme Court
precedent suggests that when Congress expressly declines to adopt specific
statutory language, "its action strongly militates against a judgment that
Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact."102 Because the
statute]... we may presume that Congress intended to codify these principles .... );
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law
incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the
new statute.").
98. See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 755.
99. 141 CONG. REC. S9,222 (1995).
100. 141 CONG. REc. S9,200 (1995).
101. The conference committee also changed the language of the standard from
"specifically allege" to "state with particularity" based on the recommendation of the
Judicial Conference that the provision be amended to conform to Rule 9(b)'s particularity
language. 141 CONG. REC. S19,066-67 (1995). It does not appear that the conference
committee intended any substantive change from the prior version of the bill.
102. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974); see also INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) ("Few principles of statutory construction
are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact
statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language." (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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conference committee deleted the Specter amendment, courts could therefore
presume that Congress did not intend for them to follow the Second Circuit
tests that the Specter amendment would have codified.1 03 The Supreme
Court's principles of statutory construction, however, can also be read to allow
courts to ignore Congress' rejection of the Specter amendment.104
Further evidence that the conference committee did not want courts to rely
on the Second Circuit test can be found in the Statement of Managers:
The Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading standard
of the Second Circuit. The standard also is specifically written to conform the
language to Rule 9(b)'s notion of pleading with "particularity."
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit
requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity, and that these
facts, in turn, must give rise to a "strong inference" of the defendant's
fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen
existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard. 105
The last sentence suggests that the conference committee did not want courts
following Second Circuit decisions that applied the "strong inference" standard
in a less than vigorous fashion.' 0 6 The last sentence is also consistent with the
view that the Committee sought an interpretation more rigorous than even the
strictest interpretation that had then been adopted by the Second Circuit. In its
more recent pre-Reform Act cases, the Second Circuit had been more
demanding, requiring that the plaintiff plead a motive consistent with
"informed economic self-interest" and an opportunity to "achiev[e] concrete
benefits by the means alleged."'107 Unlike the Specter amendment, which could
103. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of
Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 57 ("[W]eight can be given to Congress's rejection
of a bill or amendment if it is clear that Congress considered and rejected the very position
argued before the court." (citing Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411-12 (1962))).
104. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 187 (1994) (warning that failed legislative proposals are "a particularly dangerous
ground" for statutory interpretation and that "several equally tenable inferences may be
drawn from [congressional] inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation
already incorporated the offered change").
105. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Statement of Managers).
106. See, e.g., In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 274 (2d Cir. 1993) (Winter,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion allowed the motive and opportunity test to
be satisfied under circumstances that did not appear likely to produce concrete benefits),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994).
107. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A]
plaintiff must do more than merely charge that executives aim to prolong the benefits of the
positions they hold."); see also Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996)
("[G]eneralized motive, one which could be imputed to any publicly-owned, for-profit
endeavor, is not sufficiently concrete for purposes of inferring scienter."); Acito v. IMCERA
Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he existence, without more, of executive
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have been interpreted as permitting naked allegations of motive and
opportunity, this test requires plaintiffs to show a particularized economic
benefit that the defendants could rationally expect to achieve through the
fraudulent scheme alleged. Thus, one interpretation of the conference
committee's deletion of Senator Specter's proposed codification is that the
codification would have watered down the Second Circuit standard, and
therefore, that the more general formulation adopted would provide a more
effective barrier for screening out non-meritorious lawsuits. On this view, by
omitting the Specter amendment, the conference committee "strengthened"
pleading standards.
This interpretation is undermined, however, by footnote twenty-three of the
above-quoted portion of the Statement of Managers, which reads: "For this
reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard
certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness." 108  The
phrase "for this reason" is, however, vague in context: Is the reason the
Committee's intent to strengthen pleading standards to a level more stringent
than the Second Circuit's? Or is the reason the Committee's desire to avoid
codifying any specific version of the Second Circuit's case law? Footnote
twenty-three also seems to conflate the Second Circuit's tests and the cases
applying those tests, which were also far from the model of consistency. If the
intention is to give courts discretion in deciding whether to follow particular
cases from the Second Circuit that apply those tests, then the footnote adds
little to the text of the report. On the other hand, if the intention is to avoid the
Second Circuit's tests for applying the Second Circuit standard, it is not clear
how the Reform Act's standard is "based," even "in part," on the "strong
inference" standard: The tests are simply the more particular application of the
general standard, not a different rule of law. Renunciation of the tests might,
therefore, be considered a renunciation of the standard. These ambiguities are
important because the Supreme Court ordinarily considers the conference
committee report as the most authoritative evidence, after the statute's text, of
legislative intent. 109  But here the conference committee report arguably
confuses at least as much as it clarifies.
The potential difficulties with conference committee reports are well
known. As the authors of a leading casebook on legislation point out:
Lobbyists and lawyers maneuver endlessly to persuade staff members (who
write the committee reports) and/or their legislative bosses to throw in helpful
compensation dependent upon stock value does not give rise to a strong inference of
scienter.").
108. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 49 n.23 (1995).
109. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("[T]he authoritative source for
finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which represen[t]
the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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language in the reports when insertion of similar language would be
inappropriate or infeasible for the statute itself. "Smuggling in" helpful
language through the legislative history is a time-tested practice of the D.C.
bar.l1 0
Interestingly, maneuvering of just this sort is allegedly the source of footnote
twenty-three in the Reform Act's conference report. In the debates over the
subsequently passed Uniform Standards Act, Representative John Dingell
charged that the language of footnote twenty-three had been "slipped into a
footnote by a staffer at the last minute without our knowledge or
concurrence."111  If Representative Dingell is correct, the conference report
cannot be considered reliable evidence of Congress' intent in adopting the
pleading standards. But remarks of individual legislators such as Dingell are
entitled to little weight, particularly when made by opponents of the bill, and
Dingell opposed the Reform Act.112 The Court apparently recognizes the
mischief that would be encouraged by giving credence to statements made by
individual opponents of a bill, particularly when made after the fact.113
The presumption that deletion of the Specter amendment implies that
Congress did not intend for courts to follow the Second Circuit tests is further
muddied by contemporaneous legislative history. In the floor debate over the
conference committee's bill, critics charged that the pleading standard would
be impossible to meet.114 The conference committee managers rebuffed this
criticism in ways that seem to retreat from the conference committee report.
Senator Pete Domenici stated, "[T]he conference report adopts the pleading
standard utilized by the second circuit court of appeals."115  Senator Chris
Dodd, another of the managers, agreed that the conference committee had
"adopt[ed] the Second Circuit Court of Appeals standard."1 16 The Supreme
I10. NVILLLAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 710 (1988).
11 I. 144 CONG. REC. E2246 (1998).
112. See Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 139 (1983) ("[G]reater
weight is to be accorded the views of [supporters] concerning the proper interpretation of the
original bill than to the views of [opponents].").
113. This has not, however, deterred some lower courts from relying on Dingell's
statement. See, e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 170 n.1 I (2d Cir. 2000).
114. See, e.g., 141 CoNG. REC. S17,960-61 (1995) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(criticizing proposed pleading standard as being impossible to meet); 141 CONG. REc.
S17,984 (1995) (statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun) (calling new pleading standard
significantly higher than the Second Circuit's). These remarks are entitled to little weight.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 n.24 (1976) ("Remarks of this kind
made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other than by persons responsible for the
preparation or the drafting of a bill are entitled to little weight .... This is especially so with
regard to the statements of legislative opponents who [i]n their zeal to defeat a bill...
understandably tend to overstate its reach." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
115. 141 CONG. REC. S17,969 (1995).
116. 141 CONG. REC. S17,959 (1995); see also 141 CONG. Rnc. S17,934 (Senator
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Court has relied on such statements by individual legislators in attempting to
understand how a bill evolved from the original bill to the enacted statute.1 17
Senators Domenici and Dodd were sponsors of the legislation, and sponsors'
remarks are entitled to particular weight.118 But in cases of conflict between
the conference report and statements made during the floor debate, the
committee report is ordinarily entitled to precedence. 119 In this case, however,
in light of the post-veto debate explained below, the Reform Act might not
have been enacted without Domenici's and Dodd's reassurances, thereby
creating an argument that the conference report should not be given greater
weight.
The more critical problem with the Specter amendment (not mentioned by
the supporters of the bill) is that it could have been construed as implicitly
codifying "recklessness" as the liability standard under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. As noted above, the Supreme Court has not addressed this
question,120 and the Reform Act goes to lengths to sidestep the issue by using
"required state of mind" in the pleading provision, rather than knowledge or
recklessness. This formulation has the air of a compromise, suggesting that
neither proponents nor opponents of recklessness were capable of garnering a
majority (much less a supermajority) for their view. By leaving the question
unanswered in the statute, both sides could hope that the Supreme Court would
eventually rule in their favor. The Specter amendment threatened to undo that
compromise. Therefore, by maintaining the ambiguity of the pleading
standard, each side preserved the hope that their view would prevail in the
Supreme Court.121
D'Amato, a manager of the bill, states that its "standard is already the law in New York.").
117. See Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461, 475-76 (1984) (relying on statements by representatives to understand motivation for
amendments).
118. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("[R]emarks...
of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute's
construction."); Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967) ("It is the
sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt." (internal
quotations marks and citations omitted)). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualisn, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 644 (1990) ("[B]ecause the sponsor may have a hidden
agenda or may be acting pursuant to a secret logroil, the sponsor is often the least likely
person to represent the consensus view. [The sponsor] may have uttered the broad language,
not because it represented the views of most of his colleagues, but precisely because he
realized he did not have the votes to put it in the statute itself.").
119. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) ("A committee report represents the
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation. Floor debates reflect at best the understanding of individual
Congressmen. It would take extensive and thoughtful debate to detract from the plain thrust
of a committee report in this instance.").
120. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
121. The Specter amendment suffered from a related problem: It was inconsistent with
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The Reform Act passed the House by a vote of 320-102. It passed the
Senate by a vote of 65-30. The bill was met by the first veto of the Clinton
presidency. The veto was overridden in the House by a vote of 319-100 and in
the Senate by a vote of 68-30. The loss of even two votes in the Senate due to
disagreement over the "strong inference" standard would have doomed the
legislation. 122
Significantly, President Clinton's veto message focused directly on the
controversy over the meaning of the "strong inference" provision as a basis for
the veto. The subsequent debate in connection with the Senate override vote
also makes it clear that ambiguity over the definition of "strong inference" was
essential in order to maintain the supermajority needed to override the veto.
President Clinton in his veto message stated that he was:
prepared to support the high pleading standard of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit
court. But the conferees make crystal clear in the Statement of Managers their
intent to raise the standard even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept
that.
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and
adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case law
with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then they specifically indicated that
they were not adopting Second Circuit case law but instead intended to
"strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the Second Circuit. All
this shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher barrier to bringing suit
than any now existing-one so high that even the most aggrieved investors
with the most painful losses may get tossed out of court before they have a
chance to prove their case. 123
Evidently, the President concluded that the language of the statute and
accompanying legislative history would (or at least could) be construed as
supporting a standard stronger than the Second Circuit's. But if Congress were
to maintain the exquisite ambiguity that had evolved over the interpretation of
the "strong inference" provision, then it would not be sufficient to override the
President's veto. Instead, proponents of a weaker interpretation of the standard
would have to cast doubt on the President's interpretation of the statute, thereby
other provisions of the Reform Act, in that it failed to reflect the fact that recklessness was
no longer sufficient for liability under certain circumstances. Congress eliminated
recklessness as a basis for liability in cases based upon fraudulent forward-looking
statements. Under the Reform Act's safe harbor provision, a plaintiff must prove that a
forward-looking statement was made with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B). Because plaintiffs mustprove actual knowledge in the case of
allegedly misleading forward-looking statements that are covered by the safe harbor, it
follows that plaintiffs are now required to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with actual knowledge in such cases.
122. 141 CONG. REc. H1S,214 (1995); 141 CONG. Rc. S19,180 (1995).
123. 141 CONG. REc. H15,214 (1995).
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suggesting that the President may have vetoed the statute unnecessarily because
the "strong inference" provision does not mean what the President thought it
meant. At the same time, however, proponents of the stricter interpretation of
the statutory language would want to override the veto on the presumption that
the Presidential interpretation was correct and that a supermajority in Congress
favored that interpretation. 124
Thus, it should come as little surprise that, in the floor debate following the
President's veto, Senator Dodd and the other managers of the Reform Act
distanced themselves from the President's interpretation. Dodd argued the
President had "reversed course on the pleading standards" that the President
had previously endorsed. 125 Senator Dodd explained that the conference
committee had omitted the Specter amendment because it "did not really follow
the guidance of the second circuit. '126 In Senator Dodd's view, the Specter
amendment "omits that where a motive is not apparent, the strength of
circumstantial evidence must be correspondingly greater."'1 27 The pleading
provision, according to Senator Dodd and contrary to the President's belief,
"met [the Second Circuit] standard. We have left out the guidance. That does
not mean you disregard it."12 8 The fact that Congress overrode the veto thus
gives rise to still another interpretive presumption: In the face of the managers'
repudiation of the Statement of Managers, the President's understanding of the
Reform Act in his veto message is entitled to little weight.129
124. Id.
125. 141 CONG. REc. S19,067 (1995).
126. 141 CONG. REc. S19,068 (1995).
127. Id. Senator Dodd also offered a memorandum written by one of the authors of
this Article that characterized the pleading standard as "faithful to the Second Circuit's test."
141 CONG. REc. S19,067 (citing Memorandum from Joseph A. Grundfest, Professor,
Stanford Law School, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 15, 1995)).
128. 141 CONG. REc. S19,068. Senator Domenici reiterated that the Reform Act's
pleading standard "is the Second Circuit's pleading standard" and was a "codification of the
Second Circuit rule." 141 CoNG. REC. S19,150 (1995). He argued that President Clinton's
reliance on the language from the Statement of Managers was misplaced because "[a]
statement of managers is not law, everyone knows that." 141 CONG. REc. S19,045 (1995).
Representative Tauzin, another member of the conference committee, also faulted the
President for addressing "[n]ot the bill, [but] the statement of the managers." 141 CONG.
REc. H15,214 (1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. H15,218 (statement of Rep. Moran) ("We
know we are going to have the Second Circuit standard applied, and that in fact when
legislation is at variance with legislative history or report language, that it is the bill itself
that prevails.").
129. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 235 (1978) (rejecting
interpretation in Presidential veto message when supporters of the legislation disagreed with
that interpretation of the bill during post-veto debate).
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C. The Uniform Standards Act
The Supreme Court's ordinary rule of interpretation is that subsequent
legislative history is a poor guide to discerning the intent of the enacting
Congress. 130 Despite this skepticism, the Court has in some cases relied on
post-enactment history.131 In particular, the Court is more willing to consider
post-enactment statements made by sponsors of the legislation, of which
Senator Dodd was one.132 Moreover, subsequent conference reports, while not
entitled to the weight given to subsequent legislation,133 may still be entitled to
consideration in statutory interpretation, particularly when the intention of the
enacting Congress is obscure.134 There is also empirical evidence that the
Supreme Court is more heavily influenced by current legislators' preferences
than by the preferences of the legislators who actually wrote the law.135
These observations may help explain the fact that the enactment of the
Reform Act in 1995 did not end the stream of legislative history on the
pleading standard. Three years later, Congress adopted the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("Uniform Standards Act"),136 which
preempts class actions based on state securities fraud law for certain classes of
securities. Congress adopted the Uniform Standards Act in response to the
plaintiffs' lawyers' tactic of using state court class actions to evade the
obstacles that Congress had erected to federal securities class actions in the
Reform Act. 137
130. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("(T]he views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.").
131. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768-70 (1996); Bell v. New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, 461 U.S. 773, 784-85 & n.12 (1983).
132. Brock v. Pierce City, 476 U.S. 253, 263-65 (1986); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555, 567 (1984); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 531 (1982). But see
Clarke v. See. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 407 (1987) (refusing to consider sponsor's
statement made ten days after the law was enacted).
133. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980)
("Such history does not bear strong indicia of reliability.., because as time passes
memories fade and a person's perception of his earlier intention may change. Thus, even
when it would otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a
reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative
history prior to its enactment.").
134. See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980)
("[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the
enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so when the
precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure." (internal citations omitted)). But see
South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378 n.17 (1984) (rejecting use of "the committee
reports that accompany subsequent legislation" as a guide to statutory interpretation).
135. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 390.
136. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
137. See generally David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW.
Apr. 2002]
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
The SEC took advantage of Congress' deliberation over the Uniform
Standards Act to lobby to protect the recklessness standard, which the agency
has long supported.138 During the hearings on the bill, the SEC made clear that
it would withhold its support from any national fraud standard that did not
impose liability upon those who made reckless misrepresentations. 139
In addressing the SEC's concern, the Senate sought to provide assurances
in the legislative history that the national standard would include recklessness.
The Senate report accompanying the Uniform Standards Act stated that "the
PSLRA establish[ed] a uniform federal standard on pleading requirements by
adopting the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals."140  Senator Dodd also pledged to introduce legislation codifying
recklessness if the Supreme Court should ever hold that recklessness does not
suffice as a basis for pleading and proving fraud.141 This threat of statutory
override may well have been intended to influence judicial interpretation. 42
The Statement of Managers produced by the conference committee that
reconciled the House and Senate versions of the Uniform Standards Act was
considerably more tepid in its endorsement of the Second Circuit standard and
recklessness:
[I]t was the intent of Congress, as was expressly stated during the legislative
debate on the Reform Act, and particularly during the debate on overriding the
President's veto, that the Reform Act establish a heightened uniform Federal
standard on pleading requirements based upon the pleading standard applied
1(1998).
138. See, e.g., The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Oversight
Hearing on S. 1260 Before the Sec. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 105th Cong. 13 (1997) ("A uniform federal standard that did not include
recklessness as a basis for liability would jeopardize the integrity of the securities markets,
and would deal a crippling blow to defrauded investors with meritorious claims.").
139. Id. at 14 ("Should the courts of appeals conclude that the Reform Act has
somehow eliminated recklessness as a basis for antifraud liability, the preservation of state
remedies that allow recovery for reckless conduct would be critical.").
140. S. REP. No. 105-182, at 5-6 (1998) (emphasis added). A colloquy between
Senators Dodd and D'Amato on the Senate floor further emphasizes the point:
Mr. D'Amato: I was surprised and dismayed to learn that some district court decisions had
not followed the clear language of the '95 Reform Act, which is the basis upon which the
uniform national standard in today's legislation will be created.
Mr. Dodd: It appears that these district courts have misread the language of the '95 Reform
Act's Statement of Managers .... I can only hope that when the issue reaches the federal
courts of appeals, these courts will undertake a more thorough review of the legislative
history and correct these decisions.
144 CONG. REC. S4798-99 (1998).
141. See 144 CONG. REc. S4798 ("[S]hould the Supreme Court eventually find that
recklessness no longer suffices to meet the scienter standard, it is my intent to introduce
legislation that would explicitly restore recklessness as the pleading and liability standard for
federal securities fraud lawsuits.").
142. See generally Eskridge, supra note 15 (studying incidence of congressional
overrides of Supreme Court decisions).
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by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Indeed, the express language of the
Reform Act itself carefully provides that plaintiffs must "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind." The Managers emphasize that neither the
Reform Act nor S. 1260 makes any attempt to define that state of mind.143
Note the subtle shift here: While the Senate report expressed an emphatic
intent to "adopt[] the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals," the conference committee report expresses a more ambiguous intent
to "establish a heightened uniform Federal standard on pleading requirements
based upon the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals." Thus, the conference committee report reintroduces the concept that
pleading standards had been heightened, apparently a concession extracted by
the House managers. 144 Moreover, the report emphasizes that the Reform Act
did not resolve the question of recklessness. Notvithstanding the decidedly
mixed signals sent by the conference committee report, the support for
recklessness in the Statement of Managers apparently induced the SEC to
143. 144 CONG. REc. Hl1,019 (1998). Senators Dodd, D'Amato, and Gramm and
Representatives Bliley, Tauzin, Cox, White, and Eshoo served as managers of both acts.
144. See Phyllis Diamond, Uniform Standards Bill Cleared by Congress; Awaits
President's Signature, 30 SEC. REG. & L. RPp. 1503 (1988).
To add even more confusion to the legislative history, two members of the conference
committee from the House engaged in a colloquy at the time of passage attacking
recklessness and the Second Circuit pleading standard. See 144 CONG. REc. H1O,780-81
(1998) (colloquy between Representatives Tom Bliley and Chris Cox). This incident gives
weight to the Supreme Court's observation: "To permit what we regard as clear statutory
language to be materially altered by such colloquies, which often take place before the bill
has achieved its final form would open the door to the inadvertent, or perhaps even planned,
undermining of the language actually voted on by Congress .... ." Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S.
222, 237-38 (1984).
Moreover, one of these members inserted a statement arguing there is no statutory basis
for liability based on recklessness. 144 CONG. REC. HI 1,021-22 (1998). The circumstances
surrounding the original insertion of this statement into the record, as well as the original
printing of the Statement of Managers, were the source of further intrigue. Representative
John D. Dingell observed:
The final page [of the Statement of Managers, as originally printed,] mysteriously
disappeared. Curiously, this page contained important language regarding scienter,
recklessness, and the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
language essential to the conference agreement. ... The unidentified material that follows the
names of the Managers [i.e., the Bliley Statement], although erroneously printed in the same
typeface as the conference report,... is not part of the conference report's joint explanatory
statement and does not represent the views of the Managers. In point of fact, the phantom
language directly contradicts the joint explanatory statement ....
144 CONG. REc. E2246 (1998). Both printing errors were subsequently corrected.
Predictably, these moves provoked a flurry of responses. See 144 CONG. REC. S12,906
(1998) (statement of Sen. Reed); 144 CONG. REC. E2296 (1998) (statement of Rep. Eshoo);
144 CONG. REC. S12,738-39 (1998) (statement of Sen. D'Amato); 144 CNG. REc. E2246
(statement of Rep. Dingell); 144 CONG. REC. S12,737 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 144
CONG. REc. H10,781 (statement of Rep. Markey).
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support the final bill and the President to sign it into law.145
The question remains, however, whether this asserted reliance by the
President and the SEC should be given any weight. If the question of
recklessness was that important, why not insist upon that standard being
incorporated into the statute when it would have been a simple matter to do so?
Even if the Court decides to break from the standard rules of statutory
construction and looks to the 1998 Uniform Standards Act to interpret the 1995
"strong inference" provision, it is not at all clear how the 1998 language would
tip the scales in the debate. Thus, the import of this post-enactment legislative
history is open to doubt, but the time and effort devoted to the creation of this
post-enactment history is beyond dispute.
D. Summary of the PSLRA "s Legislative History
The authors find it difficult to draw any conclusions from this m6lange of
legislative history about Congress' intent in adopting the "strong inference"
pleading standard. Indeed, we disagree as to which interpretation of the "strong
inference" standard best fits the statute's text and legislative history. Grundfest
believes that the text and history of the Act are more reasonably interpreted to
exclude motive and opportunity as well as non-deliberate recklessness from
establishing a strong inference of scienter under the Reform Act. Pritchard
concludes from the same sources that the more reasonable interpretation is that
the establishment of motive and opportunity or non-deliberate recklessness
would suffice under the Reform Act.146 Neither author views the other's
145. Statement by President William J. Clinton (Nov. 3, 1998) (signing Uniform
Standards Act into law); Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC; Isaac C. Hunt, Jr.,
Commissioner, SEC; Paul R. Carey, Commissioner, SEC; and Laura S. Unger,
Commissioner, SEC, to The Honorable Alfonse M. D'Amato, Chairman, Committee on
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs and The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes, Ranking Minority
Leader, Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs (Oct. 9, 1998).
146. A similar level of disagreement can be found in the plethora of student notes
spawned by this dispute. It may be worth noting that the majority of students writing on this
topic, like the courts of appeal, favor the intermediate standard. Compare Bradley R.
Aronstam, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995's Paradigm ofAmbiguity: A
Circuit Split Ripe for Certiorari, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1061, 1091 (2000) ("The PSLRA's
plain language and limited probative legislative history militate in favor of reconciling the
circuit split with an intermediate pleading standard of recklessness.... ."), Daniel S. Boyce,
Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Legislative
Attempt at Putting Teeth into the Required State of Mind, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 761, 802
(2001) (concluding that the Baesa court correctly relied on plain text and ignored legislative
history), Nicole M. Briski, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive, and Opportunity?, 32 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 155, 204 (2000) (arguing that the intermediate standard "is consistent with the
PSLRA's text, the legislative history of the PSLRA, and the purposes behind the enactment
of the PSLRA"), Kim Ferchau, The Circuits Divide: Pleading Scienter Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 U. TOL. L. Rnv. 449, 468 (2000) (concluding
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that "plain meaning" of statute which "ignores the tortuous legislative history" requires
intermediate standard), Janine C. Guido, Seeking Enlightenment from Above: Circuit Courts
Split on the Interpretation of the Reform Act's Heightened Pleading Requiremen4 66
BROOK. L. REv. 501, 547 (2000) (determining that policy, plain language, and legislative
history favor intermediate standard), Christopher J. Hardy, The PSLRA's Heightened
Pleading Standard: Does Severe Recklessness Constitute Scienter?, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 565,
589 (2001) (concluding that "[a]fter analyzing the statutory language and legislative history,
the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA is most consistent with the language,
history, and purpose of the PSLRA"), Lisa A. Herrera, Will Motive, Opportunity or
Recklessness No Longer Constitute Scienter for Fraud? A Survey of Recent Federal District
Court Decisions After the Enactment of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Ac4
26 PEPP. L. REv. 379, 406 (1999) ("[H]igher courts confronted with the issue should use the
Baesa holding as a guideline because Baesa's plain language interpretation of the Reform
Act imposes natural limits on the lower courts while still championing the main goal of the
Reform Act: to curb the filing of frivolous lawsuits."), Chuan Li, Gauging the Hurdle to
Strike Suits: Reconciling the Circuit Split over the Proper Interpretation of the Heightened
Pleading Standard Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 26 J. CORP.
L. 435, 454 (2001) (finding that the "plain language" supports intermediate standard), Ryan
G. Miest, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1120
(1998) (arguing that legislative history and text require courts to adopt intermediate
standard), Scott H. Moss, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: The Scienter
Debacle, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 1279, 1319 (2000) ("In light of the various circuit court
opinions, the plain meaning of the PSLRA, its legislative history, and the competing public
policy regarding securities fraud litigation, it is increasingly evident that the PSLRA raises
the procedural requirement of scienter above that of 'motive and opportunity,' while leaving
the substantive requirement of recklessness untouched."), Matthew Roskoski, A Case-by-
Case Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2265, 2292 (1999) (stating that the intermediate standard "is a direct
application of the plain language of the statute"), and Laura R. Smith, The Battle Between
Plain Meaning and Legislative History: Which Will Decide the Standard for Pleading
Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995?, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 577, 613 (1999) (advocating intermediate standard based on plain meaning and
legislative history), with Eugene P. Caiola, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under
the Uniform Security Litigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 359 (2000)
("The text, legislative history, and normative goals of the PSLRA and the Uniform Act,
when considered as a whole, support the adoption of the Second Circuit's pleading standard
in addition to the use of the 'motive and opportunity' test where those facts demonstrate a
'strong inference of scienter."'), Michael A. Dorelli, Striking Back at "Extortionate"
Securities Litigation: Silicon Graphics Leads the Way to a Truly Heightened and Uniform
Pleading Standard, 31 IND. L. REv. 1189, 1217 (1998) (arguing that the Silicon Graphics
"standard is sensitive to the goals of Congress in initiating reform and strikes an appropriate
balance between the need to prevent and redress deceptive and manipulative practices in
securities litigation, and the maintenance of respectable capital markets"), Michael R. Dube,
Motive and Opportunity Test Survives Congressional Death Knell in Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 42 B.C. L. REV. 619, 647-50 (2001) (criticizing "interpretive mistake"
of First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits in conceding any relevance to motive and opportunity),
Michael B. Dunn, Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or,
A Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 250 (1998) (concluding that the "text of [the
statute] must ultimately control" interpretation, but that text confers "interpretive discretion"
on courts), Bruce Cannon Gibney, The End of the Unbearable Lightness of Pleading:
Scienter After Silicon Graphics, 48 UCLA L. REV. 973, 1012, 1014-15 (2001) (advocating
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interpretation as unreasonable.
We suggest that Congress was content to enact an ambiguous statute. The
competing attempts to manipulate the Reform Act's legislative history (and
subsequent efforts to rewrite that history in the Uniform Standards Act's
legislative history) further confuse the question. We also suggest that the
legislation would not have been enacted but for the legislative agreement to
disagree over the interpretation of the "strong inference" standard. We
conclude that the "strong inference" standard satisfies the necessary predicate
for a formal test of the judiciary's ability to impute consistent meaning in the
face of a legislative intent to obscure in order to maintain a compromise. But
how effective is the Reform Act's ambiguous language and conflicting
legislative history in creating diverse interpretations in the courts? We turn to
that question in Part IV and in the Appendix.
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
We now turn to an empirical analysis of judicial decisions interpreting the
"strong inference" standard. There is no United States Supreme Court decision
interpreting the "strong inference" standard as of the date of this Article.147
We have, however, identified thirty-three appellate decisions and 167 district
court decisions that address the question. We examine the appellate court
decisions in this Part, and turn to a statistical analysis of the district court
decisions in the Appendix. The appellate court decisions suggest that the
congressional ability to obscure has trumped the judicial ability to impose
consistent meaning on the legislative text and history of the "strong inference"
provision. These decisions also suggest that judges who agree on the
interpretation of the "strong inference" standard can disagree on its application.
The appellate court data are also weakly consistent with the hypothesis that
Silicon Graphics standard in light of "policy considerations"), Aron Hansen, The Aftermath
of Silicon Graphics: Pleading Scienter in Securities Fraud Litigation, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
769, 808 (2001) (concluding that "the Ninth Circuit's deliberate recklessness standard is
supported by case law, legislative history, and public policy considerations"), and Patricia J.
Meyer, What Congress Said About the Heightened Pleading Standard: A Proposed Solution
to the Securities Fraud Pleading Confusion, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2517, 2557 (1998)
(arguing that PSLRA standard is higher than the Second Circuit standard, but Congress
should amend the statute to adopt the Second Circuit standard). See also Ann Morales
Olazabal, The Search for "Middle Ground": Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
153, 196 (2001) (arguing that the initial split among the circuits has been reduced by
subsequent cases in which extreme interpretations have been eliminated).
147. Petitions for certiorari raising the question have been filed three time and twice
denied. In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2001),petition for cert.filed,
70 U.S.L.W. 3164 (U.S. Aug. 30, 2001) (No. 01-397); Desaigoudar v. Meyercord 223 F.3d
1020 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1962 (2001); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000).
[Vol. 54:627
Apr. 2002] AMBIGUITY IN STATUTORYDESIGN 667
ideological factors can play a role in the interpretation of the "strong inference"
standard and in the resolution of motions to dismiss.
A. Summary of Appellate Court Decisions
Table 1 summarizes the thirty-three appellate decisions that address the
interpretation of the "strong inference" provision. These decisions arise in ten
circuits. Because of the rules of intra-circuit stare decisis, this sample should
be viewed as giving rise to ten distinct opportunities for the interpretation of the
"strong inference" standard. The leading case that establishes the dominant
precedent in each circuit is denoted by an asterisk in Table 1. The additional
appellate decisions create opportunities for inconsistent interpretations within a
circuit as well as opportunities for the evolution of splits on new issues related
to the interpretation and application of the "strong inference" standard.
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Table 1
Appellate Interpretations of the "Strong Inference" Standard
(As of November 26, 2001)
Appellate District Court
Interpretive Interpretive Nominating
Circuit Decision Standard Result Standard Presidents
First Greebel v. FTF Software, Inc., Intermediate Affirmed summary Fails Lowest Reagan
194 F.3d 185 (1999)* standard judgment Reagan
Clinton
First Geffon v. Micrion Corp., 249 Intermediate Affirmed summary Not addressed Reagan
F.3d 29 (2001) standard judgment Bush
Bush
Second Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Second Circuit Affirmed dismissal Fails Lowest Nixon
Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (1999) standard Nixon
Bush
Second Kwalbrnn v. Glenayre Tech., Fails Lowest Affirmed Silicon Graphics Reagan
201 F.3d 431 (1999) dismissal standard Clinton
(unpublished) Clinton
Second Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d Second Circuit Reversed dismissal Silicon Graphics Bush
300, cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. standard standardl 4 8  Clinton
567 (2000)- Clinton
Second Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d Second Circuit Reversed dismissal Second Circuit Nixon
81(2000) standard in part standard Carter
Clinton
Second Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., Second Circuit Reversed dismissal Not addressed Carter
228 F.3d 154 (2000) standard Carter
Clinton
Second Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Second Circuit Reversed dismissal Second Circuit Bush
Toronto Dominion Bank, 250 standard in part standard Reagan
F.3d 87 (2001) Reagan
Second In re Scholastic Corp. See. Second Circuit Reversed dismissal Second Circuit Reagan
Litig., 252 F.3d 63 (2001) standard standard Clinton
Ford
Second Kanit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131 Second Circuit Affirmed dismissal Second Circuit Carter
(2001) standard standard Reagan
Clinton
Third In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Second Circuit Affirmed dismissal Fails Lowest Reagan
Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (1999)* standard Reagan
Reagan
Third Orm v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 Second Circuit Affirmed dismissal Second Circuit Reagan
(2000) standard standard Carter
Bush
Third EP Medsystems, Inc. v. Second Circuit Reversed dismissal Fails Lowest Carter
Echocath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865 standard in part Bush
(2000) Reagan
Fourth Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 Fails Lowest Affirmed dismissal Not addressed Reagan
F.3d 609 (1999) Nixon
Clinton
Fifth Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., Intermediate Reversed dismissal Not available Reagan
267 F.3d 400 (200 1)- standard in part Bush
Clinton
Sixth In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Intermediate Affirmed dismissal Silicon Graphics Carter
Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (1999)* standard standard Clinton
Clinton
148. The Second Circuit opinion in this case characterizes the panel's approach as
agreeing with the standard applied by the district court. We find this characterization
difficult to square with the district court opinion.
Apr. 2002]
Appellate District Court
Interpretive Interpretive Nominating
Circuit Decision Standard Result Standard Presidents
Sixth Heviig v. Vener, 210 F.3d Intermediate Affirmed dismissal Pleading Carter
612 (2000), vacated and standard sufficient, Bush
rehearing en bane granted, standard not Disent
222 F.3d 263 (2000) explained Carter
Sixth Helsig v. Vencor, 251 F.3d Intermediate Reversed dismissal Pleading Carter (x2)
540 (2001) (en bane) standard sufficient, Clinton (x5)
standard not Dissent
explained Carter
Reagan
Bush (x4)
Eighth Florida State Bd. ofAdmin. v. Second Circuit Reversed dismissal Fails Lowest Carter
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 standard Reagan
F.3d 645 (2001) Clinton
Ninth In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Silicon Graphics Affirmed dismissal Silicon Graphics Nixon
Src. Lilig., 183 F.3d 970 standard standard Reagan
(1999). Dissent.
Kennedy
Ninth Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Silicon Graphics Aftirmed dismissal Unclear Bush
Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971 standard Bush
(1999) Reagan
Ninth Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 Silicon Graphics Affirmed dismissal Fails Fed. R. Civ. Reagan
F.3d 933 (1999) standard P. 9(h) Bush
Clinton
Ninth Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Silicon Graphics Affirmed dismissal Second Circuit Reagan
Chantal Pharmaceutieal Corp., standard standard Bush
234 F.3d 1277 (2000) Clinton
(unpublished)
Ninth Desaigoudarv. Meyercord, Silicon Graphics Affirmed dismissal Unclear Nixon
223 F.3d 1020 (2000), cert. standard Carter
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1962 (2001) Clinton
Ninth Howard v. Everex SyS., Inc., Second Circut Reversed summary Unclear Nixon
228 F3d 1057 (2000) standard judgment in part Carter
Clinton
Ninth Lawree v. Zilog, Inc., 242 Silicon Graphics Affirmed dismissal Fails Lowest Reagan
F.3d 332 (2000) (unpublished) standard Bush
Clinton
Ninth Zeid v. Kimberley, 2001 VL Silicon Graphics Afimed dismissal Silicon Graphics Carter
357526 (2001) (unpublished) standard standard Bush
Clinton
Ninth Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d Silicon Graphics Affirmed dismissal Fails Lowest Kennedy
423 (2001) standard Bush
Bush
Ninth Berger v. Ludwick, 2001 WVL Silicon Graphics Affirmed dismissal Silicon Graphics Carter
86S355 (2001) (unpublished) Standard standard Clinton
Clinton
Tenth Sheldon v. Vermonty, 246 Unclear Reversed dismissal Fails Lowest Reagan
Fad 682 (2000) (unpublished) Reagan
Clinton
Tenth City ofPhiladelphia v. Intermediate Affirmed dismissal Silicon Graphics Reagan
Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 Fad standard standard Carter
1245 (2001)* Carter
Eleventh Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., Intermediate Vacated denial of Second Circuit Carter
187 Fad 1271 (1999)* standard motion to dismiss standard Ford
Dissent
Carter
Eleventh Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d Intermediate Affirmed dismissal Intermediate Reagan
1219 (2001) standard standard Ford
1 _1 1_ 1_ 1Carter
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Table 1
(Continued)
Appellate Interpretations of the "Strong Inference" Standard
(As of No% ember 26, 2001)
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We analyzed each of these thirty-three decisions to ascertain the
interpretive standard applied by each appellate court, the result of its ruling, and
the standard applied by the district court. We also identified the president who
nominated each of the judges who participated in these rulings.
Analysis of the decisions revealed four distinct interpretive styles:
1. Fails Lowest. Here, the court concludes that interpretation of the
"strong inference" standard is unnecessary because the complaint fails
even the weakest interpretation of the pleading standard, or fails Rule
9(b) pleading standards.
2. Second Circuit standard. The court rules that pleading motive and
opportunity suffices to establish a strong inference.
3. Intermediate standard. The court rules that pleading motive and
opportunity will not suffice, but plaintiffs may plead facts sufficient to
support a strong inference of recklessness. This standard is also often
called the "Baesa standard. ' 149
4. Silicon Graphics standard. The court rules that motive and
opportunity do not suffice, and plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to
support a strong inference of deliberate recklessness or fraudulent
intent. This standard was first articulated in the Silicon Graphics
litigation.150
In addition, there is a fifth possible interpretive style that we describe as
"Satisfies Highest." Here, the court concludes that the complaint is so well
crafted that it satisfies the most stringent interpretation of the strong pleading
standard without ever defining that articulation. This style arises frequently in
our later analysis of the district court database, but does not appear in our
analysis of appellate rulings or in our analysis of lower court rulings giving rise
to these appellate cases. 151
B. Inconsistent Appellate Interpretations
Table 1 documents that appellate courts have adopted three distinct
interpretations of the "strong inference" provision,152 and have avoided the
issue once, notwithstanding Congress' stated goal of uniformity.153 The
149. In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
150. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C96-0393, 1997 WL 337580 (N.D.
Cal. June 5, 1997), aff'd, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court's interim orders
are reported at 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997) and 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25,
1996).
151. See infra p. 684.
152. Accord Eth & Drosman, supra note 20, at 160-61 (citing the three-way split and
observing that "Itihe sharp division among the courts of appeals has, indeed, led to an
increase in litigation over the proper venue for securities class actions").
153. The Statement of Managers from the Reform Act explains Congress' concern that
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Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits have construed the Act as adopting the
Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity" standard. This standard is generally
viewed as the weakest or most pro-plaintiff interpretation of the "strong
inference" provision. The First, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
held that motive and opportunity do not necessarily suffice to create the
requisite strong inference of scienter. All of these courts except for the
Eleventh, however, have held that motive and opportunity can be used as
factors to be considered in evaluating circumstantial evidence of a conscious or
reckless misstatement.154 We describe these holdings as articulating an
"Intermediate standard" because they fall between the Second Circuit's
relatively lax interpretation and the Ninth Circuit's more stringent approach.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit in Silicon Graphics requires that plaintiffs plead that
the defendants knew that the statements were false, or that the defendants were
"consciously" or "deliberately" reckless in disregarding the truth or falsity of
the statements. The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected pleading the basis of
motive and opportunity.
The congressional effort to create ambiguity thus appears to have
succeeded at the appellate level. Nine different courts of appeal, applying
identical rules of statutory construction to identical text and legislative history,
have reached three distinct interpretations of the "strong inference" standard.
One other circuit, the Fourth, has avoided the question despite having had a
clear opportunity to address it.
If there is any discernable trend in the appellate decisions, it is toward the
Intermediate standard. From a perspective that emphasizes the formal canons
of construction, this may seem a somewhat surprising result. As we explained
in Part III, the "strong inference" language has an antecedent in the Second
Circuit case law interpreting Rule 9(b). The canon of construction that statutes
are to be interpreted consistently with prior judicial decisions supports adopting
the Second Circuit standard if a court chooses to ignore the conflicted
legislative history. The legislative history, however, more strongly seems to
support the Silicon Graphics standard. The conference committee report's
explanation for the deletion of the Specter amendment, which would have
codified the two Second Circuit tests, suggests that Congress was satisfied with
neither prong. The Intermediate standard rejects the motive and opportunity
test deriving from explanatory language of footnote number twenty-three of the
Conference Report, but that footnote also implies that recklessness has been
the courts of appeals had "interpreted Rule 9(b)'s requirement in conflicting ways." 141
CONG. REc. H13,702 (1995). The Statement of Managers also notes that congressional
hearings had "included testimony on the need to establish uniform and more stringent
pleading requirements." Id.
154. The Eleventh Circuit's disagreement on this point might be construed as creating a
fourth standard. As the Eleventh Circuit is not entirely clear on this point, we have
categorized it as following the Intermediate standard.
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eliminated, a step that courts adopting the Intermediate standard have declined
to take. Put another way, the most common appellate interpretation is the least
defensible as an analytic matter of statutory construction.
The Intermediate standard is, however, the most understandable as a matter
of judicial compromise if the courts really believe that the record is hopelessly
confused. In the face of uncertainty, the middle ground, an "average" of the
two most analytically defensible interpretations, may appear to be the safest.
The Intermediate standard may also make the most sense if the appellate courts
seek to maximize the judiciary's flexibility, consistent with our hypothesis that
courts value the discretion conferred by ambiguity. The Intermediate standard
is in many ways the most ambiguous, giving courts wide latitude in
determining whether to dismiss or not based on a given set of facts.
The confusion at the appellate level is actually more profound than these
data suggest. In particular, the Second Circuit's own post-Reform Act
decisions underscore the ambiguity inherent in its articulation of the "strong
inference" standard. In Press, a Second Circuit panel concluded that the
Reform Act adopted the Second Circuit standard, but that "[t]he Second Circuit
has been lenient in allowing scienter issues to withstand summary judgment
based on fairly tenuous inferences. '155 Indeed, the panel in Press held that the
"strong inference" standard was satisfied despite finding that the underlying
misstatement was immaterial156-a rather non-intuitive and contestable
implementation of a heightened pleading standard.
In Novak, however, a different panel of the Second Circuit sought to
minimize the Press court's observations with regard to the "strong inference"
standard by labeling them "dicta,"157 despite the fact that other courts have
viewed the same language as a "holding."'158 Novak also articulated a stricter
formulation of the "strong inference" standard than Press, stating that it was
taking a "middle ground" between the Third Circuit's wholesale adoption of
the prior Second Circuit standard and the decisions of other courts that reject
"motive and opportunity." 159 Novak explained that courts "need not be wedded
to [motive and opportunity] in articulating the prevailing standard," and went
on to emphasize several limits on the ability to plead motive and
opportunity.160 Novak also commented that the district court's requirement that
155. Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529,538 (2d Cir. 1999).
156. Id. at 538-39.
157. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000).
158. See, e.g., Coates v. Heartland Wireless Comm., Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 417,431
(N.D. Tex. 2000); T.H.C., Inc. v. Fortune Petroleum Corp., No. 96CIV.2690, 1999 WL
182593, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999).
159. Novak, 216 F.3d at 310.
160. Id. In this regard, the Eighth Circuit's interpretation in Green Tree of the Second
Circuit standard also puts limits on the use of the motive and opportunity standard. See
Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645 (2001).
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plaintiffs plead "conscious recklessness" "was an accurate statement of the
law." 161
The Novak court's suggestion that the Second Circuit would apply the
motive and opportunity standard more rigorously has not, however, been
followed by subsequent Second Circuit panels. Rothman quotes Novak for the
proposition that the Reform Act did not change the standard for pleading
scienter in the Second Circuit, ignoring the limits that Novak appeared to
impose on motive and opportunity pleading, as well as the Novak court's
invocation of "conscious recklessness. '162 Ganino fails to even cite Novak. It
relies instead on pre-Reform Act precedent and treats the question of whether
motive and opportunity suffices as a basis for pleading scienter as one of first
impression. 163 As a result, instead of strengthening the Second Circuit's
"strong inference" standard as Novak apparently intended, the Rothman and
Ganino decisions actually echo the weaker forms of the "strong inference"
standard applied by the Second Circuit prior to the enactment of the Reform
Act.
Commentators who have studied the Second Circuit's post-Reform Act
applications thus have concluded that the decisions in Rothman and Ganino,
which followed within months of Novak, undermine Novak's suggestion of a
potentially more stringent definition of the motive and opportunity standard1 64
Indeed, the Second Circuit reversed dismissals in each of the four cases to
reach it post-Novak, a pattern more consistent with a weaker standard than with
a stronger one. On the other hand, the Second Circuit's most recent case in our
sample, Kalnit, is more demanding in applying the motive and opportunity
standard and rejects generalized allegations of motive.165 In sum, there appears
to be material disagreement within the Second Circuit itself as to the proper
interpretation and application of the Second Circuit's own standard.
The appellate decisions reveal an additional level of tension with regard to
the implications of the "strong inference" standard for the resolution of motions
for summary judgment. In Everex, a Ninth Circuit panel held that the weaker
Second Circuit standard would apply to the resolution of a motion for summary
judgment, and distinguished Silicon Graphics on the ground that it involved a
motion to dismiss, not a summary judgment motion.166 Although this
distinction is faithful to the text of the statute, it creates the unusual result that
standards for pleading a complaint, which must be done without discovery, are
161. Novak, 216 F.3d at 309.
162. Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2000).
163. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 168-70 (2d Cir. 2000).
164. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Second Circuit Developments Under the
PSLRA, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22,2001, at 5.
165. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2001).
166. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
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higher than standards for summary judgment, at which point the plaintiff will
have had the benefit of discovery. This result was rejected by the First Circuit
in Geffon,167 thus creating a split between circuits as to the standard for
demonstrating scienter at the summary judgment stage in addition to the split
over the proper standard at the pleading stage.
Despite this diversity in the interpretation of the pleading standard among
and within the circuits, the appellate courts have shown a surprisingly strong
trend in the outcome of decisions applying the standard: Of the thirty-three
appellate decisions to date, only eleven have resulted in a victory for the
plaintiff. To some extent, this observation may reflect a sample bias.
Defendants who have lost on a motion to dismiss ordinarily cannot take an
immediate appeal absent certification by the district court.168 If the defendants'
motion is granted with prejudice, however, plaintiffs are entitled to an
immediate appeal as of right. The sample of cases decided on appeal may thus
be composed of fact patterns that present the strongest arguments for dismissal
because of self-selection by plaintiffs and defendants. Even so, the
overwhelming majority of plaintiff victories on appeal (nine out of eleven)
have come from circuits applying the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity
standard, the most pro-plaintiff interpretation of the law. The other two
plaintiff victories have come from courts applying the Intermediate standard;
no panel has reversed a dismissal applying the Silicon Graphics standard. This
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the standard does influence the
outcome, and that plaintiffs do in fact fare better on appeal in circuits that apply
the Second Circuit standard rather than one of the more rigorous formulations.
The data also suggest, however, that the Second Circuit standard is not
easily applied in a consistent manner. In six cases, appellate panels applied the
Second Circuit standard to overturn district court dismissals where the district
court also had applied the Second Circuit standard or had concluded that the
complaint failed the lowest standard. This pattern of reversals can arise only if
judges disagree on the proper application of the Second Circuit standard to a
fixed set of facts, or on the actual meaning of the Second Circuit standard, even
though they agree that the Second Circuit standard is the correct interpretation
of the "strong inference" provision.
The Intermediate standard is also subject to dispute over its application.
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits are both generally viewed as falling in the
"Intermediate standard" camp, but when the Sixth Circuit reversed a panel's
dismissal in Helwig, the en banc court rejected as "unduly rigid" the Eleventh
Circuit's reading of the Sixth Circuit's Comshare opinion as categorically
excluding pleading motive and opportunity.169 According to the en banc court,
167. Geffon v. Micrion Corp., 249 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2001).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
169. Helwig v. Vencor, 251 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Bryant v.
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"conclusory labels" of motive and opportunity would not be sufficient to plead
a complaint adequately, but facts showing motive and opportunity "can be
catalysts to fraud and so serve as external markers to the required state of
mind," which would be sufficient.170 The majority's use of motive and
opportunity provoked a dissent from the author of the vacated panel opinion,
charging that the stock sales alleged by the plaintiffs as a motive did not satisfy
the "strong inference" standard because they were not alleged to have been
unusual in scope or timing.171
C. Political Patterns
The political composition of the judges of the en bane court in Helwig and
their voting pattern on the issue were at least as notable as the disagreement
over the application of the Intermediate standard. While the authors of both the
majority and dissenting opinions were Carter appointees, the judges in the
majority had all been appointed by Democratic presidents, and the other
dissenting judges had all been appointed by Republican presidents.
This breakdown along party lines suggests that worldviews and political
affiliations may be correlated with interpretations and outcomes under this
statute. Putting Helwig to one side, Democratic and Republican nominees are
equally represented (fifteen and fifteen) in the cases reversing dismissal.
However, Republicans outnumber Democrats (thirty-six to twenty-five, with
two Democratic appointees dissenting) in cases affirming dismissals. A similar
partisan split may be in evidence in Silicon Graphics. There, the
plaintiff/appellant sought a rehearing en bane, which was denied. The five
judges who dissented from that denial were all Democratic appointees. 72
While these observations may be viewed by some as consistent with the
hypothesis that political affiliation is correlated with judicial behavior at the
appellate level, 173 we urge caution before reaching such a conclusion. Our
sample size at the appellate level is small and there is no strong ideological split
in the precedent-setting opinions: Six Democratic appointees have voted for
the Second Circuit standard, as have five Republican; eight Democratic
appointees have voted for the Intermediate standard, as compared to six
Republican; and one Democrat has dissented from the Silicon Graphics
Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1287 (I Ith Cir. 1999)).
170. Id. at 550.
171. Id. at 572-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting also allegations that certain
statements alleged in the pleading raised a strong inference of scienter).
172. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. See. Litig., 195 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
173. For additional discussion of this hypothesis, see infra notes 201-206 and
accompanying text.
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standard, while two Republicans have voted for that standard. Moreover, as
described in greater detail in the Appendix, the district court data only weakly
support a party affiliation hypothesis.
D. Patterns in the Decisions to Seek or Avoid Supreme Court Review
Given the frequency with which plaintiffs are losing on appeal, it is
somewhat surprising that plaintiffs have filed a petition for certiorari in only
one of the twenty-two appellate decisions that have gone against them.174 They
have declined the opportunity to file petitions despite the fact that several of
these decisions, particularly Silicon Graphics, have interpreted the "strong
inference" standard in ways that provoked heated disagreements from the
plaintiffs' bar. Indeed, Silicon Graphics presented a pure question of law with
a clear circuit split, making it an ideal vehicle for Supreme Court review.
Why has the plaintiffs' bar not sought vindication for its views before the
Supreme Court? We conjecture that plaintiffs' attorneys do not expect that the
Supreme Court, as currently configured, will adopt a pro-plaintiff interpretation
of the "strong inference" standard. The apparent strategy is to keep the issue
away from the Court for as long as possible because the plaintiffs' bar prefers
to tolerate a mixed set of decisions at the circuit level rather than risk a
uniform, but negative, interpretation from the Supreme Court. Worse yet from
the perspective of the plaintiffs' bar, the Supreme Court could finally confront
the question of the status of recklessness under Section 10(b), an issue as to
which the Court has twice before expressly reserved its views,175 and conclude
that, given the implied nature of the private right giving rise to the cause of
action, the cause of action should be narrowly construed to exclude
recklessness from the definition of scienter. The plaintiffs' bar may well have
real concerns that a holding that Section 10(b)'s requirement of scienter is not
satisfied by recklessness would harm their interests even more than an adverse
ruling with regard to the interpretation of the heightened pleading standard.
The reluctance of the plaintiffs' bar to petition for certiorari, coupled with
the Court's traditional wariness of resolving disputed legal questions before
they are fully aired by the circuit courts, has interesting implications for the
empirical analysis of debate over the "strong inference" standard. The
divergence of opinions among the circuits has allowed for a natural experiment
allowing stock market participants to register their view of the wealth effects
associated with resolution of this dispute. The Ninth Circuit's demanding
174. See Desaigoudar v. Meyercord, 223 F.3d 1020 (2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1962 (2001). Defendants petitioned for certiorari in Novak, but that petition was denied.
121 S. Ct. 567 (2001). Defendants have also petitioned for certiorari in Scholastic, and that
petition is still pending.
175. See supra note 77.
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interpretation of the standard in Silicon Graphics was received favorably in the
stock market as the decision resulted in positive abnormal returns for
shareholders of a sample of high-technology firms, the industry most
vulnerable to such suits. 176 That positive stock price response was most
favorable for firms most likely to be targeted for non-meritorious suits, and
least favorable (albeit still positive) for firms most likely to commit fraud. In
the absence of a more determinate answer from the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, the Supreme Court could rely on these findings to invoke a
functionalist, wealth-promoting interpretive approach and adopt the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the standard.177
In sum, the appellate data are consistent with the following hypotheses:
(1) Congress successfully obscured the meaning of the "strong inference"
standard. It generated three distinct schools of interpretation among
the circuits, and induced one court to avoid the issue altogether.
(2) The trend in appellate decisions is toward the Intermediate standard,
rejecting the motive and opportunity test, but preserving recklessness.
(3) The "strong inference" standard is sufficiently ambiguous to allow a
material split within the Second Circuit itself as to the application of
the standard that the circuit itself originated. Moreover, appellate
courts and district courts applying the same standard to the same set of
facts regularly reach inconsistent conclusions as to whether motions to
dismiss should be granted.
(4) The interpretive standard chosen at the appellate level influences the
outcomes of the decision.
(5) The plaintiffs' bar fears an unfavorable interpretation of the "strong
inference" standard by the Supreme Court. It may also fear a Supreme
Court ruling on the adequacy of recklessness as a basis for scienter
under Section 10(b).
(6) The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the "strong inference" standard,
which is the most pro-defendant, was favorably received by investors.
(7) Judges nominated by Republican presidents tend to adopt a more pro-
defendant stance, while judges nominated by Democratic presidents
tend to adopt a more pro-plaintiff stance, although the pattern is not
entirely consistent.
176. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon
Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act's Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 773 (2000).
177. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1479 (1987). It is a logical possibility that adoption of the Intermediate standard might have
been met with an even greater positive abnormal return. We can suggest, however, that the
Silicon Graphics standard was preferred by investors to the baseline, expected case (the
Second Circuit standard).
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V. CONCLUSION
There is a clear victor in the contest between the legislative ability to
obscure and the judicial capacity consistently to interpret the "strong inference"
provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The
legislative ability to obscure thrashes the judicial capacity to interpret.
At the appellate level, the circuits are split into three distinct camps. The
Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits conclude that the "strong inference"
provision incorporates the Second Circuit standard. The First, Fifth, Sixth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits reject the Second Circuit standard and conclude
that Congress intended to adopt a stricter Intermediate standard. The Ninth
Circuit adopts the even more rigorous "Silicon Graphics" interpretation. This
three-way split is compounded by evidence of inconsistent interpretations
among panels within the same circuit, inconsistent applications of a common
standard to a common set of facts, and the emergence of a new split as to
whether the "strong inference" standard applies only on motions to dismiss or
whether it also applies on motions for summary judgment.
The situation is at least as confused at the district court level. The analysis
of 167 district court rulings presented in the Appendix indicates that judges
who are unconstrained by appellate precedent frequently adopt minimalist
strategies that avoid the need to interpret the statute. They rule either that a
complaint is sufficiently strong that it satisfies the most stringent conceivable
articulation of the pleading standard, or that it is so deficient that it fails the
most forgiving articulation, without explaining how the "strong inference"
standard is to be interpreted or applied.
District court judges who interpret the "strong inference" provision
generate aggregate patterns of behavior that are, to a remarkable degree,
statistically indistinguishable from a "coin-toss" model of judicial behavior. In
this coin-toss model, the judge first flips a coin to determine whether the
Second Circuit standard prevails or whether Congress intended to adopt a more
stringent standard. If a more stringent standard applies then the judge tosses
the coin again to decide between the Intermediate standard and the Ninth
Circuit standard. While we do not mean to imply that judges actually flip coins
to decide the question, we do observe that the aggregate data do not allow us to
reject the hypothesis that many coins are being flipped as judges interpret the
"strong inference" provision in the absence of controlling circuit precedent.
The data are mixed as to whether the articulation of an interpretive
standard has a statistically significant effect on the outcome of the underlying
motion to dismiss. At the appellate level, the adoption of the Second Circuit
standard appears to be correlated with resolutions that are more favorable to
plaintiffs. The appellate data also suggest, however, that trial court judges and
appellate judges frequently differ on the proper application of the same
standard to a fixed set of facts. At the district court level, we find a statistically
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significant correlation between the selection of an interpretive standard and the
resolution of the underlying motion to dismiss, but also find that other factors,
such as docket load, judicial experience with class action securities fraud
litigation, and the intensity of litigation within the district involving technology
issuers, can play a significant role in explaining both the selection of the
interpretive standard and the resolution of the underlying motion.
These findings imply that judges retain significant discretion in the
application of law to facts when resolving motions to dismiss securities fraud
complaints. The level of discretion is sufficiently great that judges frequently
can dispose of motions in a manner they deem most appropriate without being
overly constrained by the formal definition of the standard. Put another way,
even if the courts were all promptly to coalesce on a single interpretation of the
"strong inference" standard, it does not necessarily follow that there would be
uniformity in the resolution of the underlying motions to dismiss. We again
caution that this observation should not be overinterpreted, and we do not
suggest that the articulation of an interpretive standard is irrelevant. Instead,
we interpret the data as suggesting that if the courts were consistently to adopt
the Ninth Circuit's (Second Circuit's) standard, the probability of pro-
defendant (pro-plaintiff) resolutions would increase, but courts would
nonetheless retain significant discretion when applying the standard to any
given set of facts.
This observation suggests that the question of statutory interpretation is
most precisely analyzed at two distinct levels: a formal, semantic level and an
applied, practical level. If a statute gives rise to a series of consistent, formal
judicial interpretations, the variance in the judicial application of the standard
to facts typically at issue in the litigation nonetheless may be sufficiently large
that the legislature succeeds in achieving random outcomes even though the
courts appear to be linguistically precise in the articulation of a common legal
standard. This result facilitates legislative compromise, but it also suggests that
the goal of consistency in statutory interpretation can be significantly more
difficult to accomplish than simple textual analysis of judicial holdings would
indicate.
The data also display patterns that inform our understanding of class action
securities fraud litigation. The district court data contain a cluster of correlated
variables that includes presence in the Northern District of California, the
intensity of class action securities fraud litigation in the district, and the
intensity of litigation against technology issuers in the district. Variables in this
cluster are correlated with pro-defendant interpretations of the "strong
inference" standard as well as with pro-defendant rulings on the underlying
motions to dismiss.
The data also indicate that district court judges with more than one decision
in our database are more likely to rule in favor of defendants on motions to
dismiss. The same judges do not, however, display an equivalently strong
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tendency to adopt pro-defendant interpretations of the pleading standard.
This behavioral pattern could result either because judges who are
frequently exposed to securities fraud litigation learn to be skeptical of
plaintiffs' claims on the merits (the "familiarity breeds skepticism" hypothesis),
or because these judges have an incentive based on judicial economy to clear
their dockets of frequently arising claims (the "docket control" hypothesis).
We view the data as more consistent with the "familiarity breeds skepticism"
hypothesis because variables that measure the intensity and frequency of
securities fraud litigation and litigation against technology issuers are
systematically and meaningfully significant, unlike other variables designed to
measure for general docket-control incentives. Further, judges who are
interested in economizing on resources might often be better served by issuing
pro-plaintiff rulings that could quickly drive the litigation toward a settlement.
These pro-plaintiff strategies could consume fewer judicial resources in
comparison with the judicial effort required to write complex pro-defendant
opinions on motions to dismiss that might only serve to prolong judicial
involvement at the trial and appellate levels.
Other variables are sporadically significant in our analysis, but none tell as
compelling or comprehensive a story. The identity or political affiliation of the
president who nominated a district court judge is occasionally significant.
Judges nominated by Democratic presidents tend to display pro-plaintiff
tendencies, but this pattern is hardly uniform or pervasive in the data. At the
appellate level, there also appears to be a weak tendency on the part of judges
nominated by Democratic presidents to adopt more pro-plaintiff interpretations.
We do not, however, view these patterns as sufficient to support a strong
conclusion that political inclinations are here systematically correlated with
judicial behavior. The data are, at most, suggestive.
Presence in the Northern District of Illinois or in the Southern District of
New York is correlated with pro-plaintiff rulings. These tendencies appear to
reflect judicial perspectives that are not systematically related to any other
significant variables measured in our analysis. If those court-specific variables
were more consistently significant in a larger number of regressions, we would
suggest that plaintiffs have an unexplained advantage in those two districts.
The data are not, however, strong enough in our view to support that
conclusion.
We also find that judges with backgrounds as prosecutors tend toward pro-
defendant interpretations of the statute. This finding is contrary to our initial
expectation that judges with prosecutorial backgrounds would tend to give
credence to plaintiffs' allegations of fraud. Again, given the large number of
regressions we have run and variables we have tested, we caution against
overinterpretation of this finding.
What are the implications of these results? At the narrowest level, they
suggest that the questions presented by the "strong inference" debate are ripe
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for Supreme Court review in order to resolve a split among the circuits and
confusion in the district courts. A Supreme Court decision could establish a
consistent nationwide interpretation of the "strong inference" standard, but we
are not confident that any such standard would generate a consistent set of
results on the resolution of motions to dismiss. Again, this is not to suggest
that a Supreme Court decision interpreting the "strong inference" standard
would have no effect on the resolution of the underlying motions. The
implication of our findings is, instead, that it is easy to exaggerate the degree of
consistency likely to result from any such ruling.
More broadly, however, our findings can inform the larger controversy
over methods of statutory construction and the analysis of the strategic
interaction between the legislative and judicial branches. Recall our earlier
observation that legislators seeking compromise will rationally prefer
ambiguity in the interpretation of statutory language. Without such ambiguity,
legislators operating in a rational expectations equilibrium would be unable to
implement mixed-game strategies as part of the legislative process, and
legislators with conflicting views would be unable simultaneously to claim
victory over the same legislative language. Ambiguity is thus a valuable
lubricant in the legislative process. 178
Judges can also value ambiguity to the extent that it allows them greater
latitude to exercise discretion, more room within which to compromise with
colleagues, and increased opportunity to avoid resolutions that they view as
unjust or incorrect by whatever metric they might apply. Judge Posner, for
example, suggests that judges often vote "their policy preferences and personal
convictions," within the confines of the "rules" of judging, as part of the
judging "game.' '179 Judges express these preferences particularly when "cases
cannot be decided by reasoning from conventional legal materials. Such cases
require a judge to exercise a legislative judgment, although a more confined
one than real legislators are authorized to exercise." 180 Statutory language that
is successfully ambiguous cannot, by construction, be "decided by reasoning
from conventional legal materials." It follows that to the extent that judges
value their ability to vote "policy preferences and personal convictions" as part
of the "game" of judging, judges should also support a technology of
interpretation that is not unduly constricting and that permits a material,
principled degree of dispute over the pragmatic meaning of words.181 The
178. See supra Part II.
179. POSNER, supra note 9, at 131. See generally supra Part II.
180. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Much in the same vein, Judge Posner has observed that
[t]he interpretation of texts is not a logical exercise, and the bounds of "interpretation" are so
elastic... as to cast the utility of the concept into doubt.... [P]ragmatists will ask which of
the possible resolutions has the best consequences, all things that lawyers are or should be
interested in considered, including the importance of preserving language as a medium of
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Supreme Court's elastic presumptions for the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation are, we believe, an example of this flexible interpretive
technology. A side effect of this flexible approach is that, while maintaining
discretion for the high court, it reduces the ability to ensure consistent
interpretation by lower courts.
To the extent that the legislative and judicial branches share a de facto
preference for some level of ambiguity, it follows that careful efforts to craft
and rigorously apply consistent principles of statutory interpretation-or to
invent novel rules of interpretation that foster greater consistency-are doomed
to failure if they impart too much precision. These efforts are doomed not
because they are lacking in any formal or intellectual sense, although some
scholars might make that argument.182 Instead, efforts at precision in statutory
interpretation may be naturally limited by the joint preference of the legislative
and judicial branches for a level of ambiguity that allows each branch to go
about its business as it best sees fit. The broadest implication of this view is
that much of the debate over statutory construction may be intellectually
interesting but pragmatically irrelevant because theories of interpretation that
seek a level of consistency that is valued by neither the legislature nor the
courts would never be implemented in an equilibrium relationship between the
branches. 183
The suggestion that the legislative and judicial branches value ambiguity
also provides a novel explanation for several long-running debates in the
literature. For example, Justice Scalia's repeated frustration over the Supreme
Court's inability to apply consistently even the simplest principles of textualism
is easily explained as the consequence of a legislative-judicial interpretive
equilibrium that requires ambiguity in order to permit mixed-game strategies.
Supreme Court justices are smart enough to follow Justice Scalia's rigorous
effective communication and of preserving the separation of powers by generally deferring to
the legislature's policy choices.
Id. at 400.
182. See, e.g., id.; Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 115-
16 (Antonin Scalia ed., 1997) (emphasizing the impossibility of interpreting text without
reference to non-textual intent).
183. The observation that a level of imprecision is consistent with the joint equilibrium
preferred by legislators and courts may provide a solution to a mystery posed by Justice
Scalia. Justice Scalia observes that the "American law of statutory interpretation" is "so
utterly unformed... that not only is its methodology unclear, but even its very objective is."
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 16. Justice Scalia also observes that "the American bar and
American legal education, by and large, are unconcerned with the fact that we have no
intelligible theory" of statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia's observation is reinforced by
the Court's practice of not affording stare decisis effect to the methodologies that it employs,
thereby leaving different justices free to employ different approaches to statutory
construction. Id. at 14. This level of apathy is, we suggest, consistent with a lack ofjudicial
or legislative demand for theories of interpretation that impose greater precision than
currently found in the literature.
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approach to statutory construction. The fact that they fail to do so thus reflects
a lack of an incentive to be overly precise rather than an inability to be precise.
The Court's refusal to jump on the new-textualist bandwagon (assuming that
new textualism in fact leads to greater precision and consistency in
interpretation) would thus be consistent with the hypothesis that neither the
legislature nor the courts want to operate in a regime where the rules of
construction produce overly consistent results. 184
Although we must be cautious in drawing broad conclusions from a study
that examines the interpretation of two words in a single statute, the
thoroughness with which Congress is able to flummox the courts supports a
much broader observation: Efforts to impose precision on the interpretation of
statutory language can be carried too far because neither Congress nor the
courts want to operate in a regime that eliminates ambiguity. If that
observation is correct, it follows that much of the effort expended to devise
more rigorous interpretive theories may be wasted energy because those
techniques generate levels of consistency that are not valued by the legislative
and judicial processes. Put another way, new-textualist, intentionalist,
expressive, or dynamic theories of statutory interpretation may be intellectually
intriguing but pragmatically irrelevant because the dominant coalitions of
legislators and judges have reason to reject the levels of precision and
consistency generated by each of these analytic approaches. Ambiguity may
well be mutually advantageous in the separation of powers game played
between the legislature and the judiciary.
Thus, even if the courts could invent a magic black box that could precisely
and predictably interpret any statutory text and legislative history, there is good
reason to believe that the legislature would not want the courts to use that black
box. There is also good reason to believe that the courts would not want to
employ such a black box on all occasions. Conscious ambiguity in the design
and interpretation of statutes thus may have strong survival characteristics in
our multi-branch legal regime.
184. Some of Justice Scalia's critics might argue that he has himself been inconsistent
in the application of his own interpretive principles, and that this inconsistency reflects
Justice Scalia's own demand for a measure of ambiguity consistent with the expression of
his own policy preferences and personal convictions. Justice Scalia and his supporters
would reject such hypotheses. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the
Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 393 (1996) (collecting
and responding to certain criticisms of Justice Scalia's consistency in statutory
interpretation).
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APPENDIX: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
This Appendix reports on an analysis of 167 district court rulings that
address the "strong inference" standard. Each ruling predates the issuance of a
decision addressing the "strong inference" standard by any panel of the court of
appeals for the circuit in which the district court resides. Each district court
decision thus represents a judicial interpretation that is unconstrained by
controlling appellate precedent.
This sample size is sufficiently large to support a series of formal statistical
analyses that we apply to test a broad array of hypotheses about statutory
construction and judicial behavior. For example, we test whether district courts
adopt a dominant interpretation of the "strong inference" standard, or whether
their interpretations are scattered and diffuse. We also test a broad array of
"legal realist" hypotheses regarding the influence of judicial background, court
workload, defendant characteristics, and a host of other variables on the
selection of an interpretive standard and on the resolution of the underlying
motions to dismiss.
The structure of our analysis is driven in part by the absence of a generally
accepted theory that can be relied upon to specify the definition of the
dependent variables used in our regression models. Therefore, rather than
apply a set of arbitrary restrictions to the data, we develop a broad range of
variable definitions and then apply dichotomous and polytomous regression
techniques to search for patterns in the data. We report all results, including
statistically insignificant results, here and in the online Statistical Appendix to
this paper.185 We find that the results of our analysis are sensitive to variable
definition and to regression techniques. We therefore caution against
overinterpreting our findings.
We recognize that our approach is characteristic of a data-mining exercise.
We suggest, however, that an analysis of the sort we report here-in which
insignificant results are reported along with significant ones, and in which
emphasis is placed only on relationships that appear to be robust across a range
of variable specifications and regression techniques-is more likely to yield a
realistic assessment of the underlying statistical relationships than an analysis
that arbitrarily constrains variable definitions or that focuses on statistically
significant relationships while obscuring equally plausible relationships that are
statistically insignificant. 186
Our analysis of the district court decisions proceeds as follows. Section A
of this Appendix describes the sample, the construction of the variables used in
the analyses, and the hypotheses to be tested. Section A also summarizes
185. See http://law.stanford.edu/lawreview/gp2001/.
186. See infra notes 220-222 and accompanying text.
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descriptive statistics that characterize the sample, and presents evidence that the
legislative ability to obscure here dominates the judicial capacity to interpret.
Section B presents a series of univariate regression analyses in which
individual explanatory variables are used to search for patterns in judicial
decision-making. Section C describes a series of multivariate logistic and
polytomous regressions that search for patterns in judicial behavior that are
correlated with the interpretation of the "strong inference" standard and with
the resolution of the underlying motions to dismiss. Section D summarizes the
findings of our statistical analysis.
A. The Sample, the Data, and the Hypotheses
1. The sample.
Our sample is composed of 167 district court opinions that address the
"strong inference" standard.187 Each of these opinions was issued prior to the
earlier of (a) the issuance of any decision addressing the "strong inference"
standard by any panel of the court of appeals for the circuit in which the district
court resides188 or (b) April 1, 2000, the cutoff date for our sample.
We identified these decisions through LEXIS and Westlaw searches and
supplemented those findings with unreported decisions that we obtained from
practitioners who specialize in securities fraud litigation.189 To the extent that
we have failed to identify unpublished decisions that would otherwise satisfy
187. The sample was limited to cases in which the court based its decision to grant or
to deny a motion to dismiss, in whole or in part, on plaintiffs' ability to plead an adequate
complaint under the Reform Act's strong inference standard. Cases were deleted from the
sample when the court based its order on plaintiffs' failure to plead an element of a Rule
lob-5 claim other than scienter, and without addressing the strong inference standard. See,
e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D. Conn. 1999) (failure to plead
materiality), rev'd dismissal, 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000); Scone Invs., L.P. v. Am. Third
Mkt. Corp., 1998 WL 205338 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998) (failure to plead reliance where
court states that the strong inference standard "is not an issue in this motion"); Rosenbaum &
Co. v. H.J. Meyers & Co., No. 97-824, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15720 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997)
(failure to plead misrepresentation or omission); Lindblom v. Mobile Telecomms. Techs.
Corp., 985 F. Supp. 161 (D.D.C. 1997) (failure to plead a transaction in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security). Cases were also deleted if they were decided on other
grounds, such as forum non coveniens or violation of the statute of limitations, without
providing guidance as to the appropriate standard. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Omega Research, 38
F. Supp. 2d 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (forum non conveniens); In re Westlake Elec. Corp., 982
F. Supp. 1031 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (time barred). A complete list of the opinions in the sample
can be found in the Statistical Appendix at http://law.stanford.edu/lawreview/gp2OO1/.
188. These dates were determined with reference to the appellate decisions reported in
Table 1, supra.
189. David Levine of the Securities and Exchange Commission graciously provided
most of the unreported decisions.
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the sample definition, we believe that the number of omitted observations is
likely to be small. To the extent that these omitted observations reflect a bias in
our sample, we reason but cannot demonstrate that the omitted observations are
more likely to be unpublished decisions denying motions to dismiss, a pro-
plaintiff outcome. Those orders are most likely to be unreported, and tend to
pass with less notice and discussion among members of the bar. Accordingly,
if there is a bias in our sample, it likely results in a sample that understates
decisions with pro-plaintiff outcomes.
Our sample of 167 observations contains decisions by 116 different judges.
It follows that fifty-one (30.5 percent) of the decisions in our sample represent
a repeat interpretation of the statutory standard by a judge. This fact suggests
two competing perspectives of our dataset, and we pursue both in our analysis.
The first perspective views each of the 167 observations as an independent
opinion that deserves equal weight. This approach can be criticized for
overweighting the views of judges who happen to have issued multiple
opinions interpreting the "strong inference" standard. This approach can be
defended, however, on the ground that judges who tend to decide more class
action securities fraud cases are, in fact, more influential with regard to the
interpretation and application of the statutory language than other judges. We
rely on this view of the data to generate our "All Observations" dataset. The
second perspective views each judge in the sample as an independent
observation that deserves equal weight. To implement this approach we adjust
for the presence of judges with multiple decisions by assigning to those judges
a dominant interpretive style variable that corresponds to one of the five
interpretive standards described below.190 Those data define an "Individual
Judge" dataset. It is not possible, however, to assign a single "outcome"
variable to each judge because the outcomes of individual cases decided by
each judge can and do differ even if the judge is consistent in choosing an
interpretive standard.
2. Content analysis and the "interpretive standard" variable.
A central objective of our analysis is to search for patterns in the
interpretation of the "strong inference" standard. Consistent with our analysis
of the appellate decisions, we began with a content analysis of each opinion in
the sample and characterized each judicial interpretation of the "strong
inference" standard according to whether it adopted the Second Circuit
standard, followed an Intermediate standard, or adopted the Silicon Graphics
standard. We soon discovered, however, that many courts avoided the need to
interpret the statute by asserting that the complaint at issue was either (a) so
well crafted that it could survive a motion to dismiss under even the strongest
190. See infra pp. 687-689.
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interpretation of the standard or (b) so poorly crafted that it would fail a motion
to dismiss under even the weakest interpretation of the standard. In order to
capture this strategy of interpretative avoidance, which is consistent with
"judicial minimalism" (i.e., a style of judging that calls for a court to decide the
minimum number of issues necessary in order to resolve the case at issue),'191
we categorized each decision as falling into one of the five following
categories:
Satisfies Highest. The complaint's allegations are sufficiently strong that
the case would survive a motion to dismiss under even the most stringent
interpretation of the statutory standard, but the court expresses no view as to the
definition of the standard.
Second Circuit standard. The opinion concludes that the statute codifies
the Second Circuit standard, or accepts motive and opportunity pleading as
sufficient. 192
Intermediate standard. The opinion concludes that "the mere pleading of
notice and opportunity does not, of itself, automatically suffice to raise a strong
inference of scienter," but requires instead that "pleadings must set forth
sufficient particulars, of whatever kind, to raise a strong inference of the
required scienter." 193
Silicon Graphics standard. The opinion concludes that "Congress intended
to elaborate the pleading requirement above the Second Circuit standard," and
rejects pleading based on "a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do
so." The opinion requires instead that plaintiffs must "plead, in great detail,
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or
conscious misconduct." 194
Fails Lowest. The complaint's allegations are so weak that the complaint
would fail a motion to dismiss under even the most lenient interpretation of the
statutory standard; or that the complaint fails even to plead fraud with the level
191. See, e.g., SUNsTEIN, supra note 11; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995
Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 6 (1996) (describing
judicial minimalism as "the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify an
outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided").
192. For pre-PSLRA articulations of the Second Circuit standard see, for example,
Acito v. lmcera Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) and Shields v. CityTrust Bancorp,
Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994). For post-PSLRA articulations see, for example,
Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000) and Press
v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999). See also supra
notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The
Second Circuit characterized that articulation as not adopting the Second Circuit's pleading
standard and as instead strengthening it. Novak, 216 F.3d at 310; see also Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183
F.3d 542, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1999).
194. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
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of particularity required pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The
court therefore finds it unnecessary to interpret the standard.
We hypothesize that these categories follow an ordinal ranking from most
pro-plaintiff to most pro-defendant. A plaintiff would thus prefer to learn that a
complaint is so strong that it would survive under any articulation of a standard
rather than learn that a complaint survives a motion under the Second Circuit
standard, and so on. 195 This ranking allows for the application of certain
clustering and polytomous regression techniques, as described below.
Table 2
Distribution of Interpretive Standards
All Observations Individual Judge
Pleading Standard Sam le Sam pie
Number Percent Number Percent
No Interpretation Necessary- Satisfies Highest standard 22 13.2% 14 12.1%
Second Circuit standard 50 29.9/. 40 34.5%
Intermediate standard 28 16.S% 18 15.5%
Silicon Graphics standard 23 13.8% 20 17.2%
No Interpretation Necessary:. Fails Lowest standard 44 26.3% 24 20.7%
Total 167 100.0% 116 100.0%
Table 2 describes the distribution of the interpretive standard variable for
the "All Observations" and "Individual Judge" datasets. This simple cut of the
data generates several significant observations.
Quite striking is the fact that judicial minimalism is the most frequent form
of interpretation-or non-interpretation-in the All Observations sample. A
total of 66 decisions, or 39.2 percent of that sample, avoid articulating a
standard by deciding either that a case is so well pled (22 decisions) or poorly
pled (44 decisions) that there is no need to wrestle with the thorny interpretive
question posed by the "strong inference" standard. The Individual Judge
sample displays a similar tendency, though not as strongly. There, 38 judges,
or 32.8 percent of the sample, resort to minimalist strategies to avoid the
interpretive thicket.196
195. We recognize that the "Fails Lowest" and "Satisfies Highest" categories (which
together constitute a "judicial minimalism" category) conflate judicial conclusions regarding
the merits of the underlying complaint with decisions as to the appropriate interpretive
standard. We therefore conduct many of our analyses on datasets that exclude decisions that
adopt these minimalist approaches.
196. The data also indicate that the incidence of decisions holding that complaints fail
to meet the lowest standard, whatever that might be, drops from 26.3 percent of the All
Observations dataset to 20.7 percent of the Individual Judge dataset. This pattern indicates
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Once we exclude minimalist decisions from consideration, we can formally
apply a series of binomial tests to determine whether the observed decisional
patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that the district courts are divided
over the proper interpretation of the standard. One method to test whether the
courts are evenly divided over the interpretive issue is to examine whether their
behavior appears to be random, or, put another way, to test whether the courts,
in the aggregate, behave as though they are deciding the issue by tossing a fair
coin. The model we test is as follows: If a judge decides to confront the
interpretive issue the judge tosses a fair coin. If the coin lands heads, then the
judge adopts the Second Circuit standard. If it lands tails then the judge selects
a more stringent standard and tosses the coin again, with a second heads now
indicating the Intermediate standard and a tails indicating the Silicon Graphics
standard. 19 7
The data in Table 2 are highly consistent with this model for both the All
Observations and Individual Judge datasets. 198 At the aggregate level, the
district courts appear to be evenly divided as to whether the "strong inference"
that judges who preside more frequently in class action security fraud matters tend to be
more skeptical of the merits of such complaints and tend to express their skepticism through
minimalist holdings that lead to dismissal.
197. No doubt, if one posits a model in which judges choose among three equally
likely interpretations of the statute, then these tests are inappropriate. We do not, however,
believe that the text and legislative history of the Act support this alternative reading because
the structure of the interpretive debate clearly poses the threshold question in a binary form:
Is the Second Circuit standard adopted or rejected? The legislative record is largely silent as
to the standard that would be applied if the Second Circuit standard is rejected, and the
courts have themselves generated the Intermediate standard and Silicon Graphics standard as
the two dominant interpretations that are applied conditional on rejection of the Second
Circuit standard.
198. For the All Observations dataset, which has 101 observations that interpret the
standard, the approximate 95 percent confidence interval spans 42 to 59 (i.e., any number of
heads between 42 and 59 would be consistent with the coin being fair). That range includes
the 50 observed "heads" (selections of the Second Circuit standard). The p-value for a result
of 50 heads is 1 (i.e., even if a fair coin is tossed 101 times you cannot observe less variation
in the sample). A stronger confirmation is not possible.
Of the remaining 51 decisions, the approximate 95 percent confidence interval spans 20
to 31 heads. That range includes the 28 "heads" (selections of the Intermediate standard on
the second toss of the coin) observed in that sample. The p-value for a result of 28 heads in
51 trials is 57.6 percent (i.e., in 57.6 percent of trials we should observe fewer than 28 heads
in 51 tosses of a fair coin).
For the Individual Judge dataset, which has 78 observations that interpret the standard,
the approximate 95 percent confidence interval spans 32 to 46, a range that includes the 40
observed "heads" (selection of the Second Circuit standard). The p-value for a result of 40
heads is 91.0 percent. Of the remaining 38 decisions, the approximate 95 percent confidence
interval spans 14 to 24 heads (selections of the Intermediate standard). The p-value for a
result of 18 heads in 38 trials is 87.1 percent.
Additional information regarding these tests and procedures can be found in the
Statistical Appendix at http://law.stanford.edullawreview/gp2001l.
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pleading requirement incorporates the Second Circuit standard or calls for a
stronger interpretation. Further, the opinions that call for a stronger standard
are closely split between the Intermediate standard and the Silicon Graphics
standard. By this analysis, the district court data are consistent with the
hypothesis that the legislative ability to obscure trumps the judicial ability to
interpret. We obviously do not suggest that courts interpret statutory language
by flipping coins. We do, however, observe that the lack of consistency in the
interpretation observed in our sample creates a pattern that is statistically
indistinguishable from one that would result if judges in fact tossed coins to
resolve this interpretive question.
3. Content analysis and the "outcome" variable.
A second central objective of our analysis is to search for patterns in the
resolution of these motions to dismiss, and to determine whether the selection
of a standard is statistically significant in determining the outcome of a motion
to dismiss. Categorizing the outcome of the underlying motion to dismiss is
more complex than categorizing an interpretive standard because a motion
typically will seek the dismissal of several distinct counts as pled against
several distinct individuals, whereas the articulation of an interpretive standard
typically calls for the selection of a standard from among a reasonably well-
specified menu of alternatives. Thus, the motion can be granted in whole or in
part and with or without prejudice with respect to any portion of the complaint.
Our analysis suggests that each resolution of a motion to dismiss can be
categorized as falling into one of seven categories:
1. The motion is denied in its entirety.
2. The motion is granted in part, but without prejudice as to any portion
that is dismissed.
3. The motion granted in its entirety, but without prejudice as to any
portion that is dismissed.
4. The motion is granted in part, but with prejudice only as to some
portion that is dismissed.
5. The motion is granted in its entirety, but with prejudice only as to some
portion that is dismissed.
6. The motion is granted in part, and with prejudice as to all portions of the
complaint that are dismissed.
7. The motion is granted in its entirety, and with prejudice as to the entire
complaint.
We hypothesize that these categories also follow an ordinal ranking from
most pro-plaintiff to most pro-defendant. Thus, a plaintiff would most prefer
that a motion to dismiss be denied in its entirety. The plaintiff would next
prefer that if a motion is denied only in part, that the denial be without
prejudice as to any part dismissed, and would least prefer that a complaint be
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dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. 19 9 Again, this ranking allows for the
application of certain clustering and polytomous regression techniques, as
described below.
A simple breakdown of the outcomes in the 167 decisions in our sample, as
displayed in Table 3, is again revealing. The most frequent result-occurring in
34.1 percent of the sample-is that the motion to dismiss is denied in its
entirety. The next most common outcome-occurring in 27.5 percent of the
sample-is that the motion is granted in its entirety, but without prejudice as to
any portion of the complaint. Additionally, in 9 percent of the sample, the
motion is granted in part, but without prejudice as to any portion of the
complaint. Aggregating these three categories, which we posit to be the most
pro-plaintiff, indicates that in 70.7 percent of the sample the motion to dismiss
is either denied in its entirety or granted with leave to replead in such a manner
as to allow the litigation to continue.
199. We recognize that this ordinal ranking is subject to several critiques. For
example, a defendant may fail to move for dismissal of the strongest allegations in a
complaint thereby leading to a situation in which a strong complaint survives despite the fact
that the entire motion to dismiss might be granted with prejudice. This observation does not,
however, suggest any bias in our categorization, nor is this situation likely to arise with great
frequency. Also, a plaintiff could argue that her sequence of preference is different than the
sequence reflected in our ordinal ranking, particularly over the intermediate categories four
through six. We respond to this critique by employing a range of clustering techniques
designed to minimize the implications of categorizations in the intermediate classifications.
See infra p. 701.
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Table 3
Distribution of Outcomes
(All Observations)
Outcome Number Percent
1. Motion to dismiss denied in entirety 57 34.1%
2. Motion granted in part, but without prejudice as to any part dismissed 15 9.0%
3. Motion granted in entirety, but without prejudice as to any part dismissed 46 27.5%
4. Motion granted in part, but with prejudice only as to some parts dismissed 3 1.8%
5. Motion granted in entirety, but with prejudice only as to some parts dismissed 6 3.6%
6. Motion granted in part, and with prejudice as to all parts dismissed 10 6.0%
7. Motion granted in entirety, and with prejudice as to entire complaint 30 18.0%
Total 167 100%
In contrast, the motion to dismiss is granted with prejudice in its entirety in
only 18 percent of the sample. It follows that the plaintiffs complaint moves
forward in the litigation, or lives to be re-pled at least in part, in 82 percent of
the opinions in our sample.
While instructive, these data must be interpreted with caution. Our data do
not capture the subsequent litigation history of complaints that were dismissed
without prejudice. It is entirely possible that a material percentage of those
complaints were later dismissed with prejudice as to all or a portion of the
claims asserted. Our data also do not capture the subsequent appellate history
of these decisions. Decisions to dismiss complaints could later be reversed on
appeal, even if the appellate court asserts that it agrees with the lower court's
interpretive standard. 200 Our data should thus be interpreted as measuring
outcomes observed at a very specific point in time as litigation progresses
through the judicial system, and not as measuring outcomes as of the final
disposition of the lawsuit.
4. Explanatory variables and hypotheses.
We look to the legal realist tradition, prior empirical literature, and legal
commentary regarding judicial interpretation of the "strong inference"
provision to identify variables that might explain patterns in the selection of
interpretive standards or in the determination of outcomes of motions to
dismiss. For example, some studies suggest that the political party of the
president who nominates a judge to the bench may be statistically correlated
200. See, e.g., supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text (discussion of Novak v.
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000)).
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with the judge's decision-making behavior, 01 and one study reports that
Clinton and Carter appointees are more likely to support "liberal" results in
cases involving economic issues.202 Other studies find no such correlation2 03
Some observers also suggest that there are real differences among presidents of
the same party, arguing that the simple measurement of party affiliation might
be insufficient.204 In the case of the "strong inference" provision, it is clear
from the legislative record that President Clinton preferred the Second Circuit
standard to stricter interpretations, while Republican legislators and corporate
defense interests supported stricter interpretations of the standard. 05  The
Reform Act's political background can thus be read to support a range of
political inclination hypotheses.
Accordingly, for each ruling in our sample, we identified the judge who
issued the ruling, the president who nominated that judge to the bench, and that
president's party affiliation.206 These data were used to generate Clinton,
Bush, Reagan, Carter, Ford, Nixon, Johnson, and magistrate variables,207 as
well as Democrat and Republican variables. In later analyses, because of low
counts in the data, we cluster the Ford, Johnson and magistrate variables to
create a presidential "Other" variable.
201. See, e.g., Sisk et al., supra note 21, at 1388 ("In contrast to the sporadic findings
of significant correlation on other background variables, studies frequently (but not
invariably) have found political party identification to be a significant predictor of judicial
voting in ideologically divisive cases."). Empirical work typically uses the party of the
nominating president as a proxy for the judge's ideological leanings because that information
is much more readily available than the party affiliation of the judge. In practice, the two are
extremely highly correlated. Prior empirical work has found that the ideology of the
appointing president's party is a powerful predictor of judicial votes. See George, supra
note 61, at 237-38 ("Attitudinal studies have demonstrated that the ideological direction
('liberal' or 'conservative') of the party of a judge's appointing President is a strong
predictor of the case votes of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals judges.").
202. Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp & Donald R. Songer, The Voting Behavior of
President Clinton's Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16, 19 (1996) (finding that Clinton
and Carter appointees voted in liberal direction 62 percent of the time, with Nixon
appointees at 48 percent, Ford appointees at 55 percent, Reagan appointees at 49 percent,
and Bush appointees at 51 percent).
203. See Ashenfelter et al., supra note 63, at 281 (finding no statistically significant
difference between Republican and Democratic judges in civil rights cases).
204. Wald, supra note 64, at 239 ("The Democratic and Republican parties of twenty
years ago are far different from those existing today, and so a Carter appointee may well
have a different worldview than a Clinton appointee, even though they both consider
themselves Democrats.").
205. See supra Part HI.
206. The data were obtained from 5 JUDICIALYELLOW BOOK No. 1 (Fall 1999).
207. Because magistrates are appointed by a separate process, we categorize them
distinctly.
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Table 4
Explanatory Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable All Observations Individual Judge
Std. Std.
Individual Judge Characteristics Count Mean Dev. Count Mean Dev.
Democrat 67 0.40 0.49 43 0.37 0.49
Republican 100 0.60 0.49 73 0.63 0.49
Clinton 55 0.33 0.47 33 0.28 0.45
Bush 25 0.15 0.36 20 0.17 0.38
Reagan 57 0.34 0.48 41 0.35 0.48
Carter 9 0.05 0.23 8 0.07 0.25
Ford 2 0.01 0.11 1 0.01 0.09
Nixon 11 0.07 0.25 7 0.06 0.24
Johnson 3 0.02 0.13 2 0.02 0.13
Magistrate 5 0.03 0.17 4 0.03 0.18
Other 10 0.06 0.24 7 0.06 0.24
ABA Rank 104 0.62 0.49 73 0.63 0.49
Corp. 126 0.75 0.43 89 0.77 0.42
Public Int. 23 0.14 0.35 13 0.11 0.32
Prosec. 96 0.57 0.50 62 0.53 0.50
Judge 78 0.47 0.50 48 0.41 0.49
District Court Incidence
S.D.N.Y. 23 0.14 0.35 13 0.11 0.32
N.D. Cal. 19 0.11 0.32 8 0.07 0.25
N.D. 11. 11 0.07 0.25 9 0.03 0.27
E.D. Pa. I1 0.07 0.25 9 0.08 0.27
D. Mass. 8 0.05 0.21 5 0.04 020
D. Minn. 8 0.05 0.21 5 0.04 0.20
C.D. Cal. 7 0.04 0.20 7 0.06 024
N.D. Tex. 6 0.04 0.19 3 0.03 0.16
Other 74 0.44 0.50 57 0.49 0.50
Defendant Characteristics
High Tech 1 671 0.401 0.49 431 0.37 0.49
Timing and Sequencing Characteristics
Quarter n/a 9.48 3.05 n's 9.26 3.14
MultCase 53 0.49 0.92 nfa n/a na
RptJdg. 84 0.50 0.50 nua na n'a
Total 167 n'a n/a 116 n'a n/a
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Table 4 describes the counts, means, and standard deviations for several of
the explanatory variables included in our analysis. As described in that table,
of the 167 opinions in the sample, 100 (59.9 percent) were issued by judges
appointed by Republican presidents and 67 (40.1 percent) were issued by
judges appointed by Democratic presidents. The large majority of the
Democratic nominees were Clinton appointees, 55 of 67 (82.1 percent). Bush
appointees constitute one quarter of the Republican sample (25 of 100), and
Reagan appointees constitute more than half (57 of 100). The data for the
Individual Judge sample are not remarkably different.
Literature also suggests that a judge's experience prior to nomination can
be correlated with behavior on the bench. To capture a judge's prior
experience we defined a cluster of five variables:
ABA rating ("ABA Rank").20 8 In the opinion of some, this variable is a
measure of judicial qualifications, but others view it as a controversial factor
that may be correlated with a liberal inclination;20 9
Corporate representation experience ("Corp. ,).210 This factor may be
correlated with an inclination to adopt pro-defendant positions;
Public interest representation experience ("Public Int. ,).211 This factor
may be correlated with an inclination to adopt pro-plaintiff positions;
208. The data were obtained from the Federal Judges Biographical Database, Federal
Judicial Center, and were very kindly supplied to us by Bruce Ragsdale, Chief Historian for
the Federal Judicial Center. Because the ABA switched from a four-part rating scale
(Exceptionally Well Qualified, Well Qualified, Qualified, Not Qualified), to a three-part
scale (Well Qualified, Qualified, Not Qualified) during the period in which the judges in our
sample were appointed, we coded Exceptionally Well Qualified and Well Qualified as the
same. See Sisk et al., supra note 21, at 1421 n.198. No judges in our sample were rated Not
Qualified. Accordingly, we coded judges rated as qualified with a 0, and judges who were
exceptionally well qualified, or well qualified, as a 1.
209. The Bush administration in 2001 terminated the American Bar Association's
formal evaluation role in the judicial nomination process. Critics of the ABA had
complained of a liberal tendency in its evaluation process. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Yes,
the ABA Rankings on Judicial Nominees Are Biased, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2001, at A13.
Supporters of the ABA participation emphasized the organization's focus on
professionalism. Editorial, The White House and the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at
AI8; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 30 (1985)
("The screening function performed by the American Bar Association's Standing Committee
on the Judiciary, although in my opinion unduly biased in favor of candidates having
extensive experience as trial lawyers, assures that most candidates will have a minimum
competence.").
210. We reviewed the ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY and MARTINDALE
HUBBELL to determine whether the judge had worked for a law firm that represented
corporate clients or had served in a corporate general counsel's office.
211. We reviewed the ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY and MARTINDALE
HUBBELL to determine -whether a judge had public interest representation experience in his or
her background.
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Prosecutorial experience ("Prosec. '9.212 This factor may be correlated
with a willingness to believe allegations contained in complaints, and hence be
viewed as pro-plaintiff;
Prior experience as a judge in state court or as a federal magistrate
("Judge ").213 We express no view as to inclinations that might be correlated
with such experience.
We find that 104 (62.3 percent) of the opinions in our database were
written by judges who were exceptionally well qualified or well qualified,
indicating that 63 (37.7 percent) were written by judges who were ranked as
qualified. We also find that 126 of the decisions, 75.5 percent of the sample,
were written by judges with corporate experience. Judges with public interest
backgrounds wrote 23 decisions, or 13.8 percent of the sample. Judges with
prosecutorial background wrote 96 decisions, or 57.5 percent of the sample,
and judges with judicial experience prior to their appointment to the federal
bench wrote 78 decisions, or 46.7 percent of the sample. Because these
categories are not mutually exclusive, the percentages sum to well over 100
percent. The data for the Individual Judge sample differ primarily in that the
incidence of judges with a public interest background appears to be lower, 11
percent of the Individual Judge sample, rather than 32 percent of the All
Observation sample.
Literature further suggests that the district in which the judge sits may
correlate with the judge's decision-making behavior, particularly when industry
influences are geographically concentrated.2 14 In the case of securities fraud
litigation, lawsuits against high-technology firms tend to cluster in Silicon
Valley, where they are heard in the Northern District of California. Litigation
against financial service providers tends to cluster in the Southern District of
New York. We accordingly identified the district in which each decision was
issued and generated binary variables corresponding to each of the eight
districts that accounted for the largest volume of litigation in our sample: (1)
S.D.N.Y., (2) N.D. Cal., (3) N.D. Ill., (4) E.D. Pa., (5) D. Mass., (6) D. Minn.,
(7) C.D. Cal., and (8) N.D. Tex. Together, these eight districts account for 56
percent (93 of 167) of the decisions and 51 percent (59 of 116) of the judges in
our two datasets. Because of the small number of observations in each of the
remaining districts, those districts were clustered in a ninth "Other" category.
212. We reviewed the ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY and MARTNDALE
HUBBELL to determine whether a judge had prosecutorial experience in his or her
background.
213. We reviewed the ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY and MARTINDALE
HUBBELL to determine whether a judge had prior judicial experience in his or her
background.
214. LAwRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 29 (1997) ("Some research
on federal district judges indicates that judges may be responsive to their districts because of
a desire for public support and approval.").
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Table 4 details the distribution of both datasets by district court. The
Southern District of New York provides the largest portion of both samples:
13.7 percent of the All Observations dataset and 11 percent of the Individual
Judge dataset. The Northern District of California is next most represented in
the All Observations dataset with 11.7 percent, but represents only 7 percent of
the Individual Judge sample. After that, representation falls off rapidly in the
four next-most frequent districts listed in Table 4.
The identity of a district court can, however, operate as a proxy for a
variety of other variables that describe salient characteristics of a court's
operations. For example, courts with heavier docket loads, whether measured
in the aggregate or on a per-judge basis, might operate differently than courts
that hear fewer cases. Here, two theories with opposite implications could
describe a court's behavior. On the one hand, a judge sitting in a busy court
could adopt a higher pleading standard in order to make it easier to dismiss
claims and thereby help clear dockets. On the other hand, judges could believe
that it takes more time to write a reasoned decision granting some or all of a
motion to dismiss and that the burden on the court is minimized if the court
simply denies the motion because the result is likely to be a settlement that
requires fewer judicial resources to monitor 2 15 Alternatively, judges may pay
no attention to docket-load factors in the resolution of class action securities
fraud cases because they constitute a small percentage of the cases actually
heard by the court, or because they view such considerations as unprofessional
as applied to these cases. We therefore have no a priori estimate of the effect
of this variable, and, to test the implications of docket-load factors, we
collected and generated the following three variables for each decision in the
database:
Judgeships.216 The number of authorized judgeships in the district in
which the case was filed.
Aggregate Docket.217 The weighted filings per district as calculated by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
Docket per Judge.2 18 The weighted filings for that district divided by the
number of authorized judgeships in that district.
The frequency with which courts hear class action securities fraud lawsuits
can also influence the court's perspective, separate and apart from workload
characteristics. In particular, if repeated exposure to class action securities
215. We are grateful to Professor Bernard Black of Stanford Law School for this
observation.
216. ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE OPTIMAL UTILIZATION OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES 29-31, tbl. 1 (1998), available at
http://vww.uscourts.gov/publications.html.
217. Id.
21S. Id.
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fraud complaints within a district tends to cause suspicion about that style of
litigation, then the data may be consistent with the hypothesis that familiarity
breeds skepticism, if not contempt, for class action securities fraud lawsuits.
To test for this pattern, we generated two additional variables:
SFCA Docket. The aggregate count of securities fraud class action cases
pending in that district as of year-end 1999V19
SFCA per Judge. The SFCA Docket statistic divided by the number of
authorized judgeships in that district 2 0
The claim is also made that complaints against technology issuers are
weaker than complaints against other issuers 221 If this claim is correct, then
one would expect to see a greater incidence of pro-defendant interpretations
and/or rulings in cases involving technology issuers or in districts with greater
exposure to technology litigation. To test for this effect we define three
additional variables designed to reflect the technology status of individual
defendant issuers and the intensity with which district courts tend to hear high-
technology cases.
High Tech. This variable measures whether the issuer named in the
complaint that gives rise to the decision in our database is a high-technology
company.222
Tech Intensity. This variable measures the number of high-technology
opinions in that district divided by the total number of opinions in that district,
to describe the percentage of decisional activity in that district attributable to
litigation involving high-technology issuers.
Tech/Judge. Number of opinions involving high-technology issuers in that
district ("High Tech") divided by number of judges in the district?23
219. The data were obtained from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,
at http://www.securities.stanford.edu. Because this statistic measures the number of
securities fraud actions filed, and not the number of opinions issued, it is substantially larger
than the number of opinions reported in our sample in each district.
220. See supra note 216 for source of judge data.
221. See, e.g., Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. 601
(1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
222. High-technology issuers operate in the computer hardware, software,
telecommunications, or pharmaceutical industries, as categorized by Bloomberg Data
Services. See http://www.bloomberg.com and industry categorization for each issuer listed
in the All Observations dataset.
223. See supra note 216 for source of judge data.
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Table 5
District Court Characteristics
(All Observations)
Docket
District Aggregate per SFCA SFCA per High Tech
Court Opinions Judges Docket Judge Docket Judge HighTech Intensity Tech/Judge
S.D.N.Y. 23 28 13,552 484 81 2.89 6 0.26 0.21
(13.M) (3.3"%) (3.0%) (6.2%) (9.0%)
N.D. CaL 19 14 6,286 449 80 5.71 17 0.89 1.21
(11.4%) (1.7%) (1.4%) (6.2%) (25.4%)
N.D. Il. 11 22 8,712 396 22 1.00 5 0.45 0.23
(6.6%) (2.6%) (1.9%) (1.7%) (7.5%)
E.D. Pa. 11 23 9,016 392 26 1.13 3 0.27 0.13
(6.6%) (2.7%) (2.0%) (2.0%) (4.5%)
D. Mass. 8 13 4,251 327 34 2.62 7 0.88 0.54
(4.8o) (1.5%) (0.9%) (2.6%) (10.5%)
D. Minn. 8 7 3,010 430 16 2.29 3 0.29 0.43
(4.9%) (0.8%) (0.7%) (12%) (4.5%)
C.D. Cal. 7 27 12,177 451 64 2.37 3 0.29 0.11
(4.2%) (3.2%) (2.7%) (4.9%) (4.5%)
N.D.Tex. 6 12 6,384 532 29 2.42 0 0.00 0.00
(3.6%) (1.4%) (1.4%.) (2.2%) (0.0%)
Other 74 704 391,083 556 948 1.35 23 0.31 0.03
(44.3%) (82.8%) (86.1%) (72.9%) (34.3%)
Total 167 850 454,471 534.7 1,300 1.53 67 0.40 0.08
(100%) (100Y) (100%) (100%) (100%) 1
Table 5 describes the distribution of these variables in the All Observation
database by district court and for the sample as a whole. Several patterns are
immediately apparent from these data. Most striking is the fact that the
Northern District of California displays a remarkably higher number of
securities fraud actions per judge, 5.71, than the sample average of 1.53. The
Northern District of California is also home to a disproportionate share of high-
technology opinions: While decisions issued in that district constitute 11.4
percent of the total sample, they account for 25.4 percent of the high-
technology opinions. The same pattern is apparent in the technology intensity
measure that indicates that 89 percent of the opinions issued in the Northern
District of California are related to the high-technology issuers whereas for the
sample as a whole the average High Tech intensity is 40 percent. Similarly, the
number of high-technology opinions per judge in the Northern District of
California is 1.21, whereas the sample average is 0.08. No other pattern in the
data appears to be quite as remarkable. If the hypothesis that familiarity breeds
skepticism is correct, particularly with respect to high-technology matters, then
we would expect to observe that decisionmaking patterns in the Northern
District of California differ from the average pattern observed nationwide.
In addition, if district court judges are influenced by decisions issued by
other district court judges, then a time trend may be apparent in the data. To
test for this effect, we defined the following variable:
Quarter. This variable is defined as "1" if the opinion was issued in the
second quarter of 1996, the earliest date for any opinion in the sample, and
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increases by 1 for each subsequent quarter. As described in Table 4, the
Quarter variable indicates that the average opinion was issued in Quarter 9 of
our sample, which corresponds to the second quarter of 1998.
The substance of a decision can also depend on whether the judge ruling on
a matter is viewing it as a question of first impression, or whether the court has
already wrestled with the issue. This is again a variant of the "familiarity
breeds skepticism" hypothesis. To address this possibility we define two
additional variables:
(1) Multiple Case ("MultCase"). This variable assumes the value "0" if
the opinion at issue is the first or only decision issued by that judge in the
database. It assumes the value "1" if it is the second issued opinion, "2" if it is
the third, and so on. Table 4 indicates that the average value for MultCase is
0.49, which corresponds to the average case being halfway between the first
and second decision issued by the average judge.
(2) Repeat Judge ("RptJdg. '). This binary variable assumes the value "1"
if the judge issuing that ruling has more than one opinion in the database, and
"0" otherwise. The RptJdg. value of 84 indicates that 84 of the decisions in the
database are by judges with more than one decision and implies that 83
decisions are by judges with a single decision in the database.
Table 6 summarizes the defmitions of these variables.
Table 6
Summary Definition of Explanatory Variables
Variable Name Definition
Individual Judge Characteristics =0 Unless
Democrat =1 ifnominated by Democratic president
Republican =1 if nominated by Republican president
Clinton =1 if nominated by President Clinton
Bush =1 ifnominated by President Bush
Reagan =1 if nominated by President Reagan
Ford =1 if nominated by President Ford
Nixon =1 if nominated by President Nixon
Johnson =1 if nominated by President Johnson
Magistrate =1 ifmagistratejudge
Other =1 if nominated by Presidents Johnson, Ford, or Carter, or if Magistrate
ABA Rank =1 ifexceptionally well qualified or well qualified (0 implies qualified)
Corp. =1 if corporate background is identified
Public Int. =1 if public interest background is identified
[Vol. 54:627
Apr. 2002] AMBIGUITYIN STATUTORYDESIGN
Table 6
(Continued)
Summary Definition of Explanatory Variables
5. Multicollinearity analysis.
In order to measure the potential for multicollinearity among these
explanatory variables, we examined the variance-covariance matrix and
discovered four clusters of variables that display correlation coefficients in
excess of 0.5. These clusters are described in Table 7 for the All Observations
sample. 224
224. The full variance-covariance matrix and corresponding analysis for the Individual
Variable Name Definition
Proset. =1 ifprosecutorial background is identified
Judge =1 ifjudicial background is identified
MultCase =0 if the decision represents the fi-st SFCA case the judge has seen;
value increases by I for each subsequent SFCA case
Rptidg. =1 ifthejudge had more than I SFCA case in the sample
Quarter =1 ifcase was decided in Q2 of 1996; value increases by I to 16 for each
subsequent quarter
Defendant Issuer Characteristics =0 Unless
High Tech =1 ifdefendant issuer is a high-technology firm
District Court Characteristics =0 Unless
S.D.N.Y. =I if decided in S.D.N.Y.
N.D. Cal. =1 ifdecided in N.D. Cal.
N.D. IlL. =1 ifdecided in N.D. Ill.
ED, Pa. =1 if decided in ED. Pa.
D. Mass. =1 ifdecided in D. Mass.
D. Minn. = ifdecided in D. Minn.
C.D. Cal. =1 if decided in C.D. Cal.
N.D. Tex. =1 ifdecided in N.D. Tex.
Other =1 if not decided in any of the eight district courts for which a separate
variable is defised.
Aggregate Docket Total Filings in the District
Docket per Judge Total Filings per Judge in the District
SFCA Docket Number of SFCA Cases
SFCAperJudge Number of SFCA Cases / Number of Judges
Tech Intensity Percentage of SFCA Docket relating to high-technology issuers
Tcch(Judge Number of Tech Cases / Number of Judges
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Table 7
Multicollinearity Analysis
(All Observations)
(a) The N.D. Col. Cluster
SFCA SFCA per Tech
ND. Cal Docket Judge Intensity Tech/Judge
N.D. Cal. 1.000 0.549 0.815 0.810 0.929
SFCA Docket 0.549 1.000 0.808 0.421 0.616
SFCA per Judge 0.815 0.808 1.000 0.693 0.846
Tech Intensity 0.810 0.A21 0.693 1.000 0.899
Tech/Judge 0.929 0.616 0.846 0.899 1.000
(b) The S.D.N.Y. Cluster
SFCA Aggregate Docket per
S.D.N.Y. Docket Docket Judge
S.D.N.Y. 1.000 0.626 0.585 0.023
SFCA Docket 0.626 1.000 0.587 -0.032
Aggregate Docket 0.585 0.587 1.000 0.342
Docket per Judgel 0.023 -0.032 0.342 1.000
(C) The Multiple Decision Cluster
MultCase RptJdg.
MultCase 1.000 0.534
RptJdg . 0.534 1.000
(d) The Presidential Cluster
Democrat Republican Clinton Reagan
Democrat 1.000 -1.000 0.856 -0.589
Republican -1.000 1.000 -0.856 0.589
Clinton 0.856 -0.856 1.000 -0.504
Reagan -0.589 0.589 -0.504 1.000
Panel (a) of Table 7 describes the "N.D. Cal. Cluster." It shows high
correlations among five variables: presence in the Northern District of
California, the size of the securities fraud docket in a district, the incidence of
Judge sample can be found in the Statistical Appendix at http://law.stanford.edu/lawreview/
gp2001/.
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securities fraud litigation on a per judge basis, the intensity of litigation against
high-technology issuers, and the number of technology-related decisions on a
per-judge basis. These correlations arise because the Northern District of
California has a high concentration of class action securities fraud litigation as
well as a high concentration of litigation involving technology issuers. The
concentration is high whether measured on an aggregate or per-judge basis.
These strong correlations may make it difficult to disentangle the explanatory
effect of any one of these variables from any of the others. More particularly,
if behavior in the Northern District of California seems to differ from behavior
in other districts, it may be difficult to determine whether the difference is
attributable to the intensity of technology litigation in the district, to the
intensity of overall securities fraud litigation in the district, or to some other
attribute associated with the Northern District.
Panel (b) describes the "S.D.N.Y. Cluster." It shows high correlations
between presence in the Southern District of New York, the aggregate size of
the class action securities fraud docket, and the aggregate size of the court's
civil docket. These correlations, however, tend to be materially lower than the
correlations observed in the N.D. Cal. Cluster.
Panel (c) shows an expected correlation between the numerical sequence in
which a judge has issued a decision (i.e., whether the decision is the first,
second, third, etc., decision issued by that judge as captured by the MultCase
variable) and whether the judge has more than one decision in the database (as
captured by the RptJdg. variable).
Panel (d) shows an expected set of correlations involving party status of the
nominating president and the identity of the nominating president. Democratic
and Republican affiliations are perfectly negatively correlated, as should be
expected. Correlations in excess of 0.5 arise only for the Clinton and Reagan
presidential variables because those variables account for the largest portions of
the Democratic and Republican sub-samples.
B. Univariate Analyses
The impression among practitioners is that decisions in the Northern
District of California tended to be more pro-defendant even prior to the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Silicon Graphics.225 To test for the accuracy of this and
other perspectives that might be based on a univariate perspective of the data,
and to illustrate the differences that can arise between univariate and
multivariate analyses, we here present a series of univariate regression analyses
that we subsequently supplement with a series of multivariate regression
analyses. The first set of univariate regressions search for correlations with the
225. See, e.g., Melvyn I. Weiss, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act; Significant
Developments Since Enactment in 1995, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 16, 1997, at 7.
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selection of the interpretive standard. The second set search for correlations
with the outcome of the motion to dismiss.
Significantly, there is no developed theory to guide us as to the correct
specification of dependant variables in these regressions, or as to the correct
specifications of the regressions themselves. We therefore test several different
specifications of the dependent variables. We also apply dichotomous and
polytomous regression techniques in our search for patterns in the data226 This
approach obviously opens us to the critique that we are engaged in "data
mining" or "data snooping,' 227 and that we are about to "torture the data until it
confesses. '228 To address this legitimate concern, the Statistical Appendix to
this page reports results that are statistically insignificant and not replicated in
this published report. By so disclosing all results-significant and insignificant
alike-we respond to data mining concerns and allow the reader better to form
a view as to the meaning of the results. We view this approach as preferable to
arbitrarily choosing variable definitions and statistical techniques designed to
maximize the appearance of statistically significant relationships. Moreover,
we consider statistically significant relationships to be analytically meaningful
only if they are clearly robust in the sense that they are statistically significant
across a large number of model specifications and regression techniques. 29
1. Interpretive standard analysis.
As previously explained,230'five different interpretive standards arise in the
databases: (1) no standard applied because the complaint was viewed as so
strong that it satisfied even the highest pleading standard, whatever that might
be; (2) the Second Circuit standard applied; (3) an Intermediate standard
applied; (4) the Silicon Graphics standard applied; or (5) no standard applied
because the complaint was viewed as so weak that it failed even the weakest
pleading standard, whatever that might be.
226. For a description of these techniques, please refer to the Statistical Appendix at
http://law.stanford.edu/lawreview/gp2001l/
227. See, e.g., DAvID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI & ROGER PURVEs, STATIsTics 495-
500 (2d ed. 1991); PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO EcONOMi~mcs 76, 159, 164 (2d ed. 1985);
Edward E. Learner, Let's Take the Con out of Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 31 (1983);
Michael C. Lovell, Data Mining, 65 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1 (1983); T. Dudley Wallace,
Pretest Estimation in Regression: A Survey, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 431 (1977).
228. A similar locution is attributed to Ronald Coase in KENNEDY, supra note 227, at
76.
229. For a similar approach see Lovell, supra note 227.
230. See supra pp. 686-687.
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Table 8
DeFinition of Dichotomous and Polytomous Dependent Variables for Interpretive
Standard Regressions
Dependant
Variable Definition
Diehot I =0 if no standard was selected because the complaint satisfied the highest standard
=1 Othervise
Diehot 2 =0 or
=1 if no standard was selected because the complaint failed even the lowest standard
Dichot 3 =0 if the Second Circuit standard was selected, or if no standard was selected because the complaint satisfied
the highest standard
=1 Otherwise
Dichot 4 =0 or
I if the Silicon Graphics standard was selected, or if no standard was selected because the complaint
would have failed even the weakest standard
Dichot S =0 if the Second Circuit standard was selected
=1 if the Intermediate orSilicon Graphics standard was selected. [All other observations excluded]
Dichot 6 =0 if the Second Circuit or Intermediate standards were selected
=1 if the Silieon Graphics standard was selected. [All other observations excluded.]
Pol)t I =0 Second Circuit standard
=1 Intermediate standard
=2 Silicon Graphics standard. [All other observations excluded.]
Pol)t 2 =0 Satisfies Highest or Second Circuit standard
A Intermediate standard
=2 Silicon Graphics or Fails Lowest standard
PolYt 3 =0 Satisfies Highest standard
=1 Second Circuit standard
=2 Intermediate standard
=3 Silicon Graphics standard
=4 Fails Lowest standard
In order to construct binary variables that reflect these interpretive styles,
we clustered these five categories to generate six dichotomous dependent
variables according to the definitions provided in Table 831 Each of these
clusters is defined so that "0" represents the more pro-plaintiff interpretation
and "1" represents the more pro-defendant interpretation. Accordingly, in
subsequent regressions, a positive (negative) coefficient on an explanatory
variable would represent a pro-defendant (pro-plaintiff) correlation. The
structure of this categorization is illustrated in Figure 1.
231. For an explanation of dichotomous logistic regressions, see the Statistical
Appendix at http:f/law.stanford.edu/lavreview/gp2OOIL/.
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Figure 1
Schematic Representation of the Definition of Dichotomous and Polytomous Dependant
Variables for Interpretive Standard Regressions
In summary form, Dichot 1 distinguishes opinions that conclude that a
complaint satisfies the highest standard from all other outcomes. Dichot 2
distinguishes opinions that conclude that a complaint fails the weakest standard
from all other outcomes. These first two categorizations thus test for factors
that might be correlated with the most extreme interpretive outcomes that
follow an approach consistent with judicial minimalism.
Dichot 3 distinguishes cases that satisfy the highest, or that adopt the
Second Circuit standard, from all other decisions. Dichot 4 distinguishes cases
that fail the lowest or that adopt the Silicon Graphics standard, from all other
decisions. These two categorizations thus test for factors that might be
correlated with the two most pro-plaintiff outcomes or with the two most pro-
defendant outcomes.
Dichot 5 and Dichot 6 exclude the "Fails Lowest" and "Satisfies Highest"
observations from the database. They accordingly test for factors correlated
with interpretive standards only in opinions that resolve the interpretive
question. Put another way, these analyses exclude opinions that practice
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judicial minimalism. Dichot 5 distinguishes decisions that adopt the Second
Circuit standard from all others, while Dichot 6 distinguishes decisions that
adopt the Silicon Graphics standard from all others.
The Polyt variables are used in a series of three polytomous regressions 3 2
In a polytomous regression, the dependent variable assumes three or more
values where the values can be ordinally ranked, for example, from most pro-
plaintiff to most pro-defendant. If the dependent variable assumes K discrete
values, the analysis here generates K-i regression coefficients where each
coefficient expresses the increased or decreased likelihood that the specified
explanatory variable is correlated with a given ordinal outcome, relative to the
baseline value that is measured as the first ordinal state. Thus, if a polytomous
variable has three possible states, a positive (negative) first coefficient in the
polytomous regression indicates an increased (decreased) likelihood of a
correlation with the second ordinal state over the first ordinal state, and a
positive (negative) second coefficient indicates an increased (decreased)
likelihood of a correlation with the third ordinal state over the first ordinal
state.233
As defined above, Polyt 1 excludes from analysis all opinions that practice
judicial minimalism. It ranks the standards so that Polyt 1 = 0 as the baseline if
the Second Circuit standard is adopted, Polyt 1 = 1 if the Intermediate standard
is adopted, and Polyt 1 = 2 if the Silicon Graphics standard is adopted. Polyt 2
clusters the two most extreme outcomes on each end of the distribution so that
Polyt 2 = 0 as the baseline if the opinion is "Satisfies Highest" or selects the
Second Circuit standard, Polyt 2 =1 if the Intermediate standard is adopted,
and Polyt 2 = 2 if the opinion is "Fails Lowest" or adopts the Silicon Graphics
standard. Polyt 3 is the most refined of the three specifications. It assigns an
independent value to each of the five categorizations of the interpretive
standard variable, in increasing order of "pro-defendant" status.
Table 9 reports the results of univariate regressions of the explanatory
variable on the six different dichotomous characterizations of the interpretive
standards variable, as well as on the three different polytomous
characterizations, where the regressions are run over All Observations2 34
Table 10 reports the same results for the Individual Judge dataset. These tables
report only statistically significant coefficients. Full reports of statistically
insignificant relationships can be found in the Statistical Appendix.
232. For an explanation of polytomous logistic regressions, see the Statistical
Appendix at http:f/law.stanford.edu/lawreview/gp200L/.
233. Technically, the coefficients describe a log-odds ratio, which can be greater than
1.0, whereas a simple probability cannot exceed 1.0. See id.
234. Dichot 5, 6, and Polyt 1 show 101 observations because they omit "Fails Lowest"
and "Satisfies Highest" observations.
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Table 9
Pleading Standard
Univariate Regression Analysis
(All Observations)
Dichotomous R__tr__s___s Po ,mom Rc is
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Clinton I) 1.046+
2.106
2) O.0O5
0.008
Reagan 1.324+ 1) 1356+
2.092 1.977
2) 1.258
.709
3) 1.583+
2.111
4) 1.187
S1.70
Canr -2.464+ I) -8.346
-2.368 .0.241
2) -2.110
-. 963
Johnson I) 6.67
0.149
2) -7.149#
>20
3) 7.663
4) 6.998
0151
Magistrate -2.424+
______ -2.565 ______
N.D. Cal 22993 1.539+ 2.317 I) -7.256
4.289 2386 3.581 -0212
2) 1.977"
3.014
N-D. IlL -1.894+ -1.994+- -2.254+ I) -1530
-2.382 1.975 -2.149 -1.231
2) -2.244+
-2099
other -0.997. 1) -0.343
-2.614 -00.67
2) -0.325
-069
3) 0.260
0.429
4) -1.163+
-ZI31
Aggregate -0.092+ -0.203- I) -0.011 1) 0.010 I) 0.078"
Docket -2.209 -2.693 .0.421 0.412 2.450
-0.207 2) -0.0893 2) 0066
2) -5.289 -4.069 1.909
3) -0.128"
-2892
4) 0.004
0133
SFCA 0.017
Docket 2.842
SFCA per 0.41S 0.3433 0.3670 I) 0.155 I) -0.01
Judge 3.652 2.930 3.316 0.947 -0.003
2) 0.41& 2) 0.157
3329 0.721
3) 0.225
1.013
4) 0507+
2,574
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Table 9
(Continued)
Pleading Standard
Univarlate Regression Analysis
(All Observations)
Dichotomos Reiono Pl omous Rcaeviom
Varalc Mcdel I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Tch 2.4741 2.638* 2250" 1) 1.823
Intcmity 3.3$4 2.965 3.057 1.563
2) 2.928*
3.169
TccdhlJ d 201211 L610* 1839# I) 0.285 1) 0.850
4.262 290 3.735 0.327 0067
2) 1.9764 2) 0.931
3.388 0.637
3) 1.691
L297
4) 2.997-
1__ 1 1 2477
Prszc., 0.943+ I) 1952' 1) 1.792" I) -0.528
2279 3.199 3.041 -1.019
2) 0.073 2) 0.149 2) 1.424+
0.145 0439 2.056
3) 0455
-0.755
4) .0.093
-0.176
1.eltCos I) 0.519+ I) 0.602- I) 0.661
2.199 2.819 L344
2) -0.668 2) 0.197 2) 1.193
-L375 0.326 2.414
3) -0.037
-0.037
4) 0.774
1.575
O3yees.teon 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167
2) + d-enoseeoetl s eiio8% teonideolescI
* dosc:s se=sstes. skgpfienee at the 0.1% cofid.cz Io.
Table 10
Pleading Standard
Univariate Regression Analysis
(Individual Judge Sample)
Dichotomous Ressions Polytomous Regressions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Clanton 1) 0.925 +
2.036
2) 0.163
0.449
Carter 1) -9.196 1) 0.058
-0.265 0.067
2) -11.015 # 2) -9.303
-10.245 -0.217
3) -9.519
-0.231 6
4) -9.926
-7.909
Johnson 1) 7.154
0.155
2) -4.074 #
>20
3) 7.873
0.170
4) -5.024
-0.109
Magistrate -2.120 +
-2.2lo___ ____ ____ ______ ______ ______
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Table 10
(Continued)
Pleading Standard
Univariate Regression Analysis
(Individual Judge Sample)
Dichotomous Regressions Poltomous Reg'esions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
N.D. Cal 2.055 * 1.710 + 1) -6.594
2.661 2.034 -0.193
2) IA13 +
2.155
D. Minn. 1) -1.455 1) -5.194
-0.067 -0.110
2) 9.703 # 2) -4.238
11.622 -0.099
3) 9.127 #
9.449
4) 3A64 #
8.886
N.D. Texas 1) 1.891
1.183
2) -10.165 #
-10.018
Rptldg. 1) 1.946 #
3.758
2) 2.113 #
3.636
3) 1A66 *
2.379
4) IA66 *
2.761
ABA Rank 1) -1.099 +
1.975
2) -0.606
-0.953
3) -0.894
-1.393
4) -0.606
-1.059
Tech Intensity 2.183 + 2.023 + I) 1.169
2.124 2.005 1.0032) 2.381 
*2.124_ 
_ 
+12.577
TechJudge 1.907 * 1.874 * 1) -0.334 1) 1.341
2.878 2.583 -0.384 1.444
2) 1.799 # 2) 1.193
3.084 0.880
3) 2.679 +
2.054
4) 3.781
3.125
Aggregate -0.097 + -0.202 + 1) -0.035 1) -0.017 1) 0.070
Docket
-1.961 -2.463 1.351 -0.689 7.211
2) -0.213 # 2) -0.101 # 2) 0.036
-5.453 -4.611 1.024
3) -0.129
-2.899
4) 0.003
0.101
Docket per Judge 1) 3.696 + 1) 3.844
2.436 1.706
2) -0.026 2) 6.850
0.193 2.918
3) 3.613
1.424
4) 2.511
1.059
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Table 10
(Continued)
Pleading Standard
Univariate Regression Analysis
(Individual Judge Sample)
Dichotomous Regressions Po ytomous Regressions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
SFCA pr Judge 0.349 0.318 1) 0.089 1) 0.102
2.244 2.191 0.545 0.499
2) 0.342 * 2) 0.167
2.728 3) 0.768
0.306
4) L375 *
0.505
1 1 1 2.564
Prosec. 1) 1.453 + 1) 0.087
2383 0.168
2) 0.201 2) 1.541 +
0.398 2.225
3) 0.288
0.479
4) 0.624
1.178
Corp. 1) -1.466 +
-2.291
2) -0.956
-1.159
3) -1.718 +
-2.357
4) -1.678 *
-2.631
MultCase 1) 0.451 1) 7.430 N
1.975 15.108
2) -0.646 # 2) 7.673 #
-2.874 15.529
3) 6.860 N
10.657
4) 6.048 #
12308
Obsrvation 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Notes: see Table 9
Analysis of Tables 9 and 10 suggests several consistent patterns. First,
Dichotomous Models 2, 3, and 4, and Polytomous Models 2 and 3 show the
largest number of statistically significant univariate correlations, whereas the
incidence of statistically significant correlations in Dichotomous Models 1, 5,
and 6 and Polytomous Model I is relatively sparse. This pattern holds true for
the All Observations and Individual Judge datasets. Dichotomous Models 5
and 6 and Polytomous Model 1 share the characteristic that they exclude
minimalist observations from their analysis. The fact that all models that
exclude minimalist observations are relatively sparse in terms of significant
relationships can be the result of two factors. First, because minimalist
observations are excluded, sample size for these regressions is smaller and
statistical significance is more difficult to discern. Second, minimalist
observations may be more correlated with our set of explanatory variables. A
combination of both factors can also account for this observed pattern. The
sparse correlations in Dichotomous Model 1 as opposed to the more frequent
correlations in Dichotomous Model 2 suggest that the data are better able to
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explain the decision that a complaint fails even the lowest standard, whatever
that might be, than the decision that a complaint is so well drafted that it
satisfies the highest standard, whatever that might be.
Tables 9 and 10 also consistently suggest that the Northern District of
California Cluster is robustly significant across model specifications and
subdivisions of the dataset. The coefficients on the Northern District of
California, Tech Intensity, Tech/Judge, and SFCA per Judge variables are all
significant in at least four specifications in Table 9, and are most often
significant beyond the one percent confidence interval. The coefficients on
these variables are also uniformly positive, suggesting that these factors are
correlated with a pro-defendant articulation of the pleading standard?35
Presence in the Northern District of Illinois is correlated with a pro-
plaintiff result in four model specifications in the All Observations sample, but
that variable has no statistically significant force in the Individual Judge
sample. This pattern arises because of the presence of a small number of
judges with repeatedly pro-plaintiff interpretations in the Northern District of
Illinois sample. Once the multiple weighting on those rulings is removed in the
Individual Judge sample, those correlations disappear.
The Aggregate Docket variable, which measures the absolute size of the
civil docket in each court, is highly significant in five regression specifications
in each of the two samples. The statistically significant coefficients are
uniformly negative, suggesting that the larger the aggregate docket load in a
court, the more likely that the court will adopt a pro-plaintiff interpretation of
the "strong inference" standard. A closer look at the data, however, supports a
different conclusion. The Aggregate Docket variable is heavily weighted by
the "Other" district observation, which contains 86.05 percent of the total
docket load in our sample (see Table 5). The Aggregate Docket variable can
thus act as though it is an overweighted version of a binary variable that
signifies presence in an "Other" district. Thus, the Aggregate Docket variable
may be measuring a proclivity toward pro-plaintiff interpretations in less active
districts rather than a true "docket management" effect. This alternative
explanation is also more consistent with the observation that the Docket per
Judge variable is not significant in Table 9 and that, in the two instances when
it is significant in Table 10, it appears with a positive coefficient, suggesting
that the busier the court, the more likely it is to exercise docket control by
adopting a pro-defendant interpretation of the "strong inference" standard.
A judge's prior experience as a prosecutor is statistically significant in four
model specifications in the All Observations sample and in two in the
Individual Judge sample, but generally only at the five percent confidence
235. In Table 10, the Northern District of California, Tech. Intensity, Tech/Judge, and
SFCA per Judge measures are statistically significant in at least three specifications. Again,
all statistically significant correlations are positive.
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level. Every statistically significant coefficient is positive. This finding
suggests that, contrary to our initial hypothesis, prior experience as a prosecutor
predisposes a judge toward a pro-defendant interpretation of the pleading
standard.
The MultCase variable is statistically significant in all polytomous
regressions in Table 9 and in two of the three polytomous regressions reported
in Table 10. The statistically significant variables are consistently positive,
suggesting that the more frequently a judge in our sample has confronted the
need to interpret the "strong inference" standard, the more likely the judge will
be to adopt a pro-defendant interpretation. This finding is potentially consistent
with both a "familiarity breeds skepticism" and a docket-control hypothesis.
The presidential variables do not, in our view, present compelling evidence
in support of the political inclination hypothesis. Party affiliation of a
nominating president is never statistically significant. No presidential variable
is significant in more than two model specifications in either dataset. To the
extent that one seeks to find meaning in the data, both datasets suggest that
judges nominated by President Carter have a pro-plaintiff tendency, and the All
Observations dataset suggests that judges nominated by President Reagan have
a pro-defendant tendency. No other presidential variable is significant in more
than one specification in either dataset.
2. Outcome analysis.
The analysis of the outcome in litigation is even more complex than the
analysis of the interpretive standard and generates seven distinct categories. 36
In order to construct a series of binary variables that supports dichotomous
logistic regression techniques, we clustered these seven categories to generate
four dichotomous dependent variables that conform to the definitions presented
in Table 11. Each of these clusters is defined so that "0" represents the more
pro-plaintiff result and "1" represents the more pro-defendant result.
Accordingly, a positive (negative) coefficient on an explanatory variable would
represent a correlation with a pro-defendant (pro-plaintiff) outcome. The
structure of this categorization is illustrated in Figure 2.
236. See supra Appendix Part A.4.
Apr. 2002]
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
Table 11
Definition of Dichotomous and Polytomous
Dependent Variables for Outcome Regressions
Dependent Definition
Variable
Dichot I =0 if motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety
=1 otherwise
Dichot 2 --0 or
-1 if motion is granted in its entirety with prejudice
Dichot 3 =0 ifmnotion is denied in entirety, or if all portions dismissed are dismissed without prejudice
=1 otherwise
Dichot 4 =0 or
=1 if motion is granted with prejudice in entirety, or granted in part and all parts are granted with prejudice
Polyt I =0 if motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety
=1 if motion is granted in whole or in part, but without prejudice as to any part
=2 otherwise
Polyt 2 =0 if motion is denied or granted in part or in whole, but without prejudice
=1 if motion is granted in part or entirety, but with prejudice as to some portions
=2 otherwise
Polyt 3 =0 if motion is denied in its entirety
=1 if motion is denied in part or granted, but without prejudice as to any part
=2 if motion is granted in part or in its entirety, but with prejudice only with respect to some portion of the motion
=3 if motion is granted in part, and with prejudice as to all portions granted
=4 if motion is granted in its entirety and with prejudice
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Figure 2
Schematic Representation of the Definition of Dichotomous and Polytomous Dependent Variables for
Outcome Regressions
Dofinition of Without Prejudice as to Any Part With Prejudice as to Some Parts With Prejudice as to All Parts
Dcpondnt Motion Denied in Motion Granted Motion Granted Motion Granted Motion Granted Motion Granted Motion Granted
Variable Entir" in Part in Entirety in Part in Entirety in Part in Entirety
Dichot 1 0 I I
Dtchot 2 0 1 I
Dichot3 0 I l
Dtchot 4 0 l
Polyt 2 0
Polyt3 0 12 3 4
Here, Dichot 1 = 0 if the motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety and
equals 1 otherwise. Dichot 2 = 1 if the motion to dismiss is granted in its
entirety with prejudice, and equals 0 otherwise. Accordingly, these two
dependent variables test for the most extreme outcomes. Dichot 3 = 0 if the
motion is denied in its entirety or if granted without prejudice as to every part,
and equals 1 otherwise. Dichot 4 = 0 unless the motion is granted in part or in
its entirety, and with prejudice.
Polyt 1 = 0 if the motion is denied in its entirety, equals 1 if it is granted
without prejudice as to any portion, and equals 2 otherwise. Polyt 2 = 0 if the
motion is denied or granted without prejudice as to any part, equals 1 if it is
granted in part or in its entirety but only portions with prejudice, and equals 2 if
the motion is granted in its entirety or in part but with prejudice as to all
portions. Polyt 3 = 0 if the motion is denied, equals 1 if the motion is granted
in whole or in part but without prejudice as to any part, equals 2 if it is granted
with prejudice as to some parts, equals 3 if the motion is granted and with
prejudice as to all parts, and equals 4 if the motion is granted in its entirety with
prejudice.
Table 12 reports univariate regression results for the All Observations
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sample.237 Its findings are in many respects quite consistent with the results
reported in the interpretive standards univariate regressions. In particular, the
Northern District of California Cluster, which here also contains Tech Intensity
and Tech/Judge, is significant in six of seven of the regression specifications,
while SFCA per Judge is significant in four regressions and SFCA Docket in
three. All of the statistically significant coefficients are positive, suggesting
that the components of the cluster are again all correlated with a more pro-
defendant ruling on the motion to dismiss.
The Rptldg variable is also statistically significant in six of seven
regression specifications, and the coefficients are all positive. This pattern
strongly suggests that judges who rule in more than one decision in our
database are more likely to rule in defendants' favor than judges who are
represented only once in the database.
Presidential appointment and party affiliation variables are again lightly
represented. Only the Bush variable is statistically significant in two
regressions, and it has a positive coefficient in both.
Table 12
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Univariate Regression Analysis
(All Observations)
Dichotomous Regressions Polytomos Regressions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Bush 1) 1.221 + 1) 1.222 +
2.202 2.203
2) 0.167 2) 0.263
0.251 0.227
3) -6.937
-0.212
4) 0.471
0.661
N.D. Cal. 2.394 + 1.154 + 1.223 + 1) 2.271 + 1) -7.300 1) 2.275 +
2.350 2.189 2.437 2.119 -0.173 2.119
2) 2.533 + 2) 1.143 + 2) -4.431
2.359 2.273 -0.193
3) 2.643 +
2.063
4) 2.841
2.583
N.D. 11l. -1.311 +
-2.017
Tech Intensity 1.922 + 1.485 + 2.065 1) 1.100 1) -3.164 i) 1.103
2.449 2.069 2.806 1.145 -0.876 1.147
2) 2.118 + 2) 1.946 * 2) -2.536
2.248 2.632 -0.692
3) 2.419
1.726
4) 2.634
2.599
237. There is no corresponding analysis for the Individual Judge sample because it is
impossible to assign a single outcome variable to each judge.
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Table 12
(Continued)
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Univariate Regression Analysis
(All Observations)
Dichotomoes Regressions Polytomous Regressions
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model I Model 2 Model 3
TccbJudge 1.444 + 1.158 + 1.195 * 1) 1.281 + 1) -3.381 1) 1.310 +
2.432 2.479 2.697 1.979 -1.105 1.995
2) 1.631 + 2) 1.112 + 2) -2.643
2.506 2.501 -0.846
3) 1.740
1.892
4) 2.020
2.909
SFCA Docket 0.012 + 1) 0.015 + 1) 0.015 +
2Z014 2.209 2Z216
2) 0.009 2) -0.011
1.246 -0.670
3) -0.002
-0.158
4) 0.016 +
2.065
SFCAparJudgc 0336 0.223 + 1) 0.351 + 1) 0.365 *
2.677 1.990 2.571 2.606
2) 0318 + 2) -0.367
2.228 -1.012
3) 0.356
1.560
4) 0.442 *
2.771
Aggregate Docket -0.068 1) 0.085 I) 0.013
-1.423 1.144 0.297
2) -0.062 + 2) 0.094
-1.28 1.188
3) -0.243 +
-1.996
4) -0.012
-0.213
Docket parJudge 1) 0.984
0.677
2) 4.218 +
2.004
3) 1.050
0.408
4) -1.205
-0.593
Rptldg. 0.832 + 1.126 1.239 * 1) 0.441 1) 0.531 1) 0.441
2.481 3.122 3.122 1.173 0.762 1.173
2) 1.357 2) 1.277 * 2) 0.762
3.278 3.191 1.052
3) 2.736 +
2.512
4) 1.232 *
2.595
Pleading standard 0.963 6 0.622 6 0370 * 0.444 * 1) 0.970 # 1) 0.057 1) 0.990 6
5.752 3.754 2.948 3.222 5.364 0.230 5.383
2) 0.964 2) 0.448 * 2) 0.635 +
5.156 # 3.223 2.181
3) 0.577 +
2.049
4) 1.256 #
5.558
Observations _ 167 167 167 167 167 167
Notes: See Table 9
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Table 13
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Univariate Regression Analysis
(Excluding Minimalist Decisions)
Dichotomous Regesions Polytomou Reg"emsioas
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Clinton -1.865 1) 1.226 1) 0.248
-2.433 1.755 0.638
2) -1.770 # 2) 1.347
-4.278 1.858
3) -1.543
-1.417
4) -1.744 #
-3.604
Bush 1) -6.855 8 1) 0.881
-6.296 1.588
2) 0.116 2) -6.637 #
0.199 -5.767
3) -7.718
-0.2358
4) 1.358
1.906
Reagan 1) -1.005 1) -0.041 1) -1.005 +
-2.524 -0.056 -2.524
2) 0.211 2) 0.835 + 2) -0.48'2
0.526 2.217 -0.634
3) 0.617
0.878
4) 0.211
0.450
Carter 1) 1.563 + 1) 1.565 +
1.986 1.988
2) 0.315 2) -5.438
0.337 -0.102
3) i.415
1170
4) -6.953 #
-5.908
Johnson 1) -8.164 1 ) -9.873 8
-5.724 -6.924
2) 0.315 2) -9.190
0.825 -0.170
3) -8.037
-0.131
4) 1.214
0.847
Democrat -1.377 1) 0.885 1) 0.485
-2.311 1.272 1.295
2) -1.312 # 2) 1.121
-3.399 1.552
3) -0.959
-L149
4) -1.182 +
-2.550
Republican 1.377 1) -0.885 1) -0.485
2.311 -1.272 -1.295
2) 1.312 # 2) -1.121
3.399 -L552
3) 0.959
1149
4) 1.182 +
2.550
S.D.N.Y. 1) 0.016 1) 0.924
0.015 1.790
2) -8.835 # 2) 0.532
-13.582 0.468
3) -8.363
-0.185
4) -8.452 #
-IL574
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Table 13
(Continued)
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Univariate Regression Analysis
(Excluding Minimalist Decisions)
Dichotomous Re _ _sions Polytomou Regessions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model I Model 2 Model 3
N.D. Cal. 1) -5.807
-0.138
2) 1.724 #
,3.430
E.D. Pa. 1) -6.071 0 1) 0.524
-5.411 0.694
2) -0.433 2) -6.676 #
-0.533 -5.494
3) -8.067
-0.174
4) 0A93
0.523
C.D. Cal. I) 0.087 1) -7.016 1) 0.087
0.094 -0.110 0.093
2) -8.248 # 2) -8.725 # 2) -6.930
-8.827 -10.176 -0.115
3) -8.629
-0.134
4) -9.073 8
-9.631
D. Mino. 1) 0.086
0.092
2) -5.259
-0.086
3) 1.415
1.170
4) -6.995 #
-7.425
Tech Intensity 2.278 + 1) -1.987
2113 -0.550
2) 2.179 *
2.946
TechfJudge 1) -2.222
-0. 726
2) 11.253 *
2.817
SFCA Docket 1) -0.011
-0.745
2) -0.012 +
-1.989
Aggregate Docket -0.182 * 1) 0.108 1) 0.007
-2.456 1.263 0.128
2) -0.175 * 2) 0.112
-2.337 1.246
3) -0.280 *
-2.212
4) -0.105
-1.155
Rptldg. 1.107 * 1.313 * 1) 0.367 1) 0.360 1) 0.367
2.367 2.477 0.977 0.517 0.977
2) 1.286 * 2) 1.341 # 2) 0.539
3.106 3.351 0.744
3) 2.736 +
2.512
4) 0.876
1.844
Carp. 1) 7.735 # 1) -0.109
7.151 -0.255
2) 0.387 2) 7.409 #
0.917 6.695
3) 0.217
0.255
4) 0.441
0.848
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Table 13
(Continued)
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Univariate Regression Analysis
(Excluding Minimalist Decisions)
Dichotomous Relressions Polvtomous Regios
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Public Int. 1) -6.855 # 1) -0.161
-6.242 -0.279
2) 0.116 2) -7.626 8
0.238 -6.766
3) 0-501
0.571
4) -0.511
-0.859
ABA Rank 1) 0.956 + 1) 0.955 +
2.461 2.461
2) -0.105 2) -0.105
-0.267 -0.139
3) -0.105
-0.153
4) -0.105
0.231
Pleading Standard 1) -8.328 N 1) 0.267
>20 1.455
2) 0.254 2) -6.756 #
1.827 >20
3) 0.374
1.327
4) 0.397
___________ __________ __  _____ ___________________________ 1.758
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 
101
Notes: See Table 9
Table 12 also reports results for a "Pleading standard" explanatory variable
that assumes a value of one through five, depending on the interpretative
standard characteristic of that judge, as described in our five-way
categorization of interpretive standards. 238 Although this variable is significant
in every regression, these correlations should be greatly discounted because the
Pleading standard variable is constructed in a manner that bears an inherent
correlation with the outcome variable: every value of one (Satisfies Highest)
for the Pleading variable will correlate with the motion to be denied and every
value of five (Fails Lowest) for the Pleading variable will correlate with the
motion being granted. We present these data in Table 12 primarily for
purposes of contrast with the results presented in Table 13.
Table 13 repeats the same analysis as in Table 12, but on a sample that
excludes all minimalist observations (Fails Lowest or Satisfies Highest) on the
theory that only cases in which a judge actually resolves the interpretative
dilemma can be viewed as providing useful information about the relationship
between interpretive conduct and the model's explanatory variables. Here,
Models 1 and 2 provide no useful information because, by construction, they
cannot operate without the inclusion of minimalist observations. Dichotomous
Models 3 and 4 are now very sparse, and explanatory relationships are most
238. Seesuprap. 686.
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apparent in the polytomous regressions.
The RptJdg variable is now significant with a positive coefficient in all five
operative regressions. This again suggests that the more frequently a judge
rules on cases in our sample, the more likely the ruling will be pro-defendant.
The Northern District of California Cluster, however, loses most of its
explanatory force. This pattern suggests that judges in the Northern District
frequently express pro-defendant results by deciding that cases are so poorly
pled that they fail the weakest interpretation of the standard.
Political variables and a new set of district court variables now appear to be
consistently significant in the polytomous regressions. In particular, the
Democrat variable appears with a negative coefficient in three of the five
operative regressions, indicating that judges nominated by Democratic
presidents who take a stand on the interpretative issue tend to rule in favor of
plaintiffs. The results for the Republican variable are identical, but with the
signs on the coefficients reversed, indicating a precisely equal and opposite
tendency for judges nominated by Republican presidents to take a pro-
defendant stance when they actually take a position on the interpretive issue?39
This pattern suggests a political inclination in the resolution of motions, even if
there is no political inclination in the selection of an interpretive standard,
provided that the data are viewed from a univariate perspective.
The results for individual presidents are not as clean. The signs on all
statistically significant Clinton and Johnson coefficients are negative,
indicating a pro-plaintiff tropism for these Democratic presidents. There is,
however, a positive coefficient on two of the statistically significant Carter
coefficients, but one of those is offset by a far more powerful negative
coefficient suggesting a strong aversion to the most pro-defendant ruling in
Polytomous Model 3. On the Republican side, Bush and Reagan coefficients
also occasionally appear as negative.
As for district court effects, the Central District of California now appears
to avoid strongly the most pro-defendant outcomes in three of the model
specifications, and the Southern District of New York displays the same
tendency in two specifications. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania appears to
avoid intermediate results in two specifications, while the Northern District of
California is the only court to display a statistically significant tendency to
adopt the most pro-defendant outcomes.
The Aggregate Docket variable is now significant in four of the five
operative regressions, and always with a negative coefficient. However, for
reasons already explained, this correlation reflects a tendency among the
"Other" districts to adopt pro-plaintiff rulings rather than a docket effect?40
239. The result is a direct consequence of the fact that the Democrat and Republican
variables are perfectly negatively correlated.
240. See supra p. 712.
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The Docket per Judge variable, which is significant in only one regression, and
there with a positive coefficient, is again consistent with our prior interpretation
of the data.2 4 1
Individual judicial characteristics, such as corporate and public interest
background and ABA ranking, now appear for the first time to be significant
with any discernable pattern. The statistically significant coefficients on the
Corp variable are both positive, while the statistically significant coefficients
on the Public Int variable are both negative. This pattern suggests, as initially
hypothesized, a tendency by judges with corporate backgrounds to rule in favor
of defendants and a tendency by judges with public interest backgrounds to rule
in favor of plaintiffs. This tendency, it should be emphasized, arises even
though there is no corresponding pattern in the articulation of interpretive
standards. The ABA Rank variable appears with a statistically significant
positive and negative coefficient in two regressions, and we draw no inference
from that conflicting pattern. The RptJdg variable is statistically significant in
five regression specifications and always with a positive coefficient. This
pattern, which is identical to the pattern observed in the interpretive standard
regressions, suggests that the more frequently judges in our sample rule on
motions the more likely they are to rule in defendant's favor. The univariate
results are thus consistent: The more frequently judges confront the question,
the more likely they are to adopt pro-defendant interpretations of the "strong
inference" standard and the more likely they are to rule in defendants' favor.
The Pleading standard variable is significant now in only two
specifications, and both times indicating a strong negative tendency toward an
intermediate form of ruling; that is, the stricter the pleading standard, the more
likely it is that a motion to dismiss will be granted or denied in its entirety. As
Table 3 illustrates, however, there are only nine such rulings in the database,
and it is difficult to conclude from this observation that the selection of an
interpretive standard has a powerful correlation with the resolution of the
motion to dismiss when the court avoids a minimalist interpretive style. These
findings do not, in our view, strongly support the conclusion that the selection
of an interpretive standard has a significant influence on the outcome of the
litigation.
C. Multivariate Analysis
In addition to these univariate analyses, we conducted a series of
multivariate forward stepwise regressions in order to identify the subsets of
variables that are statistically significant in explaining the pattern of variation
in the selection of the interpretive standard and in the resolution of the
241. Id.
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underlying motions to dismiss 2 4 2 We also applied these techniques to
determine whether the selection of a pleading standard is statistically
significant as an explanatory variable in the resolution of the motion to dismiss.
In running a forward stepwise regression, our algorithm begins by
searching for the single explanatory variable that generates the highest
correlation with the given dependent variable. Our algorithm then continues to
add individual explanatory variables, in a sequence of descending contribution
to the statistical significance of the overall regression equation, until the
addition of the next most significant explanatory variable no longer contributes
to the explanatory power of the overall regression. In many cases, the addition
of a new variable will contribute to the overall statistical significance of the
equation, but because of a correlation with a previously included explanatory
variable, the previously included variable loses its statistical significance on an
individual basis. Under those circumstances, we do not omit those insignificant
variables (which were significant in earlier stepwise iterations) from our
reported results. Accordingly, our reported results include statistically
insignificant coefficients on variables that were statistically significant in
earlier stepwise iterations of the model.
I. Interpretive standard regressions.
Tables 14 and 15 report the results of multivariate forward stepwise
regressions that search for the set of explanatory variables most significantly
related to the selection of an interpretive standard. Table 14 reports results for
regressions ran on the All Observations dataset. Table 15 reports results for the
same regressions run on the smaller Individual Judge sample. The linear
combination of the coefficients reported in each regression and the variables
are log-likelihood ratios.2 4 3 The tables report the coefficients of all variables
that are statistically significant at any stage of the forward stepwise regression
procedure, even if they are not statistically significant at the conclusion of the
process. In the polytomous regression, each coefficient reports the log-
likelihood of the corresponding sequential categorization relative to the
baseline dependent variable categorization.
Evidently, given the size of Tables 14 and 15, a large number of
explanatory variables display statistical significance at some point in the
stepwise regression procedure. If, however, we focus attention only on
variables that are statistically significant in at least three of the final stages of
242. For a description of forward stepwise regression techniques and for an explanation
why we did not rely on backward stepwise techniques, see the Statistical Appendix at
http://law.stanford.edu/Iavreview/gp2OO/1*
243. For an explanation of log-likelihood ratios, see the Statistical Appendix at
http://law.stanford.edu/lawreview/gp200l/.
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the stepwise regression specifications in either sample, a relatively focused and
coherent story emerges.
Presidential variables are statistically significant, with the Carter, Ford, and
Nixon variables displaying the most consistent significance. The coefficients
are dominantly negative, indicating that judges appointed by these three
presidents tend to adopt pro-plaintiff interpretations, even though two of the
presidents are Republican and one is a Democrat. This pattern suggests that the
identity of the nominating president, rather than the simple party affiliation,
may be the salient explanatory factor. This pattern is also consistent with the
hypothesis that more senior judges are more likely to adopt pro-plaintiff
perspectives. Although the Clinton, Bush, and Reagan variables are significant
only in the All Observations sample, and then only in a small number of the
final stages of the regression, the Clinton coefficient is uniformly negative and
the Bush and Reagan coefficients are uniformly positive. This pattern is
consistent with the political hypothesis that Clinton nominees are likely to be
pro-plaintiff and Bush and Reagan nominees are likely to be pro-defendant.
The inference is weak, however, because it is so contingent on the
specifications of the dependent variable and on the sample used to test the
hypotheses.
Beyond these observations, the situation becomes more complex. The
district court in which the case is decided can be a statistically significant
factor. In the All Observations sample, the Northern District of California and
District of Minnesota variables are statistically significant in six and five
regression specifications respectively. Each variable displays dominantly
positive coefficients, suggesting pro-defendant tendencies. In the Individual
Judge sample, however, the Northern District of California variable is
significant in only one specification, while the District of Minnesota variable
retains significance in four specifications, again with dominantly positive
coefficients. This pattern suggests that repeated decisions by a small number of
judges in our sample are responsible for driving the apparent significance of the
Northern District of California variable in the All Observations sample.
Moreover, because Minnesota decisions account for less than five percent of
either sample, the practical significance of that variable is limited.
The size of the Docket per Judge variable is statistically significant in three
specifications in the Individual Judge sample. The coefficients on the Docket
per Judge variable are uniformly positive. At the same time, the Tech/Judge
variable is significant and positive in three specifications in the Individual
Judge sample, while the RptJdg variable is significant and negative in four
specifications.
Viewed independently, these findings provide support for a "docket
control" hypothesis suggesting that busier courts, measured on a docket-per-
judge basis, are more likely to adopt a pro-defendant interpretation of the
statute. These findings also suggest that the more frequently judges view
[Vol. 54:627
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technology cases, the more likely they are to adopt pro-defendant
interpretations of the statute. At the same time, however, the data do not
support the "familiarity breeds skepticism" argument because the significant
coefficients on the RptJdg variable are negative.
This interpretation of these coefficients is, however, called into question
once we recognize that in three of the four regression models in which the
RptJdg variable is significant and negative, the Docket per Judge and/or the
Tech/Judge variables are positive and significant. The opposite signs on the
RptJdg variable on the one hand, and on the Docket per Judge and Tech/Judge
variables on the other, may thus reflect an interaction effect. If so, the "docket
control" and "technology exposure" hypotheses may be correct, but the model
may exaggerate the significance of those variables in cases involving judges
who issue more than one decision in our sample.
Table 14
Pleading Standard
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regression Analysis
(All Observations)
Dichotomous Repressions Poltonous Regessions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Clinton -0.776 -1.005 + 0.842 -1.134
-1.710 -2.340 1.547 -1.771
-0.822 -0.057
-1.785 -0.079
-1.594 +
-2.081
-1.604 +
-2.331
Bush 0.301 2.155 +
0.42) 2.050
Reagan 1.433 +
2.120
Carter -2.957 + -4.743 * -3.990 + -25.707 # -23.394 -25.975 # -106.493 # -0.408
-1.993 -2.693 -2.565 >20 -0.166 >20 >20 -0.425
-50.366 0 -4.386 + -25.116 #
>20 -2.600 >20
-35.800 #
>20
-3.953 +
-2.174
Ford -8.352 60.076 ft 164.206 # -11.955 #
-0.154 >20 >20 >20
-20.497 0 -41.124 # 37.660 #
>20 >20 >20
-6.728 #
>20
-10.642 #
>20
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Table 14
(Continued)
Pleading Standard
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regression Analysis
(All Observations)
Dichotomous Regressions Polvionous Regressions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Nixon -2.530 + -1.337 -26.047 # -26.572 -34.087 # -0.023
-2.260 -1.482 >20 -1.067 >20 -0.019
-63.757 # -40.544
>20 >20
-38,585
>20
-1.996
1 -1.234
Johnson 1.246 4.650 +
0.747 2.214
Other 7.838 -27.994 #
0.196 >20
3.042 #
>20
Magistrate -9.494 -9.512 24.135 # 27.783 6 -36.810 6
-0.238 -0.105 >30 >20 >20
-32.099 #
>20
-1.020
-0.976
-37.935 #
>20
N.D. Cal. 3.710 6 4.209 # 10.845 # 11.928 -4.223 6 -11.736 19.440 #
4.785 4.102 >20 0.058 >20 -0.014 >20
37.391 6 4.470 6 -3.763 6
>20 >20 >20
22.347 #
>20
23.066 #
>20
S.D.N.Y. 2.311
1.893
-0.256
-0.131
N.D. Ill. -2.540 * -1.325 -7.392
-2.871 -1.043 -0.062
D. Mass. 42.191 # 175.767 6 -22.873 6
>20 >20 >20
42.167 6 174.044 6 31.671
>20 >20 0.119
30.946
0.117
15.615
0.022
D. Minn. 2.302 + 21.796 # 29.909 6 -7.672 # -91.448 6
2.525 >20 >20 >20 >20
47.891 # 1.951 +
>20 2.132
Other 0.441 1.760 1.650
0.664 1.870 L868
3.018 +
2.279
SFCA per Judge 0.616 1.262 + -0277
1.771 2.555 -0.657
0.803
1.703
Aggregate Docket -0.094 -0.273 +
-1.511 -1.994
Tech Intensity 8.121 6.811 #
1.549 3.480
High Tech -0.852 -1.202 + -0.712 -0.622 -0.539
-1.603 -2.340 -1.781 -1.525 -0.914
-0.881
-1.963
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Table 14
(Continued)
Pleading Standard
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regression Analysis
(All Observations)
Dichotomous Regressions Polytomous Regresions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Tcch'Judgc
Corp. 1.159 1.391
1.699 1.345
Prosec. 0.859 0.805 + 1.455 +
1.861 2.152 1.985
0.153
1 1 1 ___0.2059 1
MultCas, 0.719 -0.497 0.002 -1.854 + 0.190 0.604 + 0.778
1.465 -1.898 0.006 -2.035 0.647 2.286 1.337
-1.512 0.268 1.203 +
-1.849 -0.933 2.040
-0.207
-0.284
0.525
0.871
Observations 167 167 167 167 101 1 101 167 167
p-value for Model 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Significance
Notes
I1) Chi-Square statistics appear in italics below coefficient values
2) + denotes statistical significance at the 5% confidence level
* denotes statistical significance at the 1% confidence level
H denotes statistical significance at the 0.1% confidence level
Table 15
Pleading Standard
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regression Analysis
(Individual Judge)
Dichotomous Regressions Pol tomous Regressions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Carter -9.564 -11.624 -12.234 -10.682 -20.305 -54.650 # -32.462 8 0.2361
-0.130 -0.198 -0.083 -0.11 -0.202 >20 >20 0.252
-29A55 # -25.268 # -27.880 #
>20 >20 >20
-30.204 #
>20
-33.713 #
>20
Nixon -2.335 -12.836 -20.120 -25.848 # -23.501 # 0.536
-1.861 -0.043 -0.218 >20 >20 0.446
-27.645 # -2.056 -36.569 #
>20 -1.577 >20
-36.935 #
>20
-1.075
-0.68)
Other -9.264 1.716 -17.239 #
-0.119 1.280 >20
3.374
1.855
Magistrate -3.675 + 23.512 6 -34.948 #
-2.457 >20 >20
-36.287 #
>20
-0.415
-0.362
-29.862 #
>20
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Table 15
(Continued)
Pleading Standard
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regression Analysis
(Individual Judge)
[Vol. 54:627
Dichotomous Rteressions Pol bmous Regressions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
N.D. Cal. 3.182 +
2.668
E.D. Pa. -2.181
-1.690
D.Mass. 12.842 11.792 -11.810 35.784 # 25.044 N
0.142 0.055 -0.558 >20 >20
33.597 # 22.841 #
I >20 >20
S.D.N.Y. -1.275 3.349 +
-1.584 2.114
-0.782
-0.386
N.D. I1. -1.704 -17.699
-1.471 -0.19
D. Minn. 6.916 12.052 12.623 27.472 # -7.735 N -1.643 # -14.710 #
0.121 0.125 0.034 >20 >20 >20 >20
29.685 # 18.750 9 -11.325 A
>20 >20 >20
20.211 #
>20
19.166 #
>20
C.D. Cal. -12.685 -17.062 9
-0.045 >20
N.D.Tex. 40.815 # 15.220 9
>20 >20
-20.093 # -. 111 9
>20 >20
SFCA per Judge -0.454
-0.912
0.803
1.967
Aggregate Docket -0.212 * -0.207 -0.102
-2.771 -1.971 -1.252
-0.313 + 10.156 +
-2.495 1.361
Docket per Judge 7A02 8.370 + 6.527 +
2.980 2.598 2.379
6.221 5.107 +
High Tech -8.125 21.876
-1.442 0.611
Tech/Judge 2.105 9 7.271 + 0.730 -0A11
2.809 2.243 0.2870 -0.195
3A89 * -2.843
2.731 -0.769
0.906
0.392
2.663
1.269
Prosec. 0.937 1.337
1.915 1.833
0.711
1.833
Carp. -2.507
-1.672
MultCase -1A51
1 -1.290
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Table 15
(Continued)
Pleading Standard
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regression Analysis
(Individual Judge)
Dichotomous Regressions Poly tomous Regreions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model I Model 2 Model 3
RptJdg. 2.241 -1.182 + -1.257 + -1.454 -0.653 -0.579 2.356
1.805 -2.012 -2.117 -1.739 -0.803 -0.761 1.901
-2.301 + -1.588 + 2.314
-2.155 -2.277 1.800
0.918
0.716
0.565
_ 0.416
Obsevations 116 116 116 116 78 78 78 116 l16
p-value for Model 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Significance ____ _____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
Notes: See Table 14
2. Outcome regressions.
Tables 16, 17, and 18 report the results of multivariate forward stepwise
regressions that search for the set of explanatory variables that is most
significantly correlated with the resolution of the underlying motions to
dismiss.
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Table 16
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regressions
Pleading Variable Omitted
(All Observations)
Variable Dichotomous Rereions Polytomous Regessions
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Clinton 1.265
-0.529
__________ ___17M___ _-1.132
Bush 1.551 2.333 2.393
0.283 0.155
0.408 0.131
-12.977 #
>20
0.745
1.008
Reagan 0.87411.988
7.702 1162 -.72
Ford 0.253 -0.115 >20
14.732 #
>20
-7.2933 -7-1144
Magistrate -0.300 -0.122 -0.298
-13.127
-0.030
-1. 035 0.875
S.D.N.Y. -1.736 1.628
-0.479
-0.700
1.72.254 -f
N.D. Cal. 1.879 2.044
1.980
_________1.808
-9.900 -57 -10.667 -0.=
N.D. 11. -1.488 -0.161 -1.421 -0.1146 0.132
-14.280 t
>20
-0.709 0390+
SFCAJudge -1.511 2.433
-0.662 4 -0.627
-2.314 -1.499
0301
1.005
0382+
2.148
Tech Intensity 1.703. 71
1.106 4 -3.091
Tech/Judge 2.392 -0.6672.963 t
2.657
-0.020
Docket -0.404
0.092
1.209
-0.422+
-2.188
-0.053
___________________________________ ________ ________ -0.863
Docket per 
-3264
Judge 
-1.640
Judge -. 9
-1.550
MultCase -1.686
0. 1.0 1.866 0.26 0.818 0.190
RptJdg. 1.913 2.964 3.440 0.576 1.053 0.456
1.195 1355 0.859
2.764 2.853 1.109
2.966+
.52
0.938
1.829
Observations 167 167 167 167 1 167 167
alue for
, elSignificance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: Nee ITable 14
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Table 16 reports the results of regressions run on the All Observations
sample that do not include any variable that describes the pleading standard
selected by the court in that case. The only variable that is significant in more
than two regression models reported in Table 16 is RptJdg, a binary variable
that measures whether a judge has more than one decision in our database. The
coefficient on that variable is positive in five of the six regressions, indicating
that judges with more than one observation in the sample tend to rule in a more
pro-defendant manner.
The failure to include an explanatory variable that measures the pleading
standard selected by the court is potentially problematic. In particular, if the
underlying structural model is that the courts first select an interpretive
standard and then apply that standard in a consistent manner to the resolution of
the underlying motion to dismiss, then the exclusion of such an explanatory
variable generates an omitted-variable problem and the underlying model
would fail accurately to describe the underlying decision making process.
To test for this possibility we incorporate the independent variable
"Pleading," previously defined for inclusion in Tables 12 and 13. If the
pleading standard selected by the court has a statistically significant influence
on the resolution of the underlying motion, then the coefficient on the Pleading
variable should be positive and significant. Tables 17 and 18 address this
question from two perspectives. Table 17 reports regression results for the All
Observations sample with the Pleading variable included among the
explanatory variables. These results must, however, be interpreted with caution
because the Pleading variable is defined in a manner that already incorporates
information about the resolution of the motion. Specifically, to the extent that a
court adopts a minimalist approach and either dismisses or grants the motions
without articulating an interpretive standard, the resort to a minimalist standard
is already correlated with a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant outcome. Put another
way, as long as minimalist decisions are included in the dataset, the Pleading
variable is not truly an independent explanatory variable. With these
significant caveats in mind, Table 17 documents a positive, robust, statistically
significant correlation with the pleading standard and with the fact that a judge
has more than one observation in the sample.
Table 18 reports the results of regressions run over a constrained dataset
that excludes from analysis all decisions in which judges adopt minimalist
styles. It therefore reports a more valid test of the hypothesis that the selection
of an interpretive standard influences the resolution of the motion. The results
reported in Table 18 suggest that only the RptJdg variable is statistically
significant in more than two specifications of the model. The coefficients on
that variable are consistently positive, again suggesting a more pro-defendant
inclination from judges who decide more than one case in our sample. The
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pleading standard is statistically significant in only two specifications, both
polytomous, and in both cases with the expected positive coefficients indicating
that the stronger the pleading standard the more likely the result will favor the
defendants.
Table 17
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regressions
Pleading Variable Included
(All Observations)
Dichotomous Regressions Polomous Ree sions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Clinton 0.930
1.164
-0.627
-1.360
Bush 1.432 4 1.830 4 1.505 +
2.052 2.580 Z233
0.652 0.281
0.787 0.226
-12.550 #
>20
0.691
-0.795
Reagan 0.608 0.776
1.577 1.791
Carter 4 4
1.776 2.010
2.077 2.243
1.390
1.300
Ford 9.091 11.962 -0.549
0.185 0.079 -0.124
11.202
0.086
Magistrate -11.322
-0.049
S.D.N.Y. 1.070
1.774
-0.327
-0.439
N.D. 111 -7.219 -11.654
1 -0.253 1 -0.061
SFCA per -0.817 4
Judge -2.072
-0.041
-0.311
SFCA 0.010
Docket 1.726
-0.028
-1.363
0.023
1.129
0.015
1.181
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Table 17
(Continued)
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regressions
Pleading Variable Included
(All Observations)
Dichotomnous Regressions Pol tornous Regressions
Variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Aggregate -0.051
Docket -0.673
0.141
1.645
-0.511 +
-2.127
-0.054
-0.585
Docket per -3A35 -4.704 3.129
Judge -1.526 -2.229 1.548
-2.730
-1.380
MulCase -0.330 -0.354
-1.394 -. 391
Rptldg. 1.328 0.67 1.440 1.770 # 0.871 0.478 0.484
2.980 1.896 3.253 3.408 1.781 0.569 1.032
1.783 t 1.470 0.838
3.516 3.101 1.430
3.200*
2.698
1.311+
2.266
Pleading 1.097 0.562 t 0.367 0.380 + 1.131 0.227 0.985#
Standard 5.717 3.351 2.768 2.531 5.462 0.801 5.015
1.098 t 0.451 0.778+
5.167 2.908 2.384
0.553
1.733
1.276#
5.244
Obserations 167 167 167 167 167 167 167
p-%alue for
Modejl
Sip ifianc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: See Table 14
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Table 18
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
Multivariate Forward Stepwise Regressions
Pleading Variable Included
(Excluding Minimalist Holdings)
Variable Dichotonous Regressiora Polytomous Regessiona
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Bush 1.621 4 1.953
2.093 2.473
0.200 -27.999
0.212 >20
-18A96
>20
1.276
1.240
Carter 2.219 4 2.319
2.308 2.419
0.914 -22.265
0.636 >20
3.440
1.945
-11.675
>20
N.D. I1. -0.547
-0.573
-15.848 b
>20
S.D.N.Y. -2.028 4
3.492
Docket per Judge 5A88
1.993
-2A36
-1.037
ABA Rank 1.140
1.922
0.447
0.714
Public ht. -2.367
-1.827
1.695
0.725
MultCase 2.967
1.884
1.696
1.103
RptJdg. 1.293 1.084 -0.914 1.704
7.163 1.267 -0.691 2.507
2.009 4 1.797 0.273
2.502 3.230 0.224
4.277
3.073
2.514
3.064
Pleading Standard -0.199 1.207
-0.495 4.498
0.623 0.305
2.994 0.707
1.099 4
2193
1.633
4.688
Observations 101 101 101 T01 101 101 101
p-value for Model
Significance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
[otes: See Table 14
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D. Discussion ofMultivariate Results
We suggest that this statistical analysis of the district court data counsels
caution more powerfully than it supports any sweeping assertions about
patterns in the behavior of district court judges. As is apparent from the
univariate and multivariate analyses alike, the significance of individual
explanatory variables is highly contingent on the specification of the dependent
variable and the regression technique employed. Because there is no generally
accepted theory that argues for the superiority of any one model over the
others, any emphasis on regressions that tend to display statistically significant
relationships can reflect data mining rather than analytically meaningful and
robust statistical relationships.
With this very significant caution firmly in mind, we call attention to a
small number of patterns that are apparent in the data, while simultaneously
urging readers not to overinterpret these findings. In particular, the
multivariate data suggest that the more often a judge rules on cases in our
sample, the more likely the judge will issue pro-defendant rulings. This
tendency supports the observation that "familiarity breeds skepticism" when it
comes to resolving motions to dismiss. The data are not, however, as strong in
supporting the conclusion that the selection of a pleading standard is
statistically significant in determining the outcome of the litigation. Thus,
consistent with our analysis of the appellate court data, there appears to be
significant plasticity in the application of standards to facts, but there is a
tendency for more stringent interpretations of the pleading standard to be
correlated with pro-defendant outcomes.
When it comes to explaining the selection of the interpretive standard it
seems that judges with more senior status, having been appointed by Presidents
Carter, Ford, or Nixon, tend to adopt more pro-plaintiff interpretations. The
pro-defendant Northern District of California effect appears to be present only
in the All Observations sample because a large number of the most pro-
defendant decisions in that district were generated by a small number of judges.
Focusing on the Individual Judge sample, however, suggests that judges
who have busier dockets and who serve in districts with more technology cases
per judge tend to adopt pro-defendant interpretations. We thus suggest that the
popular perception that the Northern District of California tends to be pro-
defendant in interpreting the "strong inference" standard is actually a reflection
of the fact that the Northern District tends to have a large technology docket
and a busy civil docket, rather than a reflection on the inclinations of the
individual judges who sit on that bench.
The fact that the RptJdg variable is statistically significant and negative we
believe reflects an interaction effect with the Tech/Judge and Docket per Judge
variables. Thus, rather than refuting the "familiarity breeds skepticism"
conclusion suggested by the univariate analysis, the RptJdg variable, which
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would also capture a Northern District of California effect because of the
disproportionate presence of "repeat judges" in that district, acts to moderate
the effects of the Tech/Judge and Docket per Judge variables.
If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that judges in districts that have a
large number of technology cases per judge, and with a large docket load per
judge, tend to adopt pro-defendant interpretations of the standard. These
findings are consistent with the "technology is different" and "docket control"
hypotheses suggested earlier in the analysis.
These multivariate results also suggest that many variables that appeared to
be significant in the univariate analysis do not retain their significance in
multivariate regression. While this result is hardly surprising from a statistical
perspective, it is valuable to underscore here because much of the "common
wisdom" about judicial tendencies in the area of securities fraud litigation is
driven by impressions that are, at best, consistent with a subjective univariate
impression of the data. As the preceding analysis suggests, those impressions
are probably deceptive.
